Challenges and opportunities in the construction of alternatives to neoliberalism : the Hemispheric Social Alliance and the Free Trade Area of the Americas process by Saguier, Marcelo I
University of Warwick institutional repository: http://go.warwick.ac.uk/wrap
A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD at the University of Warwick
http://go.warwick.ac.uk/wrap/1181
This thesis is made available online and is protected by original copyright.
Please scroll down to view the document itself.
Please refer to the repository record for this item for information to help you to
cite it. Our policy information is available from the repository home page.
Challenges and Opportunities in the 
Construction of Alternatives to Neo- 
Liberalism: 
The Hemispheric Social Alliance and the 
Free Trade Area of the Americas Process 
by 
Marcelo 1. Saguier 
A thesis submitted in partial fulf ilment of the requirements for the 
degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Politics and International Studies 
University of Wanvick, Politics and International Studies Department 
- August 2006 - 
CONTENTS 
Acknowledgments 5 
Summary 7 
Abbreviations 8 
Introduction 
Theoretical approach 16 
Methodology 20 
Contribution 31 
Chapter structure 32 
Overview of the FTAA process 37 
Regional integration initiatives in the Americas 38 
Chronological overview of the FTAA process 42 
Conclusion 59 
Understanding the FTAA process 61 
Neo-realism and neo-mercantilism 63 
Strengths of neo-real ism/neo-mercanti I ism 69 
Shortcomings of neo-real ism/neo-mercantil ism 70 
Neo-liberal institutionalism 72 
Strengths of neo-liberal institutionalism 79 
Shortcomings of neo-liberal institutionalism 80 
Critical approaches 82 
Strengths of critical approaches 91 
Shortcomings of critical approaches 92 
Conclusion 93 
A political process approach 96 
Recapturing the agency of social movements 97 
The importance of resources for mobilisation 102 
Political opportunity structure 106 
Political opportunity factors: 
the Americas as a transnational political space 112 
a. Alignments with other political actors 113 
b. Access to political institutions 117 
c. Divisions of the elite 122 
d. Inter-subjective meanings 126 
Conclusion 136 
2 
The hemispheric alignment of multi-sectoral coalitions 138 
Antecedents to the HSA 139 
The creation of the HSA: towards a common hemispheric vision 141 
Power in numbers: the Continental Campaign against the FTAA 155 
The HSA as an instrument or and agent for social change? 
The challenge of participation with autonomy 163 
Conclusion 175 
Exposing the undemocratic nature of the FTAA process 179 
The unfulfilled promise of democratic governance in the Americas 181 
The Santiago Summit of the Americas 184 
The FTAA Trade Ministerial Meeting in Toronto 188 
The FTAA Committee of Government Representatives 
on the Participation of Civil Society 191 
The Qudbec Summit of the Americas and its aftermath 195 
Liberating the text of the FTAA draft agreement 202 
The other debate: 
organising popular consultations on the FTAA project 205 
Conclusion 212 
Divisions in the ruling elites: 
The decline of the neo-liberal consensus 215 
Signs of disruption 217 
Governability under fire: political instability sweeps the region 225 
The stagnation of the FTAA negotiations 231 
Bilateral Free Trade Agreements: moving targets 235 
Conclusion 239 
Framing the IFTAA': 
The discursive construction of an antagonistic other 241 
The FTAA as an unsustainable and undemocratic 
model of development 242 
The FTAA as a project of U. S. Imperialism 247 
The FTAA as "free trade" 257 
Conclusion 262 
Conclusion 265 
Contributions of the thesis 270 
Tables 
Table 1: FTAA Chairmanship 50 
3 
Table 2: FTAA Negotiating Groups 51 
Table 3: FTAA Negotiating Groups Venue 52 
Table 4: Networks that integrate the initial nucleus of the HSA 145 
Table 5: Social conflicts in Latin America (May 2000 - April 2004) 221 
Bibliography 276 
Annex: Social organisations part of the main HSA national chapters 
and affiliated regional networks 316 
4 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
It is often claimed that writing a doctoral thesis can be a very lonely and 
cumbersome process. Whilst this portrays many of the hard times of solitary 
work and intellectual puzzlement that led to the production of this thesis, it is 
also the case that the invaluable support of a group of people has also been a 
vital part of this process. In this respect, I consider the completion of this thesis 
to be the result of an inherently collective endeavour. 
I am indebted to Professors Jan Aart Scholte and Ben Rosamond for their 
tireless supervision of this project. The spirited drive of Jan Aart and his 
experience of researching the politics of global civil society was a fine 
complement to Ben's insight into the role of discourse in the construction of 
political identities and the regional integration processes. Nicola Phillips also 
played an important part in this supervision process during the early stages of 
the research. Her contributions are also much appreciated. Moreover, I would 
also like to express my thanks to Peter Burnham, Wyn Grant, Shaun Breslin 
and Dominic Kelly for their support at times when it was most needed. In 
different ways and at various times these people have all placed their trust in 
me and my project. 
This research project was made possible due to the financial support granted by 
the British Council Chevening Scholarship; the Centre for the Study of 
Globalisation and Regionalisation and the Politics & International Studies 
Department at the University of Warwick; the Centre for Mexican Studies at 
the University of Oxford; and the Society for Latin American Studies. In am 
grateful to these institutions. I am also thankful to a number of people in the 
Hemispheric Social Alliance who have facilitated access to information and 
contacts that were essential for this research. In particular, Gonzalo Berr6n, 
Graciela Rodrfguez, Marcela Escribano, Carlos Aguilar, Enrique Daza, Kjeld 
Jacobsen, Karen Hansen-Kuhn, Sheila Katz, John Foster, and others. 
Many other people also played a significant part in this research process. I am 
thankful to the constant encouragement of Diana Tussie and her untiring 
commitment to the understanding of the complexities of trade policy processes 
and their challenges for developing countries. I am also grateful for the 
friendship and stimulating discussions with Rosalba Icaza, Peter Newell, 
Santiago Acosta Ormaechea, Patricio Dalton, Constanza Buruc6a, Mike 
Nibblet, Dwijen Rangnekar, Teresa Bailach and Diego Lawler. 
This project would not have been possible without the unconditional support 
and affection received from my family. Particularly, the conviction of my 
stepfather Julio G. Devoto about the importance of education and intellectual 
inquiry; the deeply social sensitivity of my mother Cristina Viaila; the caring of 
my grandmother Beatrfz A. Padilla (and her glowing candies) and the 
5 
reassuring companionship of my brother Gast6n Saguier. Finally, I am greatly 
thankful to my sweet girlfriend, Sian Alsop. Without her flourishing love and 
enduring patience this thesis would not have been finished. 
6 
SUMMARY 
The Hemispheric Social Alliance (HSA) emerged in 1997 in reaction to the 
advance of a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) neo-liberal agenda. As a 
transnational coalition integrated by trade union organisations, social 
movements and NGOs from all over the continent, the HSA denounced the 
detrimental social, economic and environmental consequences of the FTAA 
project on the most vulnerable sectors of the populations of the Americas. This 
thesis examines the role of the HSA in the construction of counter-hegemonic 
alternatives to the FTAA project. The analysis encompasses the time period that 
starts with the formation of the HSA in 1997 until the halting of the FTAA 
process in 2005 and draws on the political process approach of social 
movement theory - particularly on its notion of political opportunity structures 
as factors conditioning the capacity of social movements to access and control 
political resources for the advancement of collectively defined political goals. It 
is argued that the actions pursued by the HSA to construct an alternative to the 
FTAA have led to moderate, albeit significant, results. Considerable progress 
was achieved in fostering a political climate of distrust and opposition to neo- 
liberalism throughout the Americas, which contributed to the stalling of the 
FTAA process in 2005. In spite of this, the HSA continues to face the challenge 
of building political alternatives that reflect and expand a commitment to 
deeper forms of democracy and sustainable development in the region. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This thesis examines the role of the Hemispheric Social Alliance (HSA) in the 
construction of political alternatives to the Free Trade Area of the Americas 
(FTAA) project. The aim is to explore the main challenges and opportunities of 
this endeavour in order to be able to reflect on ways to overcome the limitations 
and take advantage of the possibilities available to create alternatives to neo- 
liberalism through the articulation of multi-sectoral transnational coalitions. 
The analysis comprises the time period that starts with the formation of the 
HSA in 1997 until the halting of the FTAA process in 2005. 
At the Miami Summit of the Americas in 1994, thirty-four governments of the 
Western Hemisphere (all countries apart from Cuba) announced their 
commitment to create an FTAA stretching from Alaska to Tierra del Fuego. 
The FTAA project represents the most ambitious trade integration scheme ever 
attempted in history (Salazar-Xirinachs, 2001), but equally one of the most 
controversial and disputed ones. Originally promoted by the United States 
government in 1990 as part of the 'Enterprise for the Americas Initiative', the 
FTAA constitutes a key prong of the U. S. strategy of engagement with Latin 
America in the post-Cold War period. Unlike previous regional integration 
initiatives undertaken in the hemisphere, such as the Southern Common Market 
(MERCOSUR, 1991) and North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA, 
1994), the FTAA proposal takes place in a political context characterised by 
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growing scepticism towards the neo-liberal development strategy, and by the 
later coming to power of Left governments in many Latin American countries. 
The disillusion with neo-liberal reforms during the 1990s led to the rise of 
increasingly militant and organised sectors of civil society demanding the 
democratisation of trade politics in the region. 
The FTAA project does not account for the deep level of asymmetries that 
differentiate national and sectoral economies from around the continent. Critics 
have argued that only the most developed economies in the continent could 
benefit from the FTAA, particularly the most powerful economic sectors in the 
United States (Estay and Sdnchez, 2005; Sangmeister and Taalouch, 2003). 
Since the FTAA does not contemplate a compensation mechanism for the 
sectors that will invariably suffer at the hands of trade liberalisation, the 
establishment of this trade area will further exacerbate the already extreme 
asymmetries in levels of development between and across countries that make 
Latin America the most unequal region in the world (Berry, 1998; Cardoso and 
Helwege, 1992; IDB, 2003; O'Donnell and Tokman, 1998; Portes and 
Hoffman, 2003). In the absence of special and differential treatment for poorer 
economies in the FTAA, for all intents and purposes ( ... ) 'the development 
agenda was taken out of the trade agenda' (Ceara-Hatton and Isa-Contreras, 
2003: 42). 
In addition to its distributive implications, the type of hemispheric governance 
model that is proposed by the FrAA has also been subject to severe criticism. 
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Inspired by the NAFTA integration model, the FTAA would become an 
6economic constitution' (Gill, 2002) for the Americas, as it aspires to 
institutional i se an infrastructure of rules and disciplines to regulate socio- 
economic and political processes for the benefit of corporate capital. The 
imposition of this governance model would come at the expense of democratic 
sovereignty, the rule of law and the policy autonomy of states to promote 
sustainable forms of development (Anderson and Arruda, 2002; Barenberg and 
Evans, 2004; Hillebrand, 2003). 
The HSA emerged in 1997 in reaction to the advance of an FTAA neo-liberal 
agenda. As a transnational coalition integrated by trade union organisations, 
social movements and NGOs from all over the continent, the HSA denounced 
the detrimental social, economic and environmental consequences of the FTAA 
project on the most vulnerable sectors of the populations of the Americas. The 
initial drive that led to the formation of this coalition was the need to ensure 
that the FTAA project would not be merely a vehicle to advance a trade 
libcralisation agenda, which had already had such demonstrably negative social 
consequences in the region. 
The HSA does not promote a return to some romanticised protectionist view of 
the past. It understands that international trade can be beneficial if it helps 
develop national economies. Trade cannot be the end of hemispheric 
integration, but only a means to attain development. Contrary to the neo-liberal 
assumptions implicit in the FTAA project, the HSA opposes the belief that 
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markets alone can ensure the sustainable development of the Americas region. 
National and hemispheric public instruments must actively guarantee that trade 
integration contributes to an equitable distribution of wealth, deeper forms 
democratic sovereignty, gender equality, and preservation of the natural 
environment. 
To prevent the imposition of a new wave of neo-liberal reform through the 
FTAA process, the HSA set out to build consensus among the main social 
forces in the continent for an alternative agenda on development. This differs 
from the World Social Forum (WSF) process in Porto Alegre, Brazil, in which 
there is no expressed commitment to attain a common agenda or public 
declaration. The ongoing contributions of the HSA to the creation of an 
alternative agenda of sustainable development and economic justice are clearly 
laid out in its Alternativefor the Americas documents. These policy documents 
reflect the concerns of social organisations from across the continent working 
on issues of labour, human rights, environment, indigenous rights, gender, rural 
problems and religious faith. 
As a general principle, the HSA demands a balanced treatment of the needs of 
investors for rules with the development objectives of national economies. it is 
proposed that a desirable trade agreement should reflect the different levels of 
development that exist between countries in the region, and allow them to 
impose performance requirements on foreign investors in line with their 
particular development priorities (for example, by allowing them to protect 
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small and medium scale producers, and protect or exclude sectors of the 
economy that are considered key to their development). The FTAA should also 
guarantee that countries have the right to maintain food and nutritional security, 
for example, by excluding basic grains from trade liberalisation measures. 
While laws that are passed to protect public health, the environment, and other 
matters related to the interests and well being of the general public may 
potentially conflict with the rights of investors, the autonomy of states to pass 
legislation should be safeguarded. Furthermore, the HSA demands that the 
rights and privileges granted by the FTAA should be conditional to the respect 
of countries of basic internationally recognised workers rights, as established in 
the 1998 ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work. Low 
wages and poor working conditions should not be the main competitive 
advantage of a country's economy. The differential impact of trade 
liberalisation on women should also be addressed (HSA, 1998; 2002a). 
The actions pursued by the HSA to construct an alternative to the FrAA project 
have led to moderate, albeit significant, results. Considerable progress was 
achieved in fostering a political climate of distrust and opposition to neo- 
liberalism throughout the Americas, which contributed to the stalling of the 
FTAA process in 2005 (Sosa Iglesias, 2005: 28 1). 
The main claim of this thesis is that while successfully shifting the balance of 
power against the FTAA, the HSA continues to face the challenge of building 
political alternatives to neo-liberalism in the Americas that reflect and expand a 
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commitment to deeper forms of democracy and sustainable development. 
Theoretical approach 
It is often argued that the failure of the FTAA project was due to the unresolved 
differences between the governments of the United States and Brazil over 
issues of market access, agricultural subsidies, and rules on intellectual property 
rights, government procurements and services. This explanation is certainly an 
accurate description of one aspect of the hemispheric negotiations, but is not 
suflicient to understand the reasons behind the failure of the FTAA project. 
Other explanations need to complement the intergovernmental accounts of this 
process. In particular, there is a need for an account of the FTAA process that 
brings to light the continental resistance to this trade project exemplified by the 
HSA. The contestation of the FTAA initiative by hemispheric social movement 
coalitions is as much a part of the process as is its intergovernmental 
dimension. 
Much has been written on the challenge to neo-liberal globalisation posed by 
the emerging transnational forms of counter-hegemonic forces and resistance. 
Neo-Gramscian critiques offer powerful analyses of the potential long-term 
transformations of capitalism, and the potentially transformative force of such 
new forms of resistance in their pursuit for more egalitarian and just forms of 
globalisation (Cox and Schechter, 2002; Falk, 1995; Gill, 2003; Gills, 2001; 
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Harvey, 2005). 
However, it is not enough to recognise that a reconfiguration of social forces 
with the potential to transform social reality is taking place. It is also necessary 
to encourage further reflection on the ways in which this transformation can 
actually be achieved. While valuable, these perspectives are less helpful when it 
comes to exploring the more immediate challenges and opportunities that 
coalitions like the HSA face in their efforts to bring about concrete alternatives 
(Drainville, 1994; Morton, 2001: 255). There is a great need to theorise the 
agency of counter-hegemonic forces. 
In order to analyse the challenges and opportunities encountered by the HSA in 
its pursuit of counter-hegemonic alternatives to the FTAA project, this thesis 
draws on political process approach of social movement theory (Oberschall, 
1973; Tarrow 1994; Tilly, 1978; McAdam, 1982; McAdam et aL, 2001). This 
approach does not replace neo-Gramscian critiques of counter-hegemonic 
forces. The value added by a political process theory is its research interest in 
understanding the conditions that facilitate and hinder the rise of social 
movements and their degree of success in bringing about social change. The 
long terms significance of social movement struggles in terms of the pursuit of 
deeper forms of democracy, social and environmental justice are rightly 
identified by a neo-Gramscian analysis, but the political process theory is better 
equipped to investigate issues of social movement strategy. In this regard, both 
approaches can benefit from each other. 
17 
The political process approach is a middle-range theory. It is indeterminate 
about the reasons that drive social forces to contest each other. Class struggle is 
the fundamental origin of conflict from a Marxist perspective, while the 
struggle for the emancipation of women from oppressive patriarchal structures 
underpins a feminist perspective on conflict. Regardless of what may drive 
conflict, the main interest of a political process perspective is to explore the 
ways in which social forces pursue their interests irrespectively of the nature of 
their claims. 
In this regard, the study of contentious politics from this perspective can 
address organised class interests expressed by the struggle of trade union 
organisations over a different distribution of the benefits of production, or of 
the environmental movements pressing for new legislation to prevent the 
dumping of industrial waste in rivers. What is common to these examples is 
that, in order to be successful, both trade unions and environmental groups will 
attempt to augment their relative power vis-a-vis their contending forces by 
interacting with the favourable conditions created by a given political context. 
The political process theory approaches questions of strategy in terms of the 
capacity of the social movements to generate and control resources (material 
and/or political) for mobilisation. Opportunities to access and command such 
resources involve: the creation of a sense of solidarity among prospective 
allied forces; the opening of spaces of political participation where the interests 
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of marginalised social groups can be effectively incorporated in decision- 
making processes; confidence that their struggles will yield concrete results; 
and the articulation of a coherent discourse to ingrain a sense of political 
purpose, direction and collective identity. It is on the basis of these elements 
that the actions of social movements should be ultimately assessed. 
This theoretical approach stresses the analytical importance of opportunities 
available in the political context of social movements for the understanding of 
the choice and success of their strategies. Namely, this view of social 
movements emphasises their relational and interdependent nature with their 
respective political contexts. No political actors can be understood in isolation 
from the larger power struggles in which they are immersed, since their 
identities and possibilities are mutually constituted by virtue of their partaking 
in a process of political confrontation with political elites and institutions 
associated with a continuity of the status quo. The analysis of political conflict 
therefore becomes central in order to understand the ways in which social 
movements emerge and gain influence. Conflict not only permeates the 
interactions of social movements with ruling elites, but also the relations among 
the social forces and individuals that take part in social movement politics. 
In the case of the complex political dynamics of the FTAA process, conflict 
takes place between two opposing forces: the HSA efforts to protect and 
expand the social rights of the most vulnerable sectors in the pursuit of more 
participatory forms of democracy and sustainable development, and the 
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attempts of governments and corporate elites to introduce a set of trade rules 
and disciplines in the continent that will only benefit a reduced number of 
economic sectors at the expense of large social and environmental costs. 
While changes in the political context of the Americas lead to shifts in the 
strategies of the HSA, there is no determinism dictating the relation between 
structure and agency. The actions of social movements can also transform the 
prevailing conditions of the political context, therein contributing to open 
further political opportunities for mobilisation and thus making some strategies 
of resistance more viable than others. Moreover, the interaction of social 
movements with changes in the political context is mediated by the kinds of 
inter-subjective interpretations held by particular movements at different times. 
This combines the traditional emphasis of this theory on the rationalist 
explanations of social movement actions with a hermeneutical approach that 
stresses the importance of meanings and shared understandings. 
Methodology 
An assessment of the challenges and opportunities of the HSA in constructing 
alternatives to the FTAA can only be appraised when considering the extent to 
which the actions of the HSA have contributed to increase their access and 
control of the key political resources upon which the possibility of building 
alternatives is ultimately dependant. 
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The analysis identifies four political resources that have been central to the 
emergence and relative success of the HSA in building political alternatives to 
the FTAA. The conceptual isation of these resources is derived from the 
political process theory of social movements. 
The first of these resources concerns the autonomy of the HSA as a 
transnational force in its capacity to produce a hemispheric consensus among a 
broad range of social actors concerning a vision of development and integration 
alternative to the FTAA project. The extent to which the HSA engages many 
sectors in a debate on alternatives to the FTAA while securing internal cohesion 
in the coalition is regarded as a favourable condition for the pursuit of 
alternatives to the FTAA. On the contrary, the loss of control of this resource 
due to the loss of political momentum and leadership within the HSA is 
indicative of a relative decline of the transformative potential of the HSA to act 
as a transnational force to foster new bases of consensus against neo-liberal 
politics. 
The second resource involves the legitimacy of the HSA as a force of 
democratisation in the continent. The capacity of the HSA to act as the 
representative of the marginalised peoples of the Americas is dependent on the 
perception that the HSA exposes the exclusionary nature of the FTAA process 
and presses for the incorporation therein of other agendas and interests. In the 
absence of this legitimacy, the HSA would be regarded as nothing more than 
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the expression of a narrowly defined set of interests without any connection to 
the advancement of more egalitarian forms of development. 
The third resource is related to the capacity of the HSA to generate and sustain 
high levels of optimism that their struggle will successfully lead to the halting 
of the FTAA process and the undermining of neo-liberalism in the region. This 
resource is associated with the HSA imperative to maintain momentum in the 
mobilisation of social forces throughout the continent throughout extended 
periods of time. 
Finally, the fourth political resource is the discursive construction of a critique 
of neo-liberalism through the creation of interpretive frames on the FTAA. The 
normative meaning and political significance of this trade project, as well as the 
possibility of envisioning its alternatives, are largely dependent on how the 
HSA understands the FTAA. The extent to which the HSA was able to access, 
expand and control these political resources will be addressed in the empirical 
chapters of this thesis. 
Evidence indicates that the availability of such resources is both objective and 
thus external to the HSA, and inter-subjective and so internal to the coalition. 
The theoretical approach that is developed for this thesis assumes that there is 
an indivisible relation between objective and inter-subjective dimensions of 
social reality. This view is critical of a positivist ontology, which allows for a 
separation between object and subject. 
22 
Objective changes in the external political environment of the HSA can only 
affect the choices of actions undertaken by this coalition insofar as such 
changes are interpreted by the HSA in ways that are consistent with collectively 
held expectations. The generation of social expectations invariably involves the 
dimension of inter-subjective meanings that provide the HSA with its sense of 
historicised self-awareness. 
In this respect, evidence of the access and control of the HSA of political 
resources for the construction of alternatives to the FTAA points changes in the 
rearrangement of political forces in the Americas that are beyond the immediate 
control of the HSA (objective conditions) and also the prevailing interpretations 
that the HSA has about the nature of FTAA process and its place in it (inter- 
subjective conditions). 
The methodological approach employed for this project is participatory action 
research. The main characteristic of this methodological approach is that the 
relevant parties participate in the process of knowledge production - in this 
case, members of the HSA. They are involved in examining what they 
experience as problematic action with the purpose of changing and improving 
it. Participatory action research is not research which is hoped will be followed 
by action. It is action which is researched, transformed and re-researched within 
the research process (Freire, 1970; Wadsworth, 1998). The nature of this 
method demands that fieldwork to gather information is conducted 
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continuously throughout the entire duration of the research process and not 
simply at the begining as in more conventional approaches. Main problems and 
assumptions guiding the research process were identified in the early 
interactions with HSA activists. They were later revised in light of changes in 
the political context and their awareness by the HSA and once again 
reintroduced as guiding assumptions in subsequent interactions with the HSA. 
As a cyclical process, this was repeated many times throughout the entire 
duration of the research process. The objectives of this research project were 
presented to the HSA as a first step of a longer-term engagement with this 
coalition centered on examining the role of social movement coalitions in trade 
politics in the Americas. HSA activists agreed to participate in the generation of 
data for this thesis as they understood that their collaboration had direct benefits 
for their own political work. It is often the case in such coalitions that there is 
little time to reflect on their own experiences, victories and shortcomings. 
Activists in social movements are in most cases immersed in the everyday 
demands of their work. This leaves few opportunities to reflect and develop a 
much needed historical perspective of their own work. It is in this respect that 
this research project, which deals with the challenges and opportunities faced 
by the HSA in building alternatives to neo-liberalism in the region, was 
regarded by HSA activists as a necessary exercise for the improvement of their 
own strategies of mobilisation and coalition building. The links between 
research, participation and action becomes explicit. 
The method of participatory action research rests on the trust that was 
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developed with the many activists of the HSA throughout time. Without this 
trust access to information (sometimes confidential) would not have been made 
available. More importantly, trust was essential to be able to engage key 
members of the HSA in the systernatisation of their experiences, challenges and 
opportunities that led to the production of this thesis in ways that they could 
engage with this process as a means of contributing and enhanceing their own 
political work. In other words, it was clearly explained from the start that this 
project was not concerned with 'extracting' infon-nation from them for the 
purposes of academic research. The emphasis was always to work closely with 
them about their own experiences. In several ocasions some activists solicited 
copies of my work on the HSA. These were kindly circulated among them for 
feedback and comments. In retrospect I believe that this approach to research 
was the only one that is viable in order to learn and understand the intricacies of 
complex politics of coalition building. 
The main tools employed in the research methodology included the review of 
the scarce academic literature available on the HSA, analyses of public 
statements, internal documents and memos issued by the HSA, semi-structured 
interviews with leading HSA activists and direct observation of their main 
public demonstrations and internal coordination meetings. The defining 
characteristic of the HSA as a broad coalition made up of a wide range of social 
actors from across the Americas raises the methodological issue of what 
constitutes the approriate criterion to determine the representativity and validity 
of interviews as reliable sources of information. To address this concern, the 
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criterion adopted for this project's interviews take into account the degree of 
commitment and involvement of the activist to the HSA and the influence of 
each interviewee (from each member organisation) in setting the internal 
agenda and debates within the coalition. 
Firstly, the selection of interviewees prioritised those who have been involved 
in the HSA for the longest time. This has been important in terms of 
reconstructing the development of the HSA since its origins, drawing from the 
historical perspectives and experiences of its leading activists. Interviews with 
newer members of the HSA have been less useful in terms of building a sense 
of historical awarriess. Secondly, the interview process focused on the main 
activists from social organisations that have been playing a central role within 
the HSA. The HSA is not a monolithic organisation with a single voice or 
position. Neither is it pertneable to all the political views that exist within this 
already broad-based coalition. This research project engages with the inherent 
tensions between, on the one hand, the identification of common bases of 
consensus among the HSA members and, on the other hand, the plurality of 
agendas and perspectives that animate the internal political dynamics of broad 
coalitions like the HSA. In this respect, the interviews of leading activists in the 
HSA did not seek to find fixed positions which may alegedly 'represent' the 
overall view of the HSA on issues of trade integration, strategy, etc. On the 
contrary, the aim has been to identify the terms of the debate within the HSA 
(its boundaries) regarding these issues. In other words, it cannot be said that any 
of each individual interview represents the HSA as a whole, but represents only 
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identifiable positions within the internal debate of the coalition which gives its 
structrure, limits and possibilities. The interview process was carried out 
throughout the entire research project, starting in January 2004 and up to July 
2006. This has permitted the identification of changes and continuities in the 
internal debates in the HSA regarding their involvements with the FTAA 
process. 
Interviews and observation were carried out in HSA events such as the Third 
and Fourth Hemispheric Summits of Struggle against the FTAA held in 
Havana, Cuba (in January 2004 and April 2005, respectively); the Third 
Summit of the Peoples organised in Mar del Plata, Argentina (November 2005); 
the European Social Forum in London, U. K. (October 2004); and the HSA 
event Linking Alternatives 2: Social Encounter Latin America, Europe and the 
Caribbean, in the context of the EU-Latin America Summit in Vienna, Austria 
(May 2006). In different ways these venues have provided with valuable 
opportunities to gather information for the research project of this thesis, 
however the Hemispheric Summits of Struggle against the FTAA and the 
Summit of the Peoples in Mar del Plata were the most important venues. This 
has to do with the fact that these events have been the main organised 
gatherings in the Americas taking place during the time frame of this research 
dealing specifically with building resistance to the FTAA project and with the 
construction of a hemispheric bottom-up consensus on alternatives to neo- 
liberal integration. The high political profile and significance of these events 
ensured that most of the social organisations and networks critical of the FTAA 
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project were present. This was particularly the case Summit of the Peoples in 
Mar del Plata - the event organised by the HSA parallel to the official Summit 
of the Americas in which Heads of State from the hemisphere gathered to move 
forward the FTAA project among other issues that featured in the summit's 
agenda. The large turn out of these events, mobilising activists and 
organisations from the entire continent, faciliated the availability of 
interviewees from the HSA core organisations and from more marginal ones as 
well. 
In addition to these FTAA centred gatherings, other meetings organised by the 
HSA also provided valuable oportunities for interviews even if not dealing 
specifically with the FTAA or if taking place in the Americas. The origin of the 
HSA has been the opposition of the neo-liberal agenda of integration contained 
in the FTAA project. However, the HSA has also enlarged its range of topics 
and processes incorporating the the EU-Latin America relations and the World 
Trade Organisation (WTO) process. Likewise, since the start the HSA has also 
been involved in the World Social Forum (WSF) process and in its regional 
variants. Though being non-FTAA specific, such other meetings and events 
organised by the HSA were attended in most cases by the same group of 
leading activists that are invoved (or have been at some point) in the 
mobilisation against the FTAA process. In this respect they also served as 
valuable opportunities to interview these activists. Furthermore, additional 
interviews were also conducted at the offices of the 116seau Qu6bdcois sur 
l'Int6gration Continetale (RQIQ in Montreal, Canada, and via telephone 
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whenever this form of communication was more convenient. 
In addition to the interviews, these venues also provided conditions for valuable 
direct observation of important HSA poltical activities. Two kinds of activities 
were particularly relevant. First, observation of the HSA Hemispheric Council 
meetings that are held in large hemispheric gatherings where all its members 
are able to attend. The Hemispheric Council meetings constitute the higher 
instance of political articulation of the HSA and only a limited number of 
delegates from each member organisation are allowed to attend in order to 
ensure that the greatest number of organisations can be represented. The main 
political issues concerning the strategy and actions of the HSA are discussed in 
such ocasions behind closed doors. I was able to observe several such meetings 
at the Hemispheric Summits of Struggle against the FTAA in Havana and at the 
Summit of the Peoples in Mar del Plata. Observing the internal debates of the 
HSA was vital to undestand the main issues of concern faced by the coalition, 
its bases of shared consensus and divisive issues. 
Second, public demonstrations held as closing activities to the large 
hemispheric gatherings (mainly the Summit of the Peoples in Mar del Plata) 
also provided a good opportunity to observe the ways in which the HSA 
portrays itself publicly as the main hemispheric coordinator of struggles of 
resistance to the FTAA. This is important in so far as the 'internationalism' of 
this movement coalition is considered a central pilar of its continental strategy. 
The HSA takes great consideration that such kinds of events do not end up 
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being purely 'localised' in the specifics of domestic politics while loosing their 
hemispheric dimension and significance. Observing the politics of public 
spectacle of the HSA has been a necessary complement to the equally important 
emphasis given to the internal political dynamics of the coalition. In both cases, 
direct observation was carefully conducted in a way that my presence would 
not alter the unique dynamics of these activities - particularly in the case of the 
HSA Hemispheric Council meetings. 
The advantage of a participatory action research method is that it allows access 
into the internal debates and political dynamics of coalitions that would never 
be exposed publicly or even addressed formally within the coalition. The 
ethnographic quality of this method facilitates the development of the intimate 
knowledge required to make sense of the essentially fragmentary experience of 
the HSA. There is no one single history of the HSA but a shared narrative made 
up of various histories, perceptions and expectations. However, since none of 
these knowledges have been documented or systernatised, research of the HSA 
depends necessarily on a method that highlights the involvement of the 
researcher and the activists in a joined effort of analysis and continual 
assessment. 
The disadvantage of this kind of methodology has to do with the difficulty of 
detecting subtil changes in the perceptions and debates within the coalition. 
Activists are not necessarily unambiguous in their views and positions, many of 
which can often change or alternate with other views without necessarily being 
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explicit about it. In this respect, the possibility of detecting changes and 
continuities becomes more difficult when researching political processes that 
have taken place in short periods of time - unless, of course, it concerns a 
specific point of break such as a social revolution, crisis or others. The adoption 
of a long time frame for the research process to some extent facilitates the 
awareness of small changes of views and tendencies. 
Contribution 
The original contribution of this work to scholarly debate is threefold. Firstly, 
this research adds to the scarce empirical studies that are available on the HSA 
coalition (Doucet, 2004; Korzeniewicz and Smith, 2003; Marchand, 2005; 
Massicotte, 2004; Prdvost, 2003; Smith, 2004). It is only lately that scholarly 
research has begun to analyse how increasingly influential transnational social 
movement coalitions shape international political processes (Florini, 2000; 
Cohen and Rai, 2000: 7-8; Cook, 1998; Meyer, 2003; Riker and Sikkink 2002: 
18; Tarrow and McAdam, 2005: 121). 
In many ways, the HSA provides a unique and pioneering experience of 
counter-hegemonic resistance to neo-liberalism in the Americas. The broad 
base of support of this coalition covering such varied issue areas in several 
countries cannot be found elsewhere. There are simply no other networks on 
globalisation in the world comparable to the HSA (Anner and Evans, 2004). 
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What makes this coalition interesting is that it has served as a laboratory in 
which to explore the main challenges and opportunities faced by progressive 
sectors and movements seeking to build alternatives to neo-liberal globalisation 
by engaging in strategies of coordination and coalition that are built across 
borders. Systematic studies of multi-sectoral coalitions like the HSA do not 
exist (Veltmeycr, 2004: 1,23,34). In this sense the experience of the HSA in 
the Americas can illuminate and inspire a new generation of global social 
activism. This thesis aims to stimulate much-needed reflection on the role of 
transnational campaigns against free trade agreements as meeting points for the 
generation of political alternatives to neo-liberal globalisation. 
Secondly, the thesis adds to earlier initiatives to encourage academic dialogue 
between social movement theory and IRAPE theoretical approaches (Khagram 
and Sikkink, 2002; Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Smith et aL, 1997). This kind of 
encounter opens new research avenues to address the complex dynamics of 
world politics, moving beyond the reductionism of state-centric methodologies 
that have characterised both research traditions. 
Chapter structure 
The thesis adopts the following chapter structure. Chapter I provides an 
historical overview of the official FTAA process, from its initial stages at the 
First Summit of the Americas in Miami in 1994 to its virtual breakdown at the 
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Fourth Summit of the Americas in Mar del Plata in 2005. The FTAA agenda 
and the formal structure of the FTAA negotiations are introduced to highlight 
the main particularities of this integration process. 
Chapter 2 presents a review on the existing academic and policy literature on 
the FTAA process. It is claimed that the main theoretical approaches to the 
FTAA process - identified with classical and neo-realist, neo-liberal and critical 
traditions - overlook the role that counter-hegemonic coalitions like the HSA 
have in this integration process. In different ways, these literatures fail to 
adequately expose the extent to which the FTAA process is also driven by the 
resistance of trarisnational social forces in their efforts to contest the 
institutional isation of a corporate-led model of regional governance. The 
analysis of the role of the HSA in the pursuit of alternative forms of 
development requires an approach that can bring to light the centrality of this 
conflict as a constitutive driving force shaping the nature of the FTAA process. 
Chapter 3 introduces the political process approach to social movement theory 
to fill the gaps left by the existing literature on the FTAA process. It discusses 
the origin of this theoretical tradition that centres on recapturing the agency of 
social movements from the structuralism that anteceded its emergence in the 
1970s. Furthermore, it also reformulates the state-centric assumptions of this 
theory's methodology in order to analyse transnational social movement 
coalitions like the HSA that operate across border political spaces. The notion 
of political opportunity structure is introduced as a concept to address the HSA 
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relation with its political context of the Americas. The subsequent chapters 
focus on the different political opportunities provided by this hemispheric 
political context associated with the challenges and opportunities of the HSA in 
its construction of alternatives to the FTAA. 
Chapter 4 explores the political opportunity for the construction of alternatives 
to the FTAA project created by the formation of hemispheric coalitions of a 
broad range of social forces critical to neo-liberalism. It is claimed that the 
prospects of constructing an alternative to the FTAA project can be jeopardised 
by the risk of the HSA losing its autonomy in the face of allied Left-of-centre 
governments in Latin America. 
Chapter 5 addresses the political opportunity created for the HSA by its 
participation in the hemispheric mechanisms for civil society consultation 
established as part of the official FTAA process. It is argued that the official 
FTAA process has been insulated from the demands of many civil society 
organisations aiming to engage in a political debate with public officials on the 
implications of trade liberalisation for the prospects of sustainable development 
in the region. Instead, the negotiation process was tainted with a lack of 
transparency and provided no real conditions for public accountability and for 
the involvement of civil society in the definition of the FTAA agenda. This 
resulted in a radicalisation of civil society sectors throughout the Americas, 
which enabled the HSA to increase its legitimacy by exposing the undemocratic 
and exclusionary nature of the FTAA process and agenda. 
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Chapter 6 concentrates on the efforts of the HSA to expose the signs of a 
decline of the neo-liberal consensus in order to foster confidence and optimism 
that the establishment of the FTAA project could be effectively prevented. This 
sense of optimism permitted the HSA to sustain the mobilisation of critical 
sectors involved in the continental campaign against the FTAA while this 
process was still underway. 
Chapter 7 analyses the HSA's discursive construction of the FTAA project as 
an antagonistic 'other'. To do so, the chapter focuses on three distinct 
interpretative FTAA frames that are employed by the HSA. Their implications 
for the building of alternatives to neo-liberalism are carefully analysed. it is 
argued that the framing strategy was only useful for the mobilisation of 
opposition to the FTAA. Moreover, it limited the process of fostering a deeper 
understanding of an alternative approach to development. The FTAA was 
framed in ways that could not move beyond the short-term effectiveness of a 
populist rhetorical denunciation of American Imperialism. 
Finally, the conclusion recapitulates the main arguments of the thesis, and 
discusses the theoretical, empirical and normative contributions of this work to 
the study of transnational counter-hegemonic forces. It also provides a 
reflection of the benefits and limitations of a political process approach to the 
study of transnational social movement coalitions like the HSA that may be of 
interest to other research projects and transnational social movements. Further 
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research agendas are also suggested. 
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CHAPTER I 
Overview of the FTAA Process 
This chapter provides an overview of the evolution of the Free Trade Area of 
the Americas (FTAA) process from its beginnings at the Miami Summit of the 
Americas in 1994 to the Mar del Plata Summit of 2005. This sets the ground for 
a later review of the scholarly and policy literature on the FTAA in the 
following chapter. 
Although the FTAA project constitutes the latest and most ambitious 
integration initiative ever pursued in the Western Hemisphere, regionalism has 
been part of the political economy of the Americas during most of the twentieth 
century. The first section of this chapter will provide a brief account of the main 
experiences of sub-regional integration since the 1940s leading to the revival of 
new forms regionalism in the 1990s, of which the FTAA represents its latest 
and most unique expression. The second section presents the history of the 
FTAA process and agenda. The emphasis is placed on describing the 
progressive institutional isation of this hemispheric process. As a multi-actor 
process, the FTAA process is driven by interstate bargaining and also by 
business and civil society organisations and networks. 
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Regional integration initiatives in the Americas 
Regionalism is not a new phenomenon in the Americas. The literature on this 
subject distinguishes between 'old' and 'new' forms of regionalism. The first 
describes the sub-regional integration initiatives in the Americas taking place at 
different times since the 1940s. The latter, the new wave of regionalism, refers 
to the revival of regional integration policies during the 1990s. Bdlanger and 
Mace (1999) explain that there have been two contending paradigms of 
integration in the Americas that informed the successive initiatives of regional 
integration pursued since the 1940s: the Latin American and Pan- 
American ism/Hemispheric paradigms. 
The Latin American approach was based on the premise of a strategy of import- 
substitution industrialization (ISI), in the tradition of the Economic 
Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). The Central 
American Common Market (CACM), the Andean Pact (later CAN from 1996) 
and the Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM) were 
established during the 1950s and 1960s in accordance with such a statist and 
developmental approach. The creation of the Latin American Free Trade 
Association (LAFTA) in 1960 was a bold initiative based on a laissez-faire 
approach, which thereby deviated from the core concepts of the ECLAC. 
These regional initiatives eventually failed to yield economic development. The 
combined effects of the oil crises of 1973-1974 and the resulting protectionist 
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measures adopted by industrialised countries (in the context of a worldwide 
economic stagnation) contributed to the debt crises that affected Latin 
American countries from the beginning of 1980s. According to 1361anger and 
Mace (1999: 5) these events 'reinforced the inward-looking attitudes, and put 
an end to the spirit of cooperation needed for the give-and-take approach that 
could ensure the success of regional integration. 
On the other hand, Pan-Americanism has been the second paradigm of 
integration associated with the promotion of continental integration on the basis 
of the idea of a 'Western Hemisphere'. As initiatives led by the United States, 
foundational milestones of this approach to integration are: the signing of the 
Rio Treaty on collective defence (1947), the creation of the Organization of 
American States (OAS) in Bogotd (1948), and the later establishment of the 
inter-American Development Bank (1959). 
It has been argued that the emerging support of hemispheric integration was 
progressively undermined by the inconsistency of the United States' 
hemispheric policy towards Latin America, the U. S. unilateral interventions in 
the region and the absence from the hemispheric policy of a much-expected aid 
package (like the Marshall Plan). The diminishing consensus on the idea of 
hemispheric integration was later confirmed by the failure of the Alliance for 
Progress (1961) initiative by the United States, and by the little impact of the 
1967 Meeting of American Chiefs of State at Punta del Este to bolster 
hemispheric integration (1361anger and Mace, 1999: 5; Moss, 2001: 162-3). 
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Regionalism simply lacked the unambiguous and sustained support it required 
to succeed. This was explained by the fact that the United States prioritised the 
promotion of multilateralism (Bulmer-Thomas, 2001: 4). Towards the 
beginning of the 1980s, the old regionalism had reached its point of exhaustion: 
( ... ) both paths toward regionalism (the Latin American and the 
Pan-American) 
had come to a dead end by the early 1980s as was the case with regionalism 
elsewhere in the Third World, Latin American and Caribbean integration 
schemes had become empty shells, barely surviving. Hemispheric regionalism, 
for its part, was almost nonexistentý as Latin American governments had lost all 
faith in the OAS (Bdlanger and Mace, 1999: 6). 
In spite of the degree of scepticism towards regionalism that existed by the 
middle of the 1980s (Bulmer-Thomas, 2001: 1), a series of international and 
regional transformations were underway to create the conditions for a renewed 
commitment to regionalism. Firstly, the end of the Cold War finished with the 
4socialist' alternative, therein enshrining the North American-style capitalism as 
the only viable option for development and cementing neo-liberalism as the 
prevailing economic and political paradigm. Secondly, growing impatience 
with the slow progress of the GATT Uruguay Trade Round (1986-1993) 
contributed to the renewed interest in regional integration in the Americas 
(Bulmer-Thomas, 2001: 5; Echandi, 2001: 368; Tussie, 2003). Thirdly, the 
wave of democratisation in Latin America throughout the 1980s created the 
grounds for the affirmation of the Hemisphere as a community of shared 
democratic values. Capitalism and democracy became the tenets of an 
uncontested hegemony, with implications not only for regional developments in 
the Americas but for global political, economic and cultural processes. 
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New regionalism in Latin America was regarded as a means to overcome the 
problem of the debt crisis that affected most Latin American countries in the 
early 1980s, and as a means to avoid being left out of an emerging world order 
built around three blocs: the United States, Europe and East Asia (1361anger and 
Mace, 1999: 7). Unlike past experiences of regionalism in Latin America, new 
regionalism was not designed to promote import substituting industrial isation 
policies. Rather, it was intended to 'prepare LAC [Latin American and 
Caribbean] countries for the challenge of globalisation and to encourage 
integration of the LAC economies into the world system of trade and payment' 
(Bulmer-Thomas, 2001: 1). More importantly, in contrast to the 1960s, sub- 
regional integration during the 1990s 'became the main venue for "locking in" 
hard-fought macro-economic stabilization gains and for the institutionalizing of 
new liberal trade and investment initiatives' (Wise, 2003: 18). 
In this respect, reducing barriers to trade, controlling inflation, fiscal discipline 
and the stimulation of competition and foreign investment were central policies 
associated with the new policy framework of open regionalism (ECLAC, 2001: 
191-201). The 1990s were characterised by this new approach to regional 
integration as this period witnessed the reactivation of CACM, CARICOM, the 
Andean Pact, and the creation of new blocs as the MERCOSUR (Argentina, 
Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay), the Group of Three (Mexico, Colombia and 
Venezuela) and the Association of Caribbean States (ACS). 
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The wave of new regionalism in North America is associated with the quest for 
a deeper liberalisation agenda at the regional level on the part of the United 
States. It has been argued that the United States embarked in regional 
liberalisation as a response to the slow progress achieved at the multilateral 
level and due to the fears resulting from the decline of the country's 
competitiveness (Wise, 2003: 17). The establishment of the Canada-U. S. Free 
Trade Agreement (CUSFTA) in 1989 and later the signing of the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with Mexico and Canada in 1994 
were the first steps in this effort towards regionalism. 
Undoubtedly, the most important initiative of new regionalism in the Americas 
is the current project to create a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). If 
constituted, the FTAA would extend from Alaska to Tierra del Fuego, thereby 
representing, in a geographical sense, the world's largest experiment of 
economic integration (Estevadeordal, Goto and Saez, 2000: 2). Embracing a 
combined population of 800 million and a gross domestic product of $9 trillion, 
the FTAA would represent the most ambitious integration schemes in modem 
history (Salazar-Xirinachs, 2001: 280). In the following section we will review 
the FTAA process since its origins. 
Chronological overview of the FTAA process 
The announcement of the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative (EAI) by the 
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President of the United States George Bush on June 27 1990 formally opened 
the possibility of a free trade agreement extending from Alaska to Tierra del 
Fuego. The bases of the EAI were the promotion of investment, aid 
accompanied by debt reduction and the elimination of tariff and non-tariff 
barriers to trade throughout the Americas. One of the reasons attributed to the 
formation of the EAI is the need of the United States to secure the Latin 
American market in order to curve its trade balance problem in the context of 
the uncertain negotiations of the Uruguay Round of GATT (Moss, 2001: 164; 
Bulmer-Thomas, 2001: 5). 
Similarly, another factor is that the EAI constitutes an attempt on the part of the 
United States to strengthen its global influence in the context of an emerging 
post-Cold War order (Bdlanger and Mace, 1999: 7). Further, it has also been 
claimed that the regional turn in the trade policy of the United States was 
4somewhat accidental'. Namely, that the announcement of the EAI was not 
expected to translate into an exclusively hemispheric trade policy focus, as the 
policy priority of the United States remained at the GATT level (Fishlow, 
1999a: 28; Fauriol and Weintraub, 2001: 140). 
Regardless of what may have been the original intention behind the decision of 
the United States to engage with a regional approach to its trade policy, the 
subsequent events following the EAI marked the beginning of new period of 
hemispheric relations in which integration became a central policy issue. The 
establishment in 1989 of the CUSFTA (Canada-United States Free Trade 
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Agreement), and NAFTA in 1994 constitutes the first concrete step towards the 
establishment of a regional initiative in accordance with the Pan-American 
approach to regional integration led by the United States. 
The development of the FTAA project has been tied to the Summit of the 
Americas process (Summitry). The Summitry consists of an institutional ised set 
of meetings at the highest level of governmental decision-making in the 
Western Hemisphere created with the purpose of discussing common issues and 
seeking solutions to economic, social and political problems shared by all the 
countries in the Americas. It is at these summits that 'experiences are 
accumulated, a common language is forged and mandates for collective action 
are programmed, systematizing the new theoretical and practical references in 
hemispheric relations' (Summits of the Americas website, n/d). Their 
importance resides in their high public exposure, which is central to showing 
the committed attitude of the participating states to hemispheric cooperation. As 
Richard Feinberg (1998: 3-4) maintains, 'Summitry in the Americas is still in 
its infancy, but it has already become the predominant institution driving the 
relations between the United States and its neighbors'. 
Soon after the establishment of NAFTA, the United States government invited 
the heads of state and government of 34 countries in the Americas (with the 
exception of Cuba) to participate in the First Summit of the Americas held in 
Miami in December 1994. Latin American leaders warmly received this 
invitation even when the purpose and content of the meeting remained unclear 
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(with the exception of NAFTA, the Clinton administration had not seemed to 
have Latin America as a high priority of its foreign policy) (Moss, 2001: 164). 
Latin American countries were particularly interested in the trade dimension of 
this event (Phillips, 2003: 335), even if the summit agenda proposed a 
'multidimensional integration process involving issues in many areas of 
hemispheric cooperation' (1361anger and Mace, 1999: 7). Not limited to trade 
issues alone, the agenda comprised a hemispheric commitment to advance on 
issues such as democracy, human rights, civil society participation, capital 
market liberalisation, education, health, and sustainable development, and the 
combat of corruption, narcotics and money laundry. If the FTAA was merely 
one initiative out of twenty-three (Fishlow, 1999a: 29), it nonetheless became 
the bold centrepiece of the Miami Summit (Moss, 1998: 1; Serbfn, 2003: 87). 
At the Miami Summit of December 1994, all countries committed to reaching a 
hemispheric free trade agreement that was balanced, comprehensive, and 
consistent with World Trade Organisation (WTO) agreements. There was 
commitment to both agree on the FTAA by a single undertaking through the 
implementation of a target date of 2005, and to achieve substantial progress 
toward building the FTAA by 2000. No consensus was reached for a blueprint 
or precise plan on how to achieve this goal. However, governments agreed on a 
timetable for annual trade ministerial meetings intended to review the items 
discussed at the Summit, therein maintaining the momentum generated at 
Miami. The governments signed a declaration of principles entitled Partnership 
for the Development and Prosperity of the Americas and a plan of action 
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(Summit of the Americas, 1994). The Summit Implementation and Review 
Group (SIRG) was created in 1995 by the initiative of the United States' 
government in order to coordinate and review the implementation of the 
mandates contained in the Miami Action Plan. The responsibility of 
coordinating the work of SIRG rests with the government that hosts the 
Summit. 
The First Trade Ministerial Meeting took place during the following year at 
Denver, United States, on 30 June 1995. The purpose of this meeting was to 
prepare for the FTAA negotiations: 'We agreed to begin immediately at a work 
program to prepare for the initiation of negotiations of the Free Trade Area of 
the Americas (FTAA) in which barriers to trade and investment will be 
progressively eliminated. Negotiations will be concluded no later than 2005' 
(FTAA Trade Ministerial, 1995). Working Groups were established in order to 
collect information such as existing laws and regulations, tariff and non-tariff 
barriers, applicable effects of trade agreements entered into by each member 
country and recommendations for the negotiations (Moss, 2001: 167). The 
areas covered by these groups were: (1) Market Access; (2) Customs 
Procedures and Rules of Origin; (3) Investment; (4) Standards and Technical 
Barriers to Trade (TBTs); (5) Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS); (6) 
Subsidies, Antidumping and Countervailing Duties; and (7) Smaller 
Economies. Similarly, it was also agreed that four new groups would be added 
at the next Ministerial Meeting: (8) Government Procurement; (9) Intellectual 
Property Rights; (10) Services; and (11) Competition Policy. 
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A Tripartite Committee integrated by the Organisation of American States 
(OAS), the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) and the Economic 
Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) was created to 
assist governments in compiling inventories of laws and regulations, preparing 
studies and papers in the negotiating areas. 
Trade Ministers met for the second time in Cartagena, Colombia, on 21 March 
1996. On this occasion they assessed the technical work carried out by the 
seven Working Groups, and created the four additional groups whose 
incorporation had been delayed due to the reticence of Latin American 
governments to support the United States' initiative for their immediate 
inclusion (Moss, 2001: 168). The Vice-Ministers of Trade were assigned to 
supervise, evaluate and coordinate the progress of the Working Groups, and 
finally make recommendations at the next ministerial meeting as part of an 
effort to speed up the preparatory work prior to the launching of the official 
negotiations. Most importantly, at Cartagena the ministers discussed the 
possibility of making the FTAA compatible with existing bilateral and sub- 
regional agreements. Finally, it was also agreed to incorporate another Working 
Group at the next Ministerial Meeting on Dispute Settlement Procedures 
(FTAA Trade Ministerial, 1996). 
The Americas Business Forum (ABF) was organised prior to the Cartagena 
Ministerial Meeting (1200 members of the business community participated in 
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this event). Originally created by the representatives from the private sector 
after the Denver Ministerial Meeting (1995), the ABF became a permanent 
presence in all-subsequent ministerial meetings and was given official status by 
the hemispheric governments. Its main activities include: influencing the terms 
of reference of the negotiating committees; providing technical analyses and 
information on the strategic objectives and aspirations of the private sector; 
disseminating information on the process; and the establishment of the Business 
Network for Hemispheric Integration to foster links between the business sector 
and various organisations throughout the Americas (SELA, 2000: 30). Acting 
as an effective lobbying instrument, contributions and recommendations from 
the private sector were passed on to the Trade ministers. In contrast to the ABF, 
the initiative of the main trade union organisations from the continent to include 
a Labour Forum as part of the FTAA process was never received 
sympathetically, thus producing no results. This contributed to the search of the 
labour movement for alternative strategies of engagement with the FTAA 
process. 
On 16 May 1997 ministers met again at the Third Trade Ministerial Meeting at 
Belo Horizonte, Brazil. At this meeting, they agreed to recommend that 
negotiations start at the Second Summit of the Americas to take place in 
Santiago, Chile, in March 1998. However, they did not reach any agreement on 
the format and procedure of the negotiations-objectives, approaches, structure 
and venue. Instead, they committed to advance this issue by aiming to reach an 
agreement by the next Trade Ministerial Meeting during the following year. 
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There was also a decision to create a temporary FTAA Administrative 
Secretariat to provide logistical and administrative support to the negotiations. 
The Secretariat would be based in different cities (to be decided), and it would 
not be granted any supranational authority - there was no willingness among 
member states to delegate any sovereignty. A Ministerial Joint Declaration 
contained all these points (FTAA Trade Ministerial, 1997). 
The Fourth Ministerial Meeting was held at San Josd, Costa Rica, on 19 March 
1998. This meeting was particularly important since it was the last opportunity 
before the next Summit of the Americas to lay out the foundations for the 
negotiations. Reflecting a sense of optimism with the hemispheric process, the 
trade Ministers signed the Declaration of San Josd in which they outlined the 
general principles and objectives of the FTAA negotiations, detailing the 
specific objectives by issue area, the structure, organisation. and administrative 
aspects of the negotiations (FTAA Trade Ministerial, 1998). At this point, the 
idea that had been espoused by the United States that the FTAA could become 
an enlargement of NAFTA was finally ruled out in favour of a bargaining 
structure that allowed MERCOSUR to negotiate as a bloc (the 4+1 scheme). 
This negotiating scheme would later be rejected by the United States in 2005 in 
favour of an FTAA multilateral negotiation ('U. S. rejects 4+1 agreement', 
2005). With the negotiation structure already in place, the Ministers forwarded 
a recommendation for the official negotiations to begin at the Santiago Summit. 
The FTAA Committee of Government Representatives on the Participation of 
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Civil Society (CGR) was created at the Jan Jos6 meeting in order to receive 
input from civil society to be presented for consideration by the Ministers. This 
committee does not participate in the negotiations; its role is merely 
consultative. The rationale behind the creation of the CGR is to increase the 
transparency of the negotiation process and to facilitate the constructive 
participation of the different sectors of society 
The Second Summit of the Americas was held in Santiago, Chile, in April 
1998. As recommended by the trade ministers in San Josd, the Heads of State 
and Government of the FTAA participating countries formally announced the 
beginning of the negotiations and agreed on the official structure of the 
negotiation process. The central points of the negotiation structure were the 
establishment of a pro-tempore FTAA Chairmanship, a Trade Negotiations 
Committee (TNC) and a FTAA Administrative Secretariat, and three non- 
negotiating committees and consultative groups. 
Table 1: FTAA Chairmanship 
Period Chair Vice-Chair 
I May 1998 - 31 October 1999 Canada Argentina 
I November 1999 - 30 April 2001 Argentina Ecuador 
I May 2001 - 31 October 2002 Ecuador Chile 
I Co- hair 
I November 2002 - 31 December 2004 1 Brazil 
I-U7it-edStates 
The function of the Trade Negotiations Committee (TNC), at the level of Vice- 
Ministers, is to review the process, to guide the work of nine Negotiating 
Groups (that would replace the Working Groups) and other committees and 
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groups, and to decide on the overall architecture of the agreement and 
institutional issues. It was agreed that the TNC would meet as required at 
rotating sites throughout the hemisphere, no less than twice a year. Reporting to 
the TNC, the FTAA Administrative Secretariat was created to provide 
administrative and logistical support to the negotiations (official archives, 
translation and interpretation services). It was decided that it would be 
physically located at the same places assigned for the Negotiating Groups. 
Some important modifications were included in the list of new Negotiating 
Groups, primarily the incorporation of a group on Agriculture. Similarly, three 
non-negotiating consultative groups and committees were also established: the 
Consultative Group on Smaller Economies, the Committee of Government 
Representatives on Civil Society, and the Joint Govemment-Private Sector 
Committee of Experts on Electronic Commerce. The final list of nine 
Negotiating Groups, including chairs and vice chairs, therefore included: 
Table 2: FTAA Negotiating Groups 
Chair Vice Chair 
Market Access* Colombia Bolivia 
Investment Costa Rica Dominican Republic 
Services Nicaragua Barbados 
Government Procurement United States Honduras 
Dispute Settlement Chile Uruguay - Paraguay 
Agriculture Argentina El Salvador 
Intellectual Property Rights Venezuela Ecuador 
Subsidies, Antidumping 
and Countervailing Duties , 
Brazil Chile 
II 
Competition Policy I Peru- I Trinidad & To; ago 
(*) Covering tariffs, non-tariff measures, customs procedures, safeguards, rules 
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of origin, and standards and technical barriers to trade. 
The following Non-Negotiating Committees were additionally established: 
I Consultative Group on Smaller Economies 
2 Committee of Government Representatives on Civil Society 
3 Joint Government-Private Sector Committee of Experts on Electronic 
Commerce 
It was agreed that the Negotiating Groups would meet at the following places: 
Table 3: FTAA Negotiating Groups Venue 
Period Place 
I May 1998 - 28 February 2001 Miami, United States 
I March 2001 - 28 February 2003 Panama City, Panama 
I March 2003 - 31 December 2004 Puebla, Mexico 
In spite of the substantial advances reached by the ministerial meetings and 
Working Groups in the definition of a negotiation agenda during the 
preparatory phase since the First Summit at Miami, the FTAA process was 
hindered by the lack of domestic political support in the United States and 
Brazil. Feinberg claims that 'the greatest challenge facing inter-American 
summitry is the cultivation of domestic political constituencies'. The Santiago 
Summit cmphasised its social and political agenda as a means of addressing 
such a political imperative (Feinberg, 1998). 
This agenda addressed issues related to democracy such as the improvement of 
education, the strengthening of democracy and human rights, the promotion of 
transparency, the alleviation of poverty and discrimination, and the fight against 
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corruption, crime and drug trafficking. The prevalence of such 'non-trade' 
issues evidences the understanding that trade and economic growth are central 
to the improvement of the economies of the region, but that they do not occur in 
a vacuum. Deeply entrenched social problems in the hemisphere must also be 
addressed (Moss, 1998: 2). In spite of the downward revisions in estimates of 
growth rates resulting from the effects of the Asian crisis on the different 
economies throughout the hemisphere, and the absence of the Fast Track 
legislation by the United States, the Santiago Summit reflected an underlying 
sense of optimism (Moss, 1998: 2). 
The Fifth Ministerial meeting was held in Toronto, Canada, in November 1999. 
Since the launch of the negotiation phase, the negotiators in building a common 
ground made 'considerable progress. ' It is also noteworthy that during this 
phase, sub-regional groups such as the CAN, CARICOM, and MERCOSUR 
presented their positions jointly, after intense consultation among their 
members (Salazar-Xirinachs 2001: 285). Based on the solid momentum that 
had been maintained, Ministers instructed the negotiating groups in a Toronto 
Ministerial Declaration to prepare a draft text of their respective chapters, to be 
presented at the Sixth Ministerial meeting in Buenos Aires in 2001. Other 
important decisions reached in Toronto were the approval of a series of 
Business Facilitation Measures (related to customs procedures and 
transparency) to promote hemispheric trade, and the beginnings of discussions 
on general on general institutional aspects of the overall infrastructure of the 
FTAA agreement. The central focus therefore became the development of a 
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draft text; a considerably ambitious objective to move the negotiation process 
forward (FTAA Trade Ministerial, 1999). 
At the Sixth Ministerial Meeting in Buenos Aires, Argentina, in April 2001, 
Ministers received the bracketed draft text of the FTAA agreement from the 
Negotiating Groups, and were able to make recommendations to the next 
Summit of the Americas. This meeting produced little substantial advancement. 
What was agreed was a timetable for the negotiations over tariff barriers, but 
there was no consensus on major issues such as anti-dumping legislation, 
agricultural subsidies and non-tariff barriers - all core elements of any trade 
agreement (Tussie, 2001). 
It is important to note that the Buenos Aires meeting took place in the aftermath 
of the failure of the third WTO Ministerial Meeting at Seattle in December 
1999. At Seattle, civil society organisations had successfully managed to stage 
a solid resistance to the WTO agenda and procedures by questioning the 
legitimacy of the multilateral institution. With such events as a background, 
trade ministers in Buenos Aires made an unprecedented move to make the 
FTAA process more transparent by agreeing to make the FTAA draft text 
publicly available. Finally, a Technical Committee of Institutional Issues was 
also established to consider the overall architecture of the FTAA agreement. 
These points were assembled at the Ministerial Declaration (FTAA Trade 
Ministerial, 2001). 
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The Third Summit of the Americas took place in Qudbec City, Canada, on the 
20-22 April 2001. The draft text was finally made available to the public after 
the summit when it was posted in the Official FTAA website on 3 July 200 1. It 
was agreed that negotiations would be completed by January 2005, to be able to 
implement the FTAA agreement before December 2005. 
A central development in the FTAA process was the approval of a democracy 
clause whereby 'any unconstitutional alteration or interruption of the 
democratic order in a state of the hemisphere constitutes an insurmountable 
obstacle to the participation of that state's government in the Summit of the 
Americas process. ' As explained by Feinberg and Rosenberg (2001: 2), this 
clause 'puts new teeth into the capacity of the region's democracies to deter 
and, if necessary, reverse threats to democratic governance. It also gives private 
sectors an additional incentive to support constitutional rule'. However, it 
remained to be seen whether the final accord would restate this commitment to 
a democracy clause, and what criteria will be employed to define democracy 
and the sanctions applicable to states that detract from this commitment. 
Nonetheless, according to these authors, 'Qudbec's democracy clause is a 
milestone in the hemisphere's commitment to the collective defence of 
democracy. The Summit called for the drafting of a "democracy charter" to 
codify the region's several democracy commitments' (Feinberg and Rosenberg, 
2001: 2). These commitments were included in the Summit Declaration and 
Plan of Action (Summit of the Americas, 2001a). 
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The Seventh Ministerial Meeting took place in Quito, Ecuador, on I November 
2002. At this event, the ministers confirmed the schedule for the exchange of 
initial market access offers, agreed deadlines for producing new drafts of the 
texts, and disclosed the second draft of the FTAA Agreement in the FTAA 
official website. A TNC document on Guidelines or Directives for the 
Treatment of the Differences in the Levels of Development and Size of the 
Economies was also made available. More importantly, the Hemispheric 
Cooperation Program (HCP) was established as a means of strengthening the 
capacities of the less developed and smaller economies in the region to 
participate in the negotiations and implement their trade commitments. The 
HCP was designed with the assistance of the Consultative Group on Smaller 
Economies, who were also charged with the supervision of the program. 
Finally, the ministers instructed the Committee of Government Representatives 
on the Participation of Civil Society to foster a process of increased and 
sustained two-way communication with civil society to improve its consultation 
and outreach practices (FTAA Trade Ministerial, 2002). 
The Eighth Ministerial Meeting was organized in Miami, United States, on 20 
November 2003. The negotiation process had become stagnant at this point. 
The recent failure of the WTO Ministerial Meeting at Canc6n, Mexico, earlier 
in September had created a very difficult climate for reaching consensus on 
trade liberalisation. This had raised the stakes for the outcomes of the Miami 
Meeting. FTAA negotiations stumbled over the reticence of the United States to 
commit to the liberalisation of its agricultural subsidies and antidumping 
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measures, and of some Latin American countries (particularly those of 
MERCOSUR) to agree on rules in the areas of government procurements, 
intellectual property rights, investments and services. In both cases, the United 
States and MERCOSUR were reluctant to give concessions in these sensitive 
areas in the context of an FTAA agreement, preferring in turn to negotiate these 
issues at the WTO. To overcome this stalemate, the ministers agreed at Miami 
to adopt the Brazilian initiative to compromise on a limited FTAA agreement 
(also commonly referred as TTAA-light' or TTAA A la carte'). As Engler 
(2003: 1) puts it, the FTAA-Lite 'puts a sunshine spin on an impasse. 
This limited version of the agreements has two levels. On the one hand, it 
establishes a common set of rights and obligations applicable to all countries; 
on the other hand, it allows each country to choose in which of the nine areas of 
the negotiations they want to pursue additional tariff liberalisation and trade 
rules. The FTAA-light would no longer be a multilateral agreement, but rather a 
plurilateral one. The single undertaking principle - that nothing is agreed until 
everything is agreed - was abandoned. The ministers released the third draft of 
the chapters of the FTAA agreement. Finally, the ministers agreed that the next 
Ministerial Meeting would take place in Brazil in 2004 (FTAA Trade 
Ministerial, 2003). 
The trade negotiators continued working towards securing a minimum 
consensus for a now scaled-down FTAA agenda. A series of extraordinary 
meetings were scheduled to salvage the loss of momentum of the negotiation 
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process. No progress was reached in an additional Summit of the Americas held 
in Monterrey in January 2004, in the subsequent Trade Negotiating Committee 
(TNC) meeting of February 2004 in Puebla, Mexico, or at the 'informal' 
meetings called in Buenos Aires on 31 March and on I April 2004 to rectify the 
February TNC deadlock (Public Citizen, 2004). The Trade Ministerial Meeting 
scheduled to take place in Brazil was cancelled. 
The Fourth Summit of the Americas was held in Mar del Plata, Argentina, on 
the 4-5 November 2005 with the theme of 'Creating Jobs to Fight Poverty and 
Strengthen Democratic Governance'. Many governments hoped that this 
summit would provide them with the opportunity to overcome the diplomatic 
deadlock that had resulted in the indefinite postponement of the Ninth 
Ministerial Meeting of 2004. The Mar del Plata summit instead exposed the 
lack of consensus that existed in the Hemisphere about the content of the FTAA 
agenda, and the divided positions regarding the commitment to continue with 
that process. In the Declaration of the summit, the FTAA project is mentioned 
in two separate paragraphs (A and B) that identify the contrasting views on this 
issue, and the failure in reaching an agreement. Point 19 of the Declaration 
states: 
Recognizing the contribution that economic integration can make to the 
achievement of the Summit objectives of creating jobs to fight poverty and 
strengthening democratic governance: 
A. Some member states maintain that we take into account the difficulties that 
the process of the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) negotiations has 
encountered, and we recognize the significant contribution that the processes of 
economic integration and trade liberalization in the Americas can and should 
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make to the achievement of the Summit objectives to create jobs to fight poverty 
and strengthen democratic governance. Therefore, we remain committed to the 
achievement of a balanced and comprehensive FTAA Agreement that aims at 
expanding trade flows and, at the global level, trade free from subsidies and 
trade-distorting practices, with concrete and substantive benefits for all, taking 
into account the differences in the size and the levels of development of the 
participating economies and the special needs and special and differential 
treatment of the smaller and vulnerable economies. We will actively participate 
to ensure a significant outcome of the Doha Round that will reflect the measures 
and proposals mentioned in the previous paragraph. We shall continue to 
promote the established practices and activities in the FTAA process that 
provide transparency and encourage participation of civil society. 
We instruct our officials responsible for trade negotiations to resume their 
meetings, during 2006, to examine the difficulties in the FTAA process, in order 
to overcome them and advance the negotiations within the framework adopted in 
Miami in November 2003. We also instruct our representatives in the institutions 
of the Tripartite Committee to continue allocating the resources necessary to 
support the FTAA Administrative Secretariat. 
B. Other member states maintain that the necessary conditions are not yet in 
place for achieving a balanced and equitable free trade agreement with effective 
access to markets free from subsidies and trade-distorting practices, and that 
takes into account the needs and sensitivities of all partners, as well as the 
differences in the levels of development and size of the economies. 
In view of the above, we have agreed to explore both positions in light of the 
outcomes of the next World Trade Organization ministerial meeting. To that 
end, the Government of Colombia will undertake consultations with a view to a 
meeting of the officials responsible for trade negotiations (Summit of the 
Americas, 2005). 
Conclusion 
This chapter has traced the development of the FTAA process. Particular 
attention has been paid to outlining the institutional isation of this 
intergovernmental initiative since its origins in 1994. Business and civil society 
organisations were also identified as increasingly influential actors in the FTAA 
process. I have focused on the way in which governments have sought to 
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incorporate the contributions of these non-state actors into the FTAA 
institutional process through the creation of consultation mechanisms. Having 
outlined the central features of the FTAA process, the following chapter 
reviews the ways in which the FTAA process is understood by the different 
strands of literature that have examined this hemispheric initiative. 
60 
CHAPTER 2 
Understanding the FTAA Process 
Following the overview of the central milestones of the FTAA process 
introduced in the previous chapter, in the current chapter the literature 
committed to understanding the FTAA process will be reviewed. The 
production of knowledge is an inherently political cndeavour. It involves setting 
up methodological classifications that selectively incorporate and exclude 
various elements of a social reality in the making of legitimate academic 
discourse. Similarly, the production of knowledge invariably conveys specific 
normative propositions that are inseparable from the allegedly 'neutral 
description' of a given phenomenon under consideration. A critical review of 
the literature on the FTAA process is therefore concerned with identifying the 
extent to which the prevailing approaches to the study of the FTAA process 
address the emerging transnationalisation of civil society activism throughout 
the Americas mobilised around the FTAA project. 
The chapter is divided into three sections that cover the main theoretical 
approaches employed for the study of FTAA process, as identified in the 
scholarly and policy literature. Each section begins with a general introduction 
to the central tenets of that particular theoretical approach, and the leading 
authors working in that tradition. Additionally, the sections address the core 
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beliefs, assumptions and concerns raised by the theories with particular 
reference to the FTAA process. Finally, a critique of the strengths and 
shortcomings of each theoretical view for the understanding of the FTAA 
process will be provided. Following this arrangement, the first section discusses 
the neo-realist and neo-mercantilist tradition. The second section focuses on the 
approach to integration of neo-liberal institutionalism and, lastly, the third 
section concentrates on the critical approaches identified with the Marxist and 
social democratic traditions. Finally, the conclusion will propose a theoretical 
framework for the study of transnational coalitions in the Americas, which will 
be the main subject of the following chapter. 
The central claim of this chapter is that the ways in which the FTAA process 
has been studied discourages a deep reflection on the search for political 
alternatives to neo-liberalism in the Americas. Firstly, because the existing 
literature on the FTAA process has not engaged seriously with the challenges 
posed by counter-hegemonic forces in the definition of trade integration and 
development policies. Secondly, because this literature does not address the 
ongoing debate on what kind of integration and development policies should be 
pursued in the region. A reflection on the role of counter-hegemonic actors like 
the Hemispheric Social Alliance in the construction of alternatives to neo- 
liberalism thus demands an understanding of the FTAA process as a site of 
contestation in which the HSA is an organically constituent dimension of this 
hemispheric process. 
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Neo-realism and neo-mercantilism 
World politics from a realist and mercantilist perspective is conceived as 
inherently unstable and driven by the strive for state power. The writings of 
Thucydides (460 - 406 BC), Niccolo Machiavelli (1469 - 1527), Thomas 
Hobbes (1588 - 1679) and Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712 - 78) are considered 
foundational landmarks to a realist approach to politics traditionally concerned 
with the conduct of leaders in political affairs in response to the imperative of 
ensuring the survival of the state. Classical realists have been generally 
interested in questions of war and military security. Additionally, since the 
seventeenth and eighteenth century, mercantilists have stressed the importance 
of the economic wealth of a country to its power and security in the 
international system (Viner, 1948; List, 1966; Hamilton, 1991; Heckscher, 
1994). Mercantilists regard state intervention in the economy as a necessary 
measure to ensure the competitiveness required for success in the balance of 
power game with rival states. In order to survive, states will try to ensure 'self- 
sufficiency in key strategic industries and commodities and by using trade 
protectionism (tariffs and other limits on exports and imports), subsidies, and 
selective investments in the domestic economy' (Woods, 2001: 285). 
Mercantilism shares the core elements of a realist understanding of politics. In 
particular, the commitment to the principles of. statism, survival and setf-help 
(Dunne and Schmidt, 2005: 172-79). Statism refers to the ideology that 
63 
sovereign states are the most desirable form of political organisation and, 
subsequently, the primary and unitary actors of the international system. 
Ensuring the survival of the state constitutes the supreme national interest. To 
ensure survival, states behave as egoist rational actors seeking to maximise 
power by securing relative advantages over other states. Self-help is ultimately 
the only reliable means to guarantee survival of the state, provided there is no 
world government capable of maintaining international security and order. 
Consequently, in an anarchic international system characterised by lack of 
order, states engage in balance of power politics to increase and retain state 
power. Rather than being a single theory, realism and mercantilism engulf a 
way of thinking about politics characterized by the analysis of state power as a 
universal and transhistorical dimension of politics. 
A structural neo-realist reformulation (Waltz, 1979) of realist thinking was 
introduced in the early 1980s as a response to the pressures derived from the 
adoption of behaviouralism in the IR discipline to adopt a rigorous (positivist) 
methodology (Mouritzen, 1997; Woever, 1997: 11-12,17). The notion of the 
international structure becomes the central analytical feature of this novel and 
influential variant of realism. Shifts in the power arrangement of the 
international structure create opportunities for states to increase their relative 
gains and independence vis-A-vis other states in the system. Namely, the 
choices of foreign policy available to a given state can only be understood from 
that state's relational position in the international structure of power. 
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Structural neo-realism has provided the ground for the development of theories 
seeking to explain the difficult prospects of inter-state cooperation in an 
anarchic system in terms of the changes taking place at the level of the 
international structure of power. Strong states in the international system have a 
greater autonomy to pursue their policies, whereas weaker states must align 
their policy preferences to the hegemonic ones in order to ensure their 
protection and benefits. In this respect, hegemonic states have a key role in 
creating the incentives for the formation and compliance of weak states in 
international regimes. This has been the central claim of the hegemonic stability 
theory (Kindleberger, 1974; Krasner, 1976; Snidal, 1985; Cowhey and Long, 
1983; Gilpin, 1987). 
The end of the Cold War was followed by a shift in the balance of power that 
underpinned the international system since the aftermath of World War 11. 
Academic and political debates since the early 1990s tried to make sense of the 
nature of the emerging international order that resulted from this sudden 
rearrangement of power relations. This had direct implications for the kinds of 
foreign policy options pursued by governments seeking to re-define their 
international relations in light of the characteristics of the new system of power. 
On the one hand lay the view that the emerging international system was 
conceived as an increasing unipolar order based on the hegemonic leadership of 
the United States. From this perspective, small countries could only 
'realistically' consider investing in securing a close political alignment with the 
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United States as a strategy to redefine their role in the world. The converse 
view was that the new international system tended towards a multi-polar order 
in which the other powers such as the European Union, South East Asia, China 
and perhaps even MERCOSUR could also play a preponderant role along with 
the United States. 
This debate over the meaning of the international order in the post-Cold War 
period set the framework for the analysis of the FTAA process in the Americas. 
From the perspective of neo-real ism/neo-mercantil ism, hemispheric relations in 
the 1990s became the expression of a competition between the United States 
and Brazil to increase their geo-political influence in the region. The relatively 
greater power of these two countries in the inter-American system meant that 
the prospects of reaching consensus among the 34 countries in the hemisphere 
to create an FTAA was largely dependent on the leadership of these two 
countries (Phillips, 2003: 332). The FTAA process therefore became seen as 
driven by this inter-state competition. 
Reflecting on the significance of trade integration policies vis-a-vis the 
redefinition of the U. S. national interest during the post-Cold War period, the 
literature provides analyses of foreign policy and recommendations concerning 
the United States' policy towards the region (Bdlanger, 1999; Fishlow, 1999b; 
Roett, 1999; Smith, 1999b, Ayerbe, 2003). Moreover, analyses of the role of 
Brazil in the region highlight the historical continuity of a seemingly 
uninterrupted and proud call for regional leadership (Albuquerque, 2001; 
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Danese, 2001; Hirst, 2001; Soares de Lima, 1994,1999). The literature on the 
FTAA has paid less attention to the role of middle powers in the hemispheric 
process (Belanger and Mace, 1999). 
MERCOSUR is regarded by this literature as a defensive response of its 
member states to the advancement of a U. S. strategy of hegemony in the region 
following the collapse of the Soviet Union (Carranza 2004a, 2004b; Vizentini, 
2004). In this regard, MERCOSUR has instrumental value in increasing the 
bargaining power of its member states in the negotiation of the FTAA with the 
United States and NAFTA (Carranza, 2000; Motta Veiga, 2001). Furthermore, 
this regional bloc is also an element of a broader strategy of its member states 
to improve their insertion into the global economy (Hurrell, 2005; Motta Veiga, 
2001; Rozenwurcel, 2001: 20) in the making of a multipolar system (Vizentini, 
2004). Carranza (2000: 19) argues that 'MERCOSUR fits nicely in the 
neorealist logic of geo-economics: economic regionalism as a defensive 
strategy in an increasingly competitive post-Cold War neo-mercantilist 
environment'. Supporting this view, Bernal-Meza (1999: 11) claims that 
'MERCOSUR became for Brazil an instrument of realpoliflk'. 
While there is agreement that MERCOSUR constitutes a foreign policy 
instrument to increase the balance of power of its member states in the 
hemispheric and international arenas, there is less agreement on how to use this 
sub-regional bloc for that purpose. In particular, the place of MERCOSUR in 
the FTAA process has led to a heated debate. This involves those who feared 
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that the FTAA project would undermine MERCOSUR by eroding the economic 
advantages of having instruments of protection as the Common External Tariff, 
and those who see both projects as potentially compatible, provided that the 
agreement favours clearly defined national/MERCOSUR objectives. 
The first position opposes the participation of MERCOSUR in the FTAA 
negotiation process (Guimaraes Pinheiro, 1998,2004; Jaguaribe, 1998; 
Vizentini, 2004: 19). The second one encourages the strategic engagement of 
MERCOSUR in the hemispheric process, as long as this does not preclude the 
pursuit of relations with the European Union and other emerging powers 
(Lampreia and Seabra da Cruz Junior, 2005; 'Brasil defiende', 2004). Brazil 
has sought to delay the FTAA negotiations to gain time to consolidate a 
common MERCOSUR position, and to work towards the formation of a South 
American Free Trade Area (Carranza, 2000). The success of this larger project 
would surely strengthen the position of the Southern Cone countries in the 
negotiations of the FTAA with the United States. 
Nevertheless, this objective also faces the challenge of the United States' 
strategy of negotiating bilateral free trade agreements (BFTAs) with individual 
countries in the region with the promise of access to the North American 
market (the U. S. -Central American Free Trade Agreement, and a series of 
bilateral agreements between the United States and Peru, Colombia and 
Ecuador). 
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Strengths of neo-realism/neo-mercantilism 
Perhaps the most salient contribution of a neo-realist/neo-mercantilist approach 
to the understanding of the FTAA process is the focus on the central role of 
states in the negotiation of a framework for economic liberalisation in the 
Americas. The diplomatic gridlock over what sectors will be subject to 
liberalisation, the terms of implementation of the agreement, and the thorny 
issues of protectionist practices associated with non-tariff barriers have direct 
implications for the future political economy of the region. Despite the 
recurrent views advocating minimal intervention of the state in the economic 
matters, this approach to the FTAA process reveals the crucial role of states in 
protecting selected sectors of their economies despite their rhetorical 
commitment to market liberalisation. 
Anther stong point of this perspective is its awareness of the tensions that 
emerge from the competition of the United States and Brazil governments over 
the leadership of the hemisphere process. This is valuable to understanding the 
political struggle underlying the transformation of a new paradigm of 
hemispheric relations in which the East-West confrontation is no longer a 
defining principle. It also sheds light on the diplomatic obstacles to the 
attainment of a common agaenda of liberalisation facing the U. S. and Brazil 
governmetris, which resulted in the gridlock of the FTAA negotiation process in 
2003. 
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Shortcomings of neo-realism/neo-mercantilism 
This perspective on the FTAA process defines the realm of politics as the 
expression of inter-state competition, mainly between the U. S. and Brazil. 
Governments are implicitly taken to embody the pursuit of clearly defined 
national interests. This overlooks the complex political dynamics within 
countries involved in setting the official agenda for the FTAA negotiations, and 
the overall position of governments regarding foreign relations. Whether these 
dynamics are the result of the pressure exerted by lobbying groups from the 
private sector, trade unions or social movements, this perspective on the FTAA 
does not account for the often-contested nature of the 'national interest'. The 
orientation of a government's foreign policy and trade policy in particular 
cannot be reduced solely to changes in the international system. Domestic 
factors are also central. This has important normative implications regarding 
issues of democratic sovereignty. An abstracted notion of 'national interest' can 
often silence the underlying struggles within countries for deeper and more 
significant forms of democratic control. It is problematic to assume that 
democratic representation is uncontested, particularly in a region characterised 
by systems of 'low intensity' democracy, and also by recurrent governability 
crises that constantly challenge the legitimacy and authority of their 
governments. 
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Another shortcoming of this perspective is the analytical separation that it 
establishes between the 'domestic' and 'international' spheres of politics. This 
separation rests on a legalistic conception of territorial national sovereignty. 
This view is being challenged by the increasingly dense flow of transnational 
interactions that permeate national borders (flows of information, economic, 
symbolic and cultural exchanges, and others) (Scholte, 2000), rendering the 
separation between domestic and international spheres increasingly more 
problematic. The intensification of information exchange and communications 
has opened spheres of interactions where political values and loyalties can 
converge and collide independently from the formal control of national state 
borders. The state-centric assumption of neo-real ism/neo-mercanti I ism does not 
foster a reflection on this transnational dimension of politics. 
To conclude, a neo-realist/neo-mercantilist approach to the FTAA has made a 
valuable contribution to understanding the role of state/bloc power in 
negotiating the framework for hemispheric integration in accordance with 
contending interests embedded in competing views of trade, development and 
integration. Nevertheless, by focusing merely on the inter-state level of this 
hemispheric process, this literature abstracts the complex political dynamics 
involved in this process to a power game between the governments of powerful 
states. The FTAA process is thus regarded as dominated by two big players, 
where their balancing and bargaining practices attain collective agency. There 
is no room for other expressions of political conflict in defining the dynamics of 
the FTAA process. 
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Neo-liberal institutionalism 
Neo-liberal institutionalism is a recent development of liberal thought with 
roots in the functional integration scholarship of the 1940s and the 1950s, 
studies of regional integration in the 1960s, and complex interdependence and 
transnationalism in the 1970s and 1980s (Lamy, 2001). The prevailing concern 
of this variant of liberalism is to find ways to foster inter-state cooperation in 
the context of an anarchic and competitive international system (Lamy, 2001: 
184). Economic liberalisation occupies a central place in the agenda of 
cooperative international relations, provided there is an implicit assumption that 
the removal of barriers to trade will lead to an increase in economic growth 
with a positive effect on international peace. States compete in the world 
economy, but there is always room for harmony of interests. As Axelrod and 
Keohane (1985: 226) claim, 'cooperation can only take place in situations that 
contain a mixture of conflicting and complementary interests'. 
Despite their different views on world politics, neo-liberal institutionalism 
shares with neo-realism the assumption that states are key political actors in 
international relations. Even when neo-liberalism incorporates non-state actors 
as analytically significant, states retain an unquestioned primacy in setting the 
rules of the international system. The main difference between two such 
approaches concerns their corresponding notions of gain at the core of 
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explanations of state behaviour. Neo-realism. explains the competitive 
behaviour of countries in terms of their pursuit of relative gains in their 
bargaining relation with other countries. Instead, neo-liberal institutional 
accounts highlight the importance of absolute gains. This may seem to be a 
nuanced difference, but this distinction is analytically central in order to defend 
the claim that countries can effectively overcome the structural instability of an 
anarchic international system through international cooperation. Inter-state 
cooperation takes place on the basis of mutual benefit. It is not important if one 
country obtains lesser benefits for its relation with another country, in so far as 
it is able to improve its condition in this way. 
Another revealing contrast with neo-realism relates to the view of the formation 
of national interest and foreign policy. Contrary to the belief that the structure 
of international power determines policy preference, the formation of national 
interest in neo-liberal institutional accounts is subject to the interactions of 
international and domestic factors. As Rosamond (2000: 125) explains, 
'neoliberals are as interested in the formation of state preferences as they are in 
the bargaining processes that take place between states. Such theories of 
preference formation almost inevitably begin to factor in processes of domestic 
politics'. The work of Robert Putnam (1993) has been influential in providing a 
methodological approach that integrates the inter-related dynamics between 
domestic and intemational factors in explanations of state diplomacy. The 
notion of state power is fragmented into various 'issue areas' in which states are 
believed to have differing degrees of influence and competence (Keohane, 
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1980). Foreign policy is thus regarded as reflecting differentiated objectives and 
strategies in correspondence with the specific engagement of these issue areas. 
Neo-liberal institutionalism assigns great importance to international 
institutions for the management of issue areas where states have mutual 
interests. Whether it relates to economic, financial, security or environmental 
problems, institutions allow the possibility of resolving problems of collective 
action in issue areas where international cooperation can yield greater benefits 
than adopting uncoordinated initiatives by individual states. International 
institutions can facilitate cooperation provided they circulate information 
among their member states, enabling mutual trust and the reduction of 
uncertainty (Little, 2002: 82; Keohane, 1984). 
The existence of clear provisions to determine and even punish free-riding 
behaviour of putative deviant members is important to ensure the proper 
functioning of institutions (Keohane 1984: 77; Axelrod and Keohane, 1985: 
234-238). Transparency on the rules and procedures is therefore intricately 
associated with the capacity of institutions to generate trust among their 
members. 
In addition to shaping the foreign policy of states, institutions can also be 
influential in setting foreign policy agendas. The accumulation of experience 
and the dissemination of relevant information can affect the identification and 
solution of specific problems. Similarly, they can encourage cooperation at 
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local, national, and international levels and often initiate the building of 
coalitions between state and non-state actors (Lamy, 2001: 192). In this respect, 
4creating, maintaining, and further empowering these institutions is the future 
of foreign policy for neo-liberal institutional ists' (Lamy, 2001: 191-92). 
Most of the literature on the FTAA process from the perspective of neo-liberal 
institutionalism had been produced by a group of trade policy specialists, and 
academic and intergovernmental research institutions who are formally and 
informally tied to the FTAA institutional structure. The contributions of 
organisations of the Inter-American institutions that are part of the FTAA 
process, such as the Organisation of American States (OAS), the Inter- 
American Development Bank (IADB) and the Economic Commission for Latin 
America and the Caribbean (ECLAQ, and trade research networks such as the 
NetAmericas, Latin American Trade Network (LATN), FOCAL, CEIM, and 
the Institute for the Americas have been particularly salient. Collectively, they 
constitute a 'knowledge network' on the FTAA process. In general terms, this 
literature is interested in creating and improving hemispheric institutions as a 
means of resolving problems of collective action (mainly inter-state), and 
promoting democracy and a market economy throughout the Americas. 
Overall, the literature on the FTAA process from a neo-liberal institutional 
perspective is identified with the promotion of hemispheric trade and 
democracy in the region. Different research agendas on the FTAA from this 
perspective share a common belief that hemispheric integration can improve the 
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economic, political and social conditions of the region. However, it also 
recognised that there are protectionist forces that could prevent this integration 
process from taking place. The reason for such ingrained obstructionism is 
concerned with the lack of knowledge about the FTAA process and institutions, 
and the lack of support among important sectors of civil society who question 
the legitimacy of this process. It is believed that if the benefits of trade 
liberalisation are properly explained, the opposition to this project will 
invariably disappear; its benefits will become clear to all. This perspective on 
the FTAA process can thus be characterised as 'problem-solving' (Cox, 1987). 
It responds to three main requirements. 
First, to mitigate the entrenched protectionist opposition to the FTAA process, 
the literature has presented a defence of the virtues of hemispheric trade in 
generating prosperity in the Americas (Nalm, 1994; Council of the Americas, 
2001). Again, the assumption here is that by clarifying some of the negative and 
common misconceptions about trade it is possible to overcome the protectionist 
forces that interfere with the FTAA initiative (Naim, 1994). 
Second, increasing the public visibility of the FTAA process has been equally 
important in relation to its acceptance and effective continuity. In this respect, 
the literature has produced detailed descriptions of the complex negotiation 
process (Salazar-Xirinachs, 2001; Schott, 2001,2002; Ricard-Guay, 2003; 
Rivas-Campo and Benke, 2003). Similarly, it has also paid close attention to the 
political evolution of this process by developing periodical assessments of the 
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successes and failures of the Summit of the Americas, follow-ups of the 
progress achieved, and recommendations for their improvement (Bouzas and 
Svarzman, 2001; Feinberg and Rosenberg, 2001; Feinberg, 1997; Moss and 
Lande, 1998; Lande, 1998; North-South Center 1999; Cooper, 2001; Fauriol 
and Weintraub, 2001; Salazar-Xirinachs, 2001; Leadership Council, 1998; 
1999; 200 1; Summits of the Americas Secretariat, 200 1). 
Third, considering that in many countries there is no broad support for 
establishing free trade policies, civil society participation in the FTAA process 
is regarded as necessary to build popular support for inter-American 
cooperation (Feinberg, 1998), and to ensure the democratic legitimacy that 
eventual hemispheric agreements (Albdn, 2002: 1; Pefia, 2003: 7; SELA, 2000). 
Interest in civil society results from the increasingly important political role 
acquired by civil society organisations in the FTAA negotiations (Wrobel, 
1999: 201; SELA, 2000; Serbin, 2003; Tussie and Botto, 2003). Making the 
engagement between civil society and government actors more constructive is a 
central concern of this section of the literature (FOCAL, 2000: 1). Furthermore, 
the consultation with civil society is understood as contributing to the 
democratic credentials of the hemispheric process. 
The literature dealing with civil society participation in the FTAA process has 
concentrated on the experiences of consultation at the domestic and 
hemispheric levels. At the level of domestic politics this is addressed in 
discussions concerning the role of pressure groups in trade policy processes 
77 
(IADB, 2002; Compa, 1998; Bustos, 2002; Barrios, 2003; Lortie and Bddard, 
2002). The debate over the approval of a fast track mandate/trade promotion 
authority by the U. S. Congress has received a great deal of attention, 
considering this bill as of central importance to the prospect of advancing the 
FTAA negotiations (Barfield, 1998; Krause, 2003; Chaloult and Ferndndez; 
2001). Civil society participation at the hemispheric level has been addressed in 
relation to the Summit of the Americas process, Ministerial Meetings and the 
FTAA Committee of Government Representatives on the Participation of Civil 
Society (CGR) (Feinberg, 1998; Feinberg and Rosenberg, 1999; Albdn, 2002; 
FOCAL, 2000; Sharnsie, 2000; Jdcome, 2001; Cole, 2002; Korzeniewicz and 
Smith, 2003; Sarrasin, 2003). 
Evaluating the extent to which civil society organisations have been successful 
in having their demands addressed in such institutional venues has been key to 
determining the democracy and inclusiveness of these institutions (Shamsie, 
2000). Approaches to civil society participation involving both the domestic 
and hemispheric levels have drawn on Putnam's two-level game model to stress 
the interrelated dynamics between civil society pressure at the domestic level 
and the evolution of the FTAA international negotiations (Tussie and Labaqui, 
2002). Moreover, others have provided detailed analyses of the formation of 
transnational networks of civil society organisations in the Americas as a 
product of state initiatives to delegate some of their political functions to civil 
society organisations (Korzeniewics and Smith, 2003). 
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As a concluding remark on this section, the neo-liberal institutional research 
agenda of the FTAA process is concerned with the possibility of advancing 
hemispheric integration. Issues of institutional design are central to 
international cooperation. Similarly, the continuity of institutional arrangements 
is dependent on the degree of legitimacy and support received. In this regard, 
civil society actors have been invited to legitimate the FTAA process. 
Strengths of neo-liberal institutionalism 
Perhaps the most valuable contribution of a neo-liberal institutionalist 
perspective on the FTAA process is its commitment to a relatively more 
pluralist understanding of hemispheric politics. This reveals the diversity of 
actors and interests involved in the definition of international economic 
relations. Stressing the changing nature of policy-making processes with the 
emergence of a 'complex diplomacy' shows the extent to which non-state 
actors (civil society organisations and corporate groups) have become 
influential in policy discussions around the negotiation of the FTAA. This 
approach illuminates the 'black-box' of state decision-making. 
The broadening of the trade agenda represents another strength of this 
theoretical approach to the FTAA. The understanding of state power in terms of 
issue areas where governments engage in linked but separate negotiation 
processes undermines the totalising view of power associated with realist and 
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mercantilist accounts of the FTAA process. Issue-based demands from civil 
society actors enrich the public debate on free trade agreements. 
Shortcomings of neo-liberal institutionalism 
This theoretical approach to the FTAA process, even if pluralistic, is still too 
narrow to reflect the complex political dynamics generated in the continent by 
this trade integration initiative. Most of the civil society activism that has taken 
place in the Americas on the FTAA process has not been directly mediated 
through formal institutional mechanisms. Rather, as the latter period of the 
HSA shows, most social movements and some NGOs (perhaps less the trade 
unions) have pursued other avenues to influence their governments on the 
FTAA process. The neo-liberal institutionalist treatment of civil society has 
been narrowly limited to sectors that are far from being representative of the 
complex and more politicised range of social actors mobilised around the 
FTAA. 
Despite the analytical importance of non-state actors in this theoretical 
perspective, accounts of the FTAA process are predominantly state-centric. 
This is corroborated by the comparatively abundant production of policy 
recommendations and assessments of the various multilateral venues to inform 
government officials involved in the hemispheric process. Likewise, a recurrent 
concern with the priority of the state even permeates the accounts of the 
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formation of networks of civil society organisations. State-centric 
interpretations of the FTAA process misconstrue the relative political autonomy 
attained by the collective efforts of transnational civil society networks. They 
also obstruct any possibility of thinking of civil society as an active agent 
capable of interacting with and transforming the inter-state political process in 
the Americas. Instead, civil society is stripped of any sense of agency reducing 
it to a passive reaction to the interplay of state policies. 
Similarly, this perspective has failed to address the shifting debate on the 
meaning of development and trade integration. There has been a move among 
many scholarly researchers towards a more critical view of market liberalisation 
policies, resulting from the devastating effects of their implementation during 
the 1990s (especially, though not exclusively, in Latin America). In focusing on 
the institutional dimension of the hemispheric process, the involvement of non- 
state actors in this debate include only those sectors that largely agree with 
many of the assumptions on which the FTAA project is based - the 'insider' 
social organisations (Smith and Korzeniewics, 2003). Furthermore, in focusing 
on such social actors, this theoretical perspective does not adequately address 
the resistance that the FTAA process has generated amongst the most critical 
sectors of civil society - such as the HSA. 
To conclude, it was argued that the strength of the neo-liberal institutional 
approach to the FTAA process rests on its portrayal of the trade policy process 
as driven by the interplay between a multiplicity of actors at the domestic and 
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international levels. Accounts of the evolution of the negotiating process cannot 
therefore ignore the influence these actors are having on the hemispheric 
process. Similarly, the centrality of institutional matters associated with the 
building of consensus to pursue the FTAA agenda constitutes a valuable 
starting point from which to think about future forms of multi-level governance 
in the Americas. 
Nevertheless, the efforts to gain support for the hemispheric process by creating 
consultation mechanisms with civil society have fallen short of improving the 
problems of democratic deficit and the lack of legitimacy of this process. This 
is verified by the prevalent emphasis of this literature on the exploration of civil 
society participation within the significantly small group of social organisations 
that have been involved in consultation processes. Such a narrow focus 
invariably overlooks the activities of large segments of civil society that have 
remained largely at the margins of the FTAA institutions. This can only 
contradict a commitment to making the FTAA process more democratic and 
inclusive of social demands. 
Critical approaches 
Critical perspectives are identified with the theoretical and political debates on 
the critique of capitalism following Karl Marx (1818-83). Stemming from this 
legacy, the first attempt to develop a comprehensive critique of the world 
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economy came from Lenin's theory of imperialism. According to this theory, 
imperialism had installed a system by which advanced countries at the core 
exploited less developed countries at the periphery by exporting capital, 
creating industries and extracting natural resources (Lenin, 1995). These views 
were further developed by the Latin American dependency school which 
stressed the unequal and declining terms of trade of the world economy which 
condemn peripheral countries to a state of structural dependency (Prebisch 
1963,1964; Cardoso and Faletto, 1979; Frank, 1979). Furthermore, these 
developments in turn led to the formulation of the world-system theory, 
considered the most renowned critique of world capitalism in this tradition 
(Wallerstein, 1974,1980 and 1989). 
Critiques of imperialism share with mercantilist approaches to world politics 
the view that the state can act as an instrument of oppression and domination of 
weaker countries (through colonialism, for example). Their main difference, 
however, is connected with the explicit association between class interests and 
the state institutions and policy identified by Marxist critics. Mercantilists are 
not concerned with the exploitative relations of production legalised by the state 
within its society and through its international relations. A central concern that 
arises from structural critiques to capitalism is the possibility that dependent 
(neo-colonial) states could have autonomy from an exploitative international 
system dominated by the imperial powers. Similarly, as Lenin pointed out, 
when national bourgeoisies 'compensate' local working classes to secure their 
support for the exploitation of other workers in foreign countries, the prospects 
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of international labour solidaritY representing common class interests becomes 
problematic. 
Another influential contribution to the tradition of Marxist critical approaches 
to capitalism comes from Gramsci's development of the idea of hegemony 
(Gramsci, 1971). As a notion of power, hegemony combines the practices of 
coercion and consent of the dominant groups/classes in society to legitimate 
exploitative social relations with subordinate groups. The creation and 
contestation of hegemony takes place in the institutions of civil society with 
relative autonomy from the state. This view contrasts with what may be referred 
to as orthodox variants of Marxism that have been criticised for relying 
exclusively on structural explanations, while disregarding the importance of the 
superstructure (ideology, institutions, values, culture, etc. ) in creating the 
conditions for revolution. The main concern for Gramsci was therefore to 
understand why revolution had not taken place in developed economies as 
predicted by Marx. This was attributed to the role of hegemony in preventing 
social revolutions. 
Neo-Gramscian scholars have further extended these ideas - firstly conceived 
in the context of the interwar period in Italy - to analyze the current capitalist 
world order (Cox, 1987; Gill and Law, 1989; Gill 1993; Cox and Sinclair, 
1996). The notion of 'new constitutionalism' has been particularly influential in 
this reformulation of the Gramscian tradition. 'New constitutionalism' refers to 
the political project of introducing institutional reforms to 'lock in' the power 
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gains of capital by increasing constitutional rights to private property at the 
expense of subordinating democracy to the pursuit of profit. This process 
nonetheless lacks hegemonic support and is thus open to the challenge of forces 
resistant to neo-liberalism struggling to prevent the encroachments on 
democracy (Gill, 2002). From this perspective, the present world order is 
regarded in terms of a contestation between private corporate interests trying to 
cement a neo-liberal hegemony and counter-hegemonic forces defying what is 
regarded as the undermining of public rights. 
Resistance to hegemony can take place outside formal political institutions 
(demonstrations, civil disobedience, etc. ) but also within them. The 
fruitlessness or likeliness of achieving a socialist revolution through 
participation in liberal democratic institutions has divided Marxist thinkers 
since the early twentieth century into adopting revolutionary armed struggles or 
social democratic strategies. Participatory democracy has been one of the social 
democratic responses to the inherent tensions between capitalism and 
democracy. 
Through the creation of participatory forms of democracy, it would be possible 
to resolve the problem of democratic deficit in governance structures, ensuring 
equality and inclusiveness irrespective of social hierarchies. A central concern 
here is to determine to what extent participation serves to improve the 
conditions of disadvantaged sectors of society, or whether it merely serves as a 
means of obtaining their consent in order to legitimate policies and legislation, 
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contrary to the advancement of public interests. Namely, formal participation 
could be regarded as a practice for the creation of hegemony. 
Following the failure of the neo-liberal reform programs in the 1990s to deliver 
equitable economic growth and development, voices critical of the FTAA 
process gained significant political influence in the shaping of new public 
understandings of free trade and market liberalisation. The criticisms of the 
FTAA have tended to concentrate on the denunciation of the economic, social 
and environmental implications of this project, on the formulation of alternative 
forrns of integration to it, and on the analyses of the nature of the social actors 
in the Americas and the strategies adopted to oppose the FTAA. 
In spite of the differences among the various existing critical traditions, they all 
regard the FTAA as a neo-liberal project that runs contrary to the principles of 
egalitarianism, social justice, democracy and sustainable development. Apart 
from some individual contributions to a critical literature on the FTAA from 
committed academics, the bulk of this literature comes from institutions such as 
the Social Observatory of Latin Americas in the Latin American Social 
Sciences Council (CLACSO), member organisations of the HSA, the 
Observatory of the Americas of the University of Qudbec at Montr6al, the 
International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD), the Institute for 
Policy Studies, the Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, OXFAM, the 
Interhemispheric Resource Center (IRC), amongst others. 
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In this criticism, firstly, the FTAA project has been accused of being an 
instrument of American imperialism to subjugate Southern countries by 
reducing them to a state of dependent neo-colonialism. This assessment 
suggests that the capital liberalisation propounded by this agreement will 
depend on the exploitation of the working class and the annihilation of the 
national industries of less developed countries (CUT, 2003; Bor6n, 2002, 
Petras, 2002). Nevertheless, this process of colonial carving-up of the continent 
has heightened class warfare towards an anti-imperialist struggle for social- 
economic transformation (Petras, 2004). 
Similarly, others have stressed the lack of legitimacy and undemocratic nature 
of the FTAA process. Participation mechanisms such as the FTAA Committee 
of Government Representatives on the Participation of Civil Society (CGR), 
and the consultation process coordinated before the Americas Summits are not 
considered to provide real opportunities for civil society to influence the 
definition of the FTAA agenda (Wiesebron, 2004; Prdvost, 2003: 124). 
Furthermore, they are rejected as being instruments of Political cooptation of 
the more critical positions (Benessaieh, 1999). Others have even questioned the 
legitimacy of the national political systems and governments that participate in 
the FTAA process (Serbin, 2003: 99). 
The lack of transparency of the FTAA process is another element contributing 
to its democratic deficit. Decisions are taken secretly by negotiators behind 
closed doors, in many cases even without the supervision of national 
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parliaments (Wiesebron, 2004). Such secretive and exclusionary practices 
support the denunciations that the FTAA only represents corporate interests 
(Sampson, 2003), which translate into widespread discontent and the 
mobilization of citizen movements (Carlsen, 2003: 2; Hansen-Kuhn, 2003; 
Sampson 2003: 1). 
The FTAA project will institutional ise a new form of governance in the 
Americas. This means that the FTAA is not just concerned with the 
liberalisation of trade and services. What is also at stake is the establishment of 
an infrastructure of rules and disciplines to regulate international and domestic 
social processes to the benefit of corporate capital and to the detriment of 
democracy, the rule of law and the capacity of the state to promote equitable 
development (Barenberg and Evans, 2004; Brunelle, 2004b). Replicating and 
even deepening the foundational model of NAFTA, this form of governance 
would represent an 'economic constitution' for the Americas. 
The FTAA chapter on investment rules (in line with Chapter II from NAFTA) 
is perhaps the most contentious provision of this agreement considering the 
unbalanced rights it grants to corporate interests to the detriment of democratic 
sovereignty (Anderson and Arruda, 2002; Barlow and Clarke, n. d.; Hillebrand, 
2003; Brunelle, 2004b; Lee, 2004). The rules on investment protection 
contemplated in this chapter are aimed at securing a stable and safe 
environment for investments by discouraging governments (at the national, 
provincial or municipal levels) from modifying their legislation in ways that 
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may directly or indirectly affect their investment expectations. 
Nevertheless, as the experience of NAFTA demonstrates, reform of legislation 
may need to be introduced to ensure the protection of public interests like 
health or the environment. Additionally, the investor-state dispute mechanism 
(ISDM) included in this provision would entitle companies to take legal action 
directly against governments to demand hefty monetary compensations for 
alleged expropriation. No public access to oral hearings is contemplated in 
these arbitration systems. Safeguarding investor's security comes at the cost of 
more uncertainty to governments and citizens concerned with public interest 
(Lee, 2004: 46). 
Secondly, in addition to denouncing the implications of the FTAA project, there 
have been several initiatives to formulate concrete alternative approaches to 
hemispheric integration. Such alternatives recognise that the establishment of 
an FTAA will accentuate the problems of poverty, inequality and 
environmental degradation that already affect most of the continent. Alternative 
approaches to integration instead propose sustainable forms of development 
that contradict the market-led approach of the FTAA project (HSA, 2002a; 
Oxfam, 2003; Gallagher and Blanco, 2003; IISD, 2004; Barlow and Clarke, 
n. d. ). Characterised by a strong social dimension to integration, alternative 
approaches to integration advocate the incorporation of social clauses in the 
areas of labour (Collingsworth, 2001; Godio, 2004), the environment (IISD, 
2002), human rights (Bronson and Lamarche, 2001) and gender (Castrillo, Pey, 
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Trautmann and Espino, 2003). 
Critical positions have being trying to include labour protection (and other 
social clauses) in the core of FTAA agreement (Hansen-Kuhn, 1996) rather 
than taking the negotiation to the International Labour Organisation (Carnegie 
Endowment, 2001). Similarly, they reject the inclusion of labour and 
environmental protection as side agreements to the FTAA. As the experience of 
NAFTA reveals, side agreements are difficult to enforce (Lee, 2004: 47). 
Another issue pressed by critics of the FTAA is that the FTAA should affirm 
previously recognised accords such as the International Labor Organisation 
conventions, the United Nations convention to eliminate all forms of 
discrimination against women, and the Inter-American convention on human 
rights (Hansen-Kuhn, 1996). 
Thirdly, apart from the critiques and alternatives produced by some civil 
society sectors to the FTAA, there has been some effort in the literature to 
understand the actors that are engaged in opposing the FTAA. Some of the 
central concerns driving this research are derived from the need to understand 
the emergence of new forms of resistance to neo-liberalism, exemplified by the 
creation of broad counter-hegemonic North-South coalitions between labour 
movements and social movements such as the Hemispheric Social Alliance 
(HSA) (Anner and Evans, 2004; Chaloult and Ferndndez, 2001; Drainville, 
1999; Prdvost, 2003; Sampson, 2004; Smith, 2004). The relations between such 
developments at the hemispheric level with global processes like the WSF have 
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also been discussed (Brunelle, 2002). Fewer authors have nevertheless 
specifically addressed the complex processes of coalition building where 
diverse sectors and identities come together in joint collective strategies to 
challenge the hegemony of neo-liberal global isation/regional isation in the 
Americas (Massicotte, 2004; Evans, 2005). 
Strengths of critical approaches 
An important advantage of critical approaches is their political commitment to 
demand the democratisation of the hemispheric process. This involves a greater 
participation of civil society in the negotiation process, but also the 
reformulation of current neo-liberal approaches to integration in order to ensure 
a socially equitable, environmentally sustainable and democratic form of 
development in the Americas. Related to this, the formulation of alternative 
policy options to the FTAA project is in itself the most valuable contribution to 
the promotion of a debate that raises the ethical implications of trade politics. 
Moreover, this debate exposes the problematic nature of uncritically accepted 
distinctions between public and private spheres that often serve to safeguard 
corporate benefits at the expense of public costs. 
This literature has also made a crucial contribution to our understanding of the 
ongoing struggle throughout a continent in search of new forms of expression 
of dissent and political representation in the face of a generalised trend towards 
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the erosion of credibility in formal democratic institutions (UNDP, 2004). This 
continuing endeavour against an exclusionary FTAA project presents the 
possibility of reinventing the meaning and roles of an emerging new 
citizenship. 
Shortcomings of critical approaches 
Accounts of the development of counter-hegemonic forces opposing the FTAA 
process are crucial to understanding the political dynamics that characterise 
hemispheric relations in the current post-neoliberal period. Unfortunately, few 
analyses have been produced on this subject. Recent experiences of 
transnational multi-sectoral coalitions between labour unions, social 
movements and NGOs (of which the HSA is a prime example) still need to be 
more thoroughly addressed by this literature. 
Critical accounts of the FTAA process concentrate primarily on the 
denunciation of the dangers posed by this trade integration project to the most 
vulnerable social sectors of the continent. This denunciation is carried out by 
some academic sectors (often marginal from mainstream academic discourse), 
NGOs working on development issues, some trade union organisations. These 
critiques to the FTAA aim to raise awareness of the risks involved in this 
proposed project in order to build opposition to it. In this regard, they are a 
necessary condition for the creation of alternative forms of development and 
regional integration. 
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However, these accounts often treat the FTAA process as something 'external' 
to the social forces that oppose and resist it. As a result, these social forces are 
never portrayed as being an integral part of this process, driving its complex 
political dynamics and not merely reacting to it. Consequently, this literature 
does not encourage a scholarly and political reflection on how social 
movements emerge in the first place, resulting from their strategic interventions 
in terms of alliance formation, consensus building, mobilisation, denunciation, 
and communication, among others. This partly results from the limited chances 
available to activists for reflection and systernatisation on their experiences. As 
a consequence, critical accounts of the FTAA assume that counter-hegemonic 
forces are already there without exploring the tight inter-relations between the 
FTAA process and the formation of new counter-hegemonic subjects. 
Similarly, this literature is limited to exploring the challenges and opportunities 
encountered by transnational coalitions like the HSA in their construction of 
political alternatives to neo-liberalism. 
Conclusion 
The review of the literature on the FTAA process shows that the priorities and 
assumptions of neo-realist/neo-mercantilist, neo-liberal insitutionalist and 
critical theoretical approaches discourage a deep reflection on the search for 
political alternatives to neo-liberalism in the Americas. 
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The complex political dynamics of hemispheric relations that underlie the 
FTAA process are not captured in state-centric perspectives that concentrate 
mainly on the inter-governmental dimension of regional integration. When 
there have been attempts to engage with this complexity by incorporating the 
role of non-state actors, this has been done in a restrictive manner that 
ultimately fails to reveal the shifting political climate and organised 
mobilisation led by the more critical sectors of civil society. The emphasis on 
'improving' the institutional infrastructure of the FTAA process to encourage 
the democratic participation of broader sectors of society reveals its 
instrumental purpose of minimising and neutralising opposition to trade 
integration. 
Likewise, critical approaches to the FTAA tend to cmphasise the negative 
consequences of this project without reflecting on the role of civil society in the 
creation of alternatives. The three theoretical approaches to the FTAA process 
present views on the meaning of this project from distinct policy positions. 
Despite their differences, these theoretical traditions share a common neglect of 
the role of counter-hegemonic forces like the HSA in the FTAA process. What 
0 
is needed is a theoretical perspective that enables reflection on the opposing and 
mutually constituting dynamics of trade liberalisation and counter-hegemonic 
formation. Only after the forces of resistance to the FTAA are seen as an 
integral dimension of this hemispheric process can there be the possibility of 
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reflecting on the challenges and opportunities faced by counter-hegemonic 
coalitions like the HSA in the building of political alternatives to neo-liberalism 
in the Americas. The next chapter develops a theoretical perspective that allows 
closer movement towards this objective. 
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CHAPTER3 
A political process approach 
The purpose of this research is to assess to what extent the HSA has contributed 
to the construction of political altematives to the neo-liberal view of 
development identified in the FTAA project. It was argued in the previous 
chapter that the academic and policy literature produced on the FTAA project is 
inadequate to understand the important role that the HSA plays in this 
hemispheric process. This chapter proposes a theoretical framework for the 
analysis of the HSA as a key social force affecting the dynamics of the FTAA 
process. The first section of the chapter discusses the origin and contribution of 
the political process version of the resource mobilisation theory for the study of 
social movements. The second section highlights the importance for 
mobilisastion of the access to and control of social movments to political and 
material resources. The third section introduces the concept of political 
opportunity structure to define the dimensions of the political environment that 
affect positively or negatively the emergence and success of social movements. 
This concept is central to the political process tradition of social movement 
theory. The fourth section identifies the specific political opportunity factors 
present in the context of the Westem Hemisphere associated with the rise and 
mobilisation of the Hemispheric Social Alliance. 
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Recapturing the agency of social movements 
The political process tradition of social movement theory is a later variant of 
the resource mobilisation (RM) theory that developed in the United States 
during the 1970s as an attempt to understand the rise and actions of the civil 
rights and anti-war movements. The study of movements before the emergence 
of RM theory was dominated by the classical collective behaviour theory with a 
research agenda centred on explaining the emergence of fascism and Nazism in 
Europe, which had so tragically resulted in World War 11 (Tarrow, 1994: 82). 
According to the core assumptions of the classical collective behaviour theory, 
collective action was regarded as an unpredictable and non-institutional 
phenomenon, resulting as a reaction to societal stress or breakdown and leading 
to a generalised state of social alienation. Discontent and psychological anxiety 
were taken to be the causes that drive individuals to partake in collective 
behaviour acts (Buechler, 2000: 20-21). Accordingly, social movements were 
defined as 'dysfunctional, irrational, and inherently undesirable, and those who 
joined them as disconnected from intermediate associations that would link 
them with more productive, and less disruptive, social pursuits' (Meyer, 2004b: 
126) - this view was epitomised by the work of William Kornhauser (1959) on 
mass society. 
This view of social movements was inherently conservative. It reflected - and 
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in turn contributed to reproduce - the prevailing political climate of the 
McCarthysm period characteriscd by a preoccupation with issues of social 
order and control (Buechler, 2000: 30-57). The rise of the civil rights and anti- 
war movements seemed at odds with the view that social movements resulted 
from the coming together of socially dislocated and distressed individuals. This 
could not possibly happen in what was regarded as an afflucnt and 'healthy' 
democratic society like the United States (Mcyer, 2004b: 127). In failing to 
acknowledge the political dimension of the emerging social movements, the 
classical collective behaviour theory discouraged the possibility of questioning 
the social and political assumptions of its period, even when confronted with 
the rise of new social actors who challenged some aspects of the prevailing 
status quo. 
Furthermore, the prevailing approach to social movements at the time was 
incapable of conceiving of social movements as purposeful social actors. 
Contrary to their initial intuitions, social movement researchers realised that 
collective initiatives such as public protests were sometimes leading to 
concessions from governments. This suggested that rather than being 
manifestations of mass hysteria, protests were in fact rational Political resources 
employed by groups for whom conventional means of political expression were 
not available (Meyer, 2004b: 127). Increasingly, it became apparent that 
protests were not erratic outbreaks of an irrational mob, but rather acts of 
defiance to authority and prevailing social values through rational means. 
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The resource mobilisation (RM) theory came out in the attempt to assert the 
rational agency and political quality of the new social movements from the 
stultifying contrives of the classical collective behaviour tradition. Research 
focused on explaining how social movements organise, accumulate resources, 
coordinate collective action and make strategic choices (Gamson, 1990; 
McCarthy and Zald, 1977). In highlighting the rationality of social movements, 
RM questioned the 'premises of anomie and political disconnection' (Meyer, 
2004b: 127) that had guided previous studies in this area. 
According to Canel (1997: 19): 
By focusing on resource management, tactics and strategy, it [RM] calls 
attention to the importance of strategic-instrumental action. It examines a level 
of social action where the actors' decisions affect the outcomes of conflicts and 
influence the future and the effectiveness of SMs [social movements]. 
The RM research agenda eventually branched off into two distinct variants: the 
entrepreneurial version (McCarthy and Zald, 1973; 1977) and the political 
process version (Oberschall, 1973; Tilly, 1978; McAdam, 1982). Here we are 
concerned with the second of these traditions. 
Just like the earlier RM perspectives, the political process approach reaffirmed 
the analytical importance of rational agency, the organisational arrangement 
and the resource control capacity of social movements in accounts for their 
emergence and acquired degree of political success. However, the political 
process version criticised what it regarded as a static view of social movements 
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that was implicit in RM approaches (McAdam et aL, 200 1; Tarrow 1994). 
It was claimed that 'early resource mobilization models exaggerate the 
centrality of deliberate strategic decisions to social movements' to the extent of 
downplaying 'the contingency, emotionality, plasticity, and interactive 
character of movement politics' (McAdam et aL, 2001: 15). Knowing how 
movements organise and access resources would only take us to a certain point. 
In order to understand social movements they have to be approached as part of 
a dynamics of interaction with its contending forces in society. 
Likewise, the political process perspective considered that it was not enough to 
simply recognise the rationality, strategies, organisations and resources of 
social movements. What was lacking was a reflection on the political sources of 
the grievances of social movements. This was not addressed by the 
entrepreneurial version of RM. This variant considered that grievances were 
only secondary when explaining the rise and actions of social movements. The 
suitability of their organisational arrangement for the access to and control of 
resources was what ultimately made the difference. The political process 
variant regarded this view as limiting since it did not take into consideration the 
political context and content of social movement struggles. In this regard, it can 
be said that whereas RM 'provided something of a corrective to collective 
behavior, emphasizing the intentionality and rationality of protesters', it also 
neglected 'the political factors that provided grievances, resources, and 
openings to challengers' (Meyer, 2004a: 49). In light of these criticisms, the 
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distinctive contribution of the political process approach was the emphasis 
placed on the interactions of social movements with their political context. 
Attempts to understand the agency and formation of social movements had to 
take into account the possibilities and restrictions of the external environment in 
which movements operate. Initial concerns about how social movements secure 
and mobilise political resources were thus readdressed to take into account the 
opportunities and limitations presented by the political context. Meyer (2004a: 
50) claims that the 'essential emphasis of the PPT [political process tradition], 
as it developed in the 1970s and 1980s, is that activists don't choose goals, 
strategies, and tactics in a vacuum. Rather, the political context, conceptualized 
fairly broadly, sets the grievances around which activists mobilize, advantaging 
some claims and disadvantaging others. 
Furthermore, 
[The] PPT correctly turns analysts' attention to the world outside social 
movements, but not to the exclusion of strategy and tactics. Indeed, if we are to 
develop a good understanding of the process by which activists make choices 
about strategies and tactics, and the wisdom of these choices, we need to 
understand the weight that external factors play in those calculations. 
Meaningful understanding of agency can only come with attention to structure. 
Political process emphasizes the connections between challengers and those they 
challenge, particularly in more conventional politics and political institutions, in 
order to understand what they do and what impact they have (eg., Soule, 1997) 
(Meyer, 2004a: 54). 
Such emphasis on the constitutive relation between movements and their 
context permitted political process analysts to move away 'from their confreres 
by stressing dynamism, strategic interaction, and response to the political 
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environmcnt' (McAdam et aL, 2001: 16). 
The interactions between social movements and political context express the 
conflict between forces struggling to challenge existing structures of authority, 
and political elites seeking to maintain the stability and continuity of a given 
social order. One implication of asserting the analytical primacy of conflict - 
as the site for social reproduction through sustained interactions between 
challengers and authorities - is that political actors cannot be understood in 
isolation from the power struggles in which they are immersed. Their identities 
and possibilities are mutually constituted by virtue of their partaking in a 
process of political confrontation with their adversaries. Likewise, conflict 
permeates not only the interactions of social movements with ruling elites, but 
also the relations among the social forces and individuals that take part in social 
movement politics. The analysis of political conflict becomes central to 
understand the ways in which social movements emerge and gain influence and 
a sense of collective identity. 
The importance of resources for mobilisation 
Resource mobilisation theory explores the relation between access to and 
control of resources and social movement mobilisation. There are plenty of 
examples of sources of grievances that could potentially lead people and/or 
sectors of society to act together for the pursuit of collective interests. However, 
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the extent to which such movements will succeed is always conditional upon 
their capacity to acquire and employ resources for collectively defincd 
purposes. Foweraker (1995: 16) explains that MI theory 'begins with the 
premise that social discontent is universal but collective action is not. It is 
inherently difficult to organize a social movement, and the main problem is 
mobilizing sufficient resources to maintain and expand the movement'. 
There is no agreement within the theory over what constitutes 'resources' 
(Jenkins, 1983: 533). One way to approach this is to distinguish between 
material and non-material resources. The first often include money, 
organisational facilities, personnel, communications infrastructure, links with 
other social organisations with shared political agendas and access to the media, 
amongst others. The second comprise legitimacy, loyalty, authority, moral 
commitment, solidarity and others. Social movement mobilisation therein refers 
to the process by which a group gathers resources and places them under their 
collective control for the purpose of advancing its interests through collective 
action (Canel, 1997: 14). 
The formation and initiatives undertaken by the Hemispheric Social Alliance 
(HSA) are also tied to its availability and control of strategic resources, even if 
the HSA is not a social movement per se but a transnational social movement 
coalition. Following the earlier distinction between different kinds of resources, 
material resources that have been important in the HSA include its flexible 
organisational structure which comprises an Executive Secretariat, an Operative 
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Coordination body, a Hemispheric Council and a numbcr of issue-spccific 
Committees. Also, the personnel and research expertise provided mostly by the 
large trade union organisations that partake in this coalition and also by the 
development NGOs has been extremely valuable, particularly the United 
Workers Federation (CUT) in Brazil and the American Federation of Labor- 
Congress of Industrial Organisations (AFL-CIO) in the United States. 
Material resources cannot be assumed to be equally available among all the 
member organisations of the HSA. Asymmetries in levels of resource 
endowment are prevalent with trade unions and some development NGOs, 
particularly from the North, relying on more stable and reliable access to 
resources in contrast to less formally organised and poorer grassroots 
movements. In this regard, the HSA should not be approached as an 
organisation that is capable of centralising and controlling a pool of material 
resources for its activities. Even when some resources are available to be 
allocated for joint HSA activities, most of the reliance on material resources is 
conditional to the specific positions of each of the HSA members in their 
respective countries. Differentiated access to this type of resource has 
facilitated or limited the kinds of activities that the respective local HSA 
chapters have been able to coordinate. 
Political or non-material resources have played a much greater part in the 
development of and influence acquired by the HSA at the hemispheric level. 
These political resources include, first, the HSA Alternative for the Americas 
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policy documents, which contain the bases of consensus of a broad multi- 
scctoral and hemispheric coalition on an alternative vision of development and 
integration opposed to the FTAA project (IISA, 1998; 2002a). Second, the 
legitimacy of the IISA as a dcmocratisation force in the continent to counteract 
the exclusionary nature of the FTAA process. Third, the capability of the HSA 
to generate expectations that the FTAA process can be halted as a means of 
maintaining high levels of mobilisation of opposition throughout the continent. 
Fourth, the discursive construction of FTAA frames around which to advance a 
critique of this proposed agreement was also a key political resource that 
permitted the hemispheric articulation of this coalition. These non-material 
resources have been central in the articulation of the HSA as a multi-sectoral 
transnational coalition. The extent to which the HSA was able to fully control 
these political resources will be addressed in the empirical chapters of this 
thesis. 
An analysis of the HSA from a resource-based perspective is therefore 
concerned with the initiatives undertaken by this coalition to create and control 
a series of strategic political resources with the aim of pursuing the construction 
of alternatives to the FTAA project. A political process approach emphasises 
the path-dcpendency and contingency of such actions that results from the 
interaction of the HSA with its shifting political contcxt. 
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Political opportunity structure 
There arc many sources of grievance in society that could potentially lead to the 
formation of social movements with sufficient political power to successfully 
challenge the prevailing social order and authority. However, it is only in very 
few cases that such grievances will actually translate into forces of social 
transformation of any considerable significance. The contribution of a RM 
theory is to show that the kinds of organisations and resources available to 
social movements are important to an understanding of their success. 
Furthermore, the political process variant of this theory accepts that 
organisations and resources are analytically important but equally claims that 
these cannot be understood independently of the political struggles guiding the 
relation of social movements to their political environment. 
Considering the vast range of movements that could emerge and acquire 
political influence, the notion of political opportunity structures is helpful to 
understand why movements do not appear only in direct response to the level of 
supporters' grievances. For it is political opportunities that translate the 
potential for movement into mobilization, then even groups with mild 
grievances and few internal resources may appear in movement, while those 
with deep grievances and dense resources - but lacking opportunities - may 
not' (Tarrow, 1994: 17-18). 
Tarrow (1994: 18) defines political opportunity structure as: 
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[C]onsistent - but not necessarily formal, permanent or national - dimensions of 
the political environment which either encourage or discourage people from 
using collective action. The concept of political opportunity emphasizes 
resources external to the group - unlike money or power - that can be taken 
advantage of even by weak or disorganized challengers. Social movements form 
when ordinary citizens, sometimes encouraged by leaders, respond to changes in 
opportunities that lower the costs of collective action, reveal potential allies and 
show where elites and authorities are vulnerable. 
This concept - ccntral to the political process tradition of social movmcnt 
theory - has led to considerable definitional confusion and imprecision in the 
literature (Gamson and Mcycr, 1996; Goodwin and Jasper, 2004: 6; Meycr, 
2004b: 126). Koopcrmans (2004) disaggregates this concept in an attempt to 
clarify its meaning. 
Firstly, the notion of 'opportunity' 'generally refers to constraints, possibilities 
and threats that originate outside the mobilizing group, but affccts its chance of 
mobilizing and/or of realizing its collective interests'. Furthermore, it also 
refers to 'options for action, which may be either available or not', since 
opportunity 'also contains a notion of uncertain outcomes' (Koopermans, 2004: 
64). This means that there is always a 'chance that certain options will bring 
about desired outcomes and the risk that they will have undesired outcomes, 
(2004: 64). Building on these clarifications, the author argues that the 
'opportunity thesis then amounts to the claim that people choose those options 
for collective action that are (a) available and (b) are expected to result in a 
favorable outcome' (2004: 64-65). In other words, opportunities are the options 
for actions that are potentially available to social movements and which arc 
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expected to be successful. 
Secondly, Koopermans distinguishes between what the literature considers 
4political' opportunities from other sorts of opportunities that are not 
necessarily political. Since the political process tradition has focused primarily 
on the interactions between social movements with state institutions and actors, 
its understanding of the political is circumscribed to the sphere of such 
interactions. Consequently, political process research has tended to concentrate 
mainly on 'citizenship movements' involved in the struggle for the provision of 
collective goods, or the removal of collective bads by external authorities 
(Koopermans, 2004: 66). In defining the realm of the 'political' restrictively in 
terms of the demand for public rights within the context of the nation-state, 
other kinds of social movements are invariably neglected from the dynamics of 
social change. 
This is the case of counter-cultural movements dedicated to changing cultural 
codes and promoting new lifestyles and identities. As their strategies do not 
necessarily have state institutions or actors as their main target, they cannot be 
easily captured by the intercst-based notion of politics, which is associated with 
narrowly-defined conceptions of political struggle rooted in institutional 
frameworks. In subverting established social meanings and conventional 
thinking, cultural movements question the non-nalisation (or naturalisation) of 
social conventions and values, associated with the legitimisation of authority 
structures. This is a political act, even if different from, for example, the 
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practice of lobbying in congress or the mobilisation of public protest against the 
privatisation of public scrvices. 
Koopcrmans tries to justify the exclusion of other kinds of social movements 
from the notion of political opportunity by arguing that as countcr-culturc 
movements 'produce their own collective benefits; they will have a greater 
degree of autonomy from their political environment and thus be less 
adequately explained by political opportunities' (2004: 66). It is also the case 
that movements who reject the traditional forms of political action associated 
with the struggle to take the power of the state as a means by which to obtain 
their objectives. One example of this is the Zapatista, movement in Mexico 
which advocates a strategy of changing the world without taking (state) power. 
Thirdly, political opportunities can have 'structural' qualities when social 
movements think that they 'cannot be influenced, at least not in the foreseeable 
future, by collective action' (Koopmans, 2004: 67). Since this tradition of social 
movement research assumes the rationality of social movements, explanations 
of their agency must assume the premise that political actors react to the 
opportunities available to them in a given political context by seeking to 
maximize the results of their interventions. The notion of 'structures' evokes 
the idea that there are certain conditions in the external political context that 
social movements are not capable of changing and which will remain relatively 
stable throughout time. If something is structural, it can be said that it bears the 
quality of enduring time; moreover, that it can be assumed that it will remain 
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constant in the foreseeable future. In rational accounts of agency, structures are 
analytically valuable because political actors assume their relative stability 
when assessing the most suitable form of intervention in the political context. 
In other words, political opportunity structures concern the stable external 
incentives that affect the choices made by social movements when developing 
forms of organisation and strategies in the pursuit of their political objectives. 
Taken as given within a political environment, political opportunity structures 
can also be expanded by the struggle and engagement of social movements with 
authorities. Thus, they must be treated as stable while deciding what strategy to 
implement, even if the consequences of the adoption of that strategy can 
contribute to create further incentives for other movements to seek their 
objectives by other means. 
There is a risk of seeing political opportunity structures as a series of incentives 
that determine the rise and success of social movements. This view would 
reduce social movements to the condition of mechanical responses to changes 
in the political context which may facilitate or inhibit their actions. Whatever 
political opportunity factors may be involved in providing incentives for social 
movement mobilisation, their sources are not located exclusively in the political 
context. Social movements must be able to interpret changes in the political 
environment in order to understand them as opportunities (Gamson and Meyer, 
1996). Namely, external changes in the political environment per se do not 
account for particular actions or decisions that social movements may 
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undertake or adopt - which may affect their chances of acquiring political 
influence. External changes arc a necessary, yet insufficient in isolation, 
condition for the existence of meaningful incentives for mobilisation. 
There is an ongoing debate as to the limitations of this rationalist approach to 
adequately address the cultural dimension of social movements (Goodwin and 
Jasper, 2004). What is suggested here is that the recognition of this cultural 
dimension can enable us to move away from the structural deterministic 
tendency implied in the notion of political opportunity structure. Gamson and 
Mcyer (1996: 279) suggest that '[o]pportunity has a strong cultural component 
and we miss something important when we limit our attention to variance in 
political institutions and the relationships among political actors'. 
It is not enough to claim that social movements can only be studied in relation 
to the political opportunities that define their environment. It is also necessary 
to show how their relation to that context is expressed. The political process 
tradition provides abundant examples of how external changes 'explain' social 
movement developments. However, the other side of this equation has received 
lesser attention. The claim that changes in the political opportunity structure are 
always mediated by historicised and ideologically informed knowledge restores 
political agency to social movements. This is the case because social 
movements articulate ideological positions or discourse in relation to their 
struggles, objectives and political contexts. Only after incorporating the 
di scurs ive- ideological dimension can the claim that incentives for mobilisation 
associated with changes in the political opportunity become (politically) 
mcaningful. 
Political opportunity factors: the Americas as a transnational political 
space 
It was established that the political opportunity structure is anal)lically 
important because its affects the strategic choices of social movements. But 
what are the political opportunity factors or incentives that affect the decisions 
of social movements to take action in the pursuit of their political objectives? 
Tarrow proposes that 'the most salient changes in opportunity structure result 
from the opening up of access to power, from shifts in ruling alignments, from 
the availability of influential allies and from cleavages within and among elites' 
(Tarrow, 1994: 18). Furthermore, in addition to these factors, inter-subjective 
cultural meanings embedded in society also constitute an important factor in 
political opportunity. Tarrow discusses the importance of the cultural symbols 
as resources that social movements employ to ensure that their claims resonate 
with accepted beliefs in society. While this is certainly the case, beliefs are not 
just analytically important as the resources available to movements. They are 
elements that are part of the external political context which can affect the 
movement's choices of strategy. Accordingly, they should be treated as part of 
political opportunity structures. 
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Khagram and Sikkink (2000) argue that most 'political opportunity theorists 
specify the mechanisms of opportunity in local, regional or national terms ( ... ) 
But there is no inherent reason why opportunity structure must be limited to 
national or local politics'. The following sub-sections propose the use of the 
notion of political opportunity structure to address a transnational political 
space as defined by the IISA continental resistance to the FTAA agenda. 
Alignments with otherpolitical actors 
The alignments of social movements with other political actors or sectors of the 
electorate are also relevant sources of political opportunity. By creating 
alignments, movements can increase their relative power vis-A-vis the 
authorities, improve their chances of attaining their political goals and expand 
their range of choices of action. However, to succeed they also need to ensure a 
sufficiently stable basis of consensus to maintain their unity of action and 
purpose. 
Research has tended to concentrate on the alignment of social movements with 
political actors, which make up the institutional framework of the nation-state. 
These include political parties, government coalitions and trade union 
organisations -depending on what theory of the state is assumed. However, 
the emergence of new social forces that emerged as a rejection of traditional 
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institutional politics has expanded the range of possible kinds of alignments 
available to social movements. 
Market libcralisation and state reform implemented in the region since the 
1970s, and accentuated since the 1990s, transformed the corporatist system of 
statc-society relations in Latin America (Garrct6n, 1999). This transformation 
of state-socicty relations meant that trade union organisations lost a significant 
degree of the political influence and representational capacity that they once 
had (Chalmers ct. al., 1998; Oxhorn, 1998). In the midst of this relative decline 
of the labour movement, new and heterogeneous social movements arose from 
the "margins" of established society, acquiring considerable influence in the 
dynamics of national politics. This is the case of the urban movements of 
unemployed workers, such as the Piquetero movement of Argentina. Other 
examples throughout Latin America of movements that have emerged in search 
of social inclusion, or have gained greater political influence, include the rural 
(Edelman, 2003) and indigenous movements (Houghton and Bell, 2004; 
Quijano, 2005). The emergence of these movements displaced the left parties 
and the union movements as the main form of social transformation (Zibechi, 
2005a: 13-14). 
An important characteristic of these new movements is their demand for greater 
autonomy from the state in light of the exclusionary consequences of economic 
liberalisation (Escobar and Alvarez, 1992; CaIder6n et aL, 1992: 24; Seoane 
and Taddei, 2002: 111). Disenchanted with traditional politics, movements 
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have a 'clear awareness of the limits of the parties'. This has led them to 
develop 'their own agenda and their own programs', rather than purely reacting 
to states or parties as they had done in the past (Zibechi: 2005b: 3). It has been 
claimed that possibly 'one of the most noticeable new things is the growing 
self-esteem of the movements, which now feel capable of drawing their own 
courses and establishing their own programs without waiting for political 
parties to take on work that only organized society can carry out. In this way, 
the Latin American social movements are preparing more extensive and 
substantial offensives that can once again modify the regional scenario in the 
coming years' (4). 
The multiplication of social actors evidences the crisis of representation of 
social interests and likewise the search for new forms of interest organisation. 
The formation of broad-based multi-sectoral coalitions has become the prime 
example of this search for new ways to articulate social demands amid a 
political context characterised by a proliferation of social actors. These 
emerging coalitions bring together 'old' movements like the trade unions and 
6new' movements and political actors associated with traditional institutional 
politics such as parties and governments coalitions. 
The scope of action of these new broad coalitions is not restricted to the context 
of national politics. They have also extended their linkages across state borders 
in the formation of transnational multi-sectoral coalitions. Transnationalism has 
increased their autonomy and added a certain independent logic of its own that 
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escapes the effective control of a single state or a coalition of states (Vayryncn, 
2001: 237). Tarrow (1994: 195-6) claims that '[t]he national social movement 
grew out of the efforts of states to consolidate power, integrate their peripheries 
and standardize discourse among groups of citizens and bctNvecn them and their 
rulers', however, '[i]f movements are becoming transnational, they may be 
freeing themselves of state structures and thence of the constraining influence 
of state-mediatcd contcrition'. 
The social space for the transnational interactions of social movements is 
therefore becoming increasingly irreducible in terms of the effective control of 
the territorially bounded systems of political organisation and imagination 
embedded in the nation-state. According to Melucci (1995: 52) the 'social 
space of movements has become a distinct area of the system and no longer 
coincides either with the traditional forms of organisation of solidarity or with 
the conventional channels of political representation. The area of movements is 
now a 61sector" or a "subsystem" of the social arena. These kinds of alignments 
across borders have opened the possibility for reflection on the issues of 
organisation, strategies, agendas and identity independently of their direct 
interactions with political parties and states institutions. 
The possibility of establishing political alignments with other social actors 
within and beyond the national context expands the range of options for action 
(strategies, tactics) available to social movements. In addition to the alignment 
with political parties and trade unions, contemporary social movements in Latin 
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America are also engaging in joint initiatives of collective action with a variety 
of new social forces that were not part of the national political process until 
very recently. The formation of national and transnational coalitions among 
diverse numbers of actors has increased the potential political power of social 
movements through their capacity to set the political agenda and terms of the 
public debate - particularly in the areas of trade integration, unemployment, 
environmental issues, human rights and also public security. The complex 
dynamics of contemporary social movement politics in Latin America cannot 
be studied simply by focusing on institutional politics and political parties, even 
if these continue to play an important part in this process. Likewise, the 
boundaries of social movement interactions are not restricted to the borders of 
the nation-state. Transnational alignments increasingly complement and 
rederine the national and sub-national localities of social movements. 
Chapter 4 explores the political opportunities available to the HSA in its 
attempt to build a basis of consensus for an alternative agenda of integration to 
the FTAA project by creating transnational alignments with other social 
networks and left-of-centre governments. 
A ccess to political institutions 
The political process tradition considers the access of social movements to 
power as the main political opportunity affecting their choices of strategy and 
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their degree of success. Social movements arc less likely to adopt a more 
confrontational stratcgy of protcst mobilisation whcn thcy count on institutional 
avenues for meaningful access routes through which to influence the political 
system. 
Access to power primarily depends on the possibility of influencing the 
dynamics of formal political institutions. The recurrent image of 'institutional 
channels' conveys the idea of a polity-centric orientation to the strategies of 
social movements. This centrality on the polity has to do with the original 
development of the political process theory due to the formation of the nation- 
state institutions. The analytical salience of institutional arrangements as 
sources of political opportunities for social movements goes back to the 
foundational work of Eiscnger (1973) and Tilly (1978). 
Eisengcr was interested in explaining the emergence of riots in U. S. cities 
during the 1960s, which were driven by race and poverty grievances. Tilly 
instead explored the role of revolutions in the development of the state in 
Europe. In both cases, the main explanatory factor associated with the rise of 
contentious forms of collective action by social movements is the degree of 
openness or closeness of the existing institutional arrangements for citizen 
participation - at the municipal level in the first case, and at the nation-state 
level in the second. The authors proposed that open institutional arrangements 
that offer the possibility of participation in the formal political process 
discourage social movements from adopting more disruptive strategies such as 
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riots or direct action tactics as a means of pursuing their political goals. This 
proposition is based on the assumption that social movements would rather 
avoid more costly forms of action, which could expose them to greater failure, 
when less costly options arc available. 
It does not follow from this claim that in the absence of institutional access 
social movements will necessarily engage in protest tactics. Authorities can 
break and repress the attempts of movements to organisc resistance and thereby 
disrupt their cfforts to develop the minimum organisational capacities required 
for mobilisation. Mcyer (2004a: 50) explains that: 
In order for organizers to mobilize protest, potential activists need to be 
convinced that this tactic is both necessary and potentially effective in getting 
them what they want from government. If government appears likely to respond 
to less disruptive means of participation, it will generally be hard to convince 
many people to take on the risks and difficulties of protesting. And if 
government makes protest even less attractive, perhaps by harshly repressing 
protesters or by offering no prospects of responding to dissent, protest 
mobilization is less likely. This all makes sense, as does the recognition that 
governments can make protest less likely by either offering less costly, often 
more institutional, means of participation or by repressing protest more 
aggressively. 
That is, 'protests occur when there is a space of toleration by a polity and when 
claimants are neither sufficiently advantaged to obviate the need to use 
dramatic means to express their interests nor so completely repressed to prevent 
them from trying to get what they want' (Meyer, 2004b: 128). 
The decision over what kinds of strategy social movements adopt as the result 
of changes in the degree of access to political institutions is not dependent only 
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on the objective characteristics of the external environment: for example, a new 
legislation that creates an institutional space to incorporate non-govemmental 
actors within the policy-making arena, or conversely the greater criminalisation 
of protest due to the tightening of security laws. Not all social movements will 
understand their position in relation to political institutions in the same way. 
Meyer (2004a: 50) claims that: 
Obviously, some constituencies are more likely to respond to greater openness, 
which enables them to express political grievances through collective action. 
Others are more likely to resort to protest when the prospects of meaningful 
access through more conventional political participation are foreclosed. 
Provocation and exclusion are more significant in such cases. 
The reason that this is the case is linked to the fact that the political significance 
of changes in the degree of institutional access is also dependent on the kinds of 
subjective expectations of social movements. This is not a minor point, as it 
affects what ultimately counts as 'open' or 'closed' institutional arrangements 
in the eyes of social movements. 
Many social movements seek to influence political processes by participating in 
official mechanisms of consultation through civil society organisations, forums 
organiscd by government representatives, and other means of engagement in 
the definition and implementation of state policies. Others instead will be less 
inclined to participate in such consultations with public officials. There are 
different views as to what constitutes "meaningful participation" in these 
processes. In this, what counts as meaningful access depends on the nature of 
the political expectations held by different social groups, which result from 
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their past experience of interactions with state institutions and authorities. 
In other words, the kinds of responses from social movements to changes in 
degrees of openness of political institutions cannot be attributed to the nature of 
such institutional conditions per se. Nor can they be exclusively attributed to 
the decisions and organisational capacity of social movements alone - as the 
resource mobilisation perspective originally emphasiscd. Instead, it is in the 
historicised interaction between political institutions and social movements that 
the actual meaning of an 'open' or 'closed' access to a polity is to be found. 
Moving away from a strictly national focus on the relation of social movements 
to state institutions, there have been attempts to explore the transnational 
dimension of social movements that concentrates on the political opportunities 
created at the level of inter-governmental and trans-governmental organisations 
(Fisher, 2002; Joachim, 2003; Metzges, 2004; Meyer, 2003; Passy, 1999; Smith 
el aL, 1997; Smith, 1997; 1999a). 
The incorporation of other decision-making institutional venues as potential 
points of access for social movements prompted the necessity to understand 
how the political opportunities at the domestic and international levels relate to 
each other. It has been argued that both institutional levels of opportunity 
become interdependent and mutually reinforcing (Ansell and di Palma, 2004; 
Bob, 2002; Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Risse-Kappen, 1995; Sikkink, 2005; 
Tarrow, 2004). 
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The work of Keck and Sikkink (1998) on transnational advocacy networks is 
perhaps the most renowned study exploring the multi-level approach of this 
institutional dimension of political opportunities. The authors show how NGOs 
embarked on a strategy of lobbying international organisations to press their 
governments to change their human rights and environmental policies. In what 
they call a 'boomerang effect', these NGOs were capable of reaching back and 
influencing their governments through the leverage they gained at the 
international level. Others have conducted similar kinds of analyses focusing on 
the strategic choices of institutional venue made by labour organisations as part 
of a campaign against maquiladoras in Honduras (Armbruster-Sandoval, 2003), 
among others. 
In the case of the FTAA process, institutional access concerns the official 
mechanisms of civil society consultation. Chapter 5 explores the participation 
of the HSA in these hemispheric official consultations to argue that its lack of 
access in the FTAA process permitted the HSA to accrue its legitimacy and 
launch a continental campaign against the FTAA. 
Divisions ofthe elite 
Another opportunity factor in the political context associated with the options 
available for social movements is the degree of cohesion of ruling elites. it is 
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assumed that when the coalition of elites is more stable and cohesive, their 
capacity to ncutralise the attempts of social movements to challenge their 
authority will increase accordingly. 
Cohesive elites can offset the influence of social movements by being able to 
secure the legitimacy and support of the general public regarding their proposed 
policies or actions, the removal of privileges such as institutional access, 
constitutional rights, material resources and public recognition and inhibit their 
actions by means of repression using the security forces and new legal 
instruments to criminalise their actions. This can directly undermine the power 
of social movements. When deciding the most adequate strategy of action, 
social movements will consider the extent to which ruling elites are cohesive 
enough to employ such means of intervention and deterrence. 
Tarrow (1994) differentiates between the political opportunities created by 
'cleavages within and among elites' and 'shifts in ruling alignments! lie 
reason for this distinction is that the latter refers to the standing of new 
governments following electoral processes. Government coalitions can be 
unstable due to a poor electoral result and therefore prone to being susceptible 
to the pressures of social movements. However, given its interest in exploring 
the transnational dimension of this political opportunity factor, this section 
treats them as part of a single opportunity. 
In their struggle for social change, movements will try to exploit every apparent 
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division between the elites in order to expose their contradictions and 
weaknesses. Insofar as politics takes place in the realm of the public spectacle, 
showing the limitations of ruling elites can seriously damage their claim to 
authority as legitimate representatives of the people. 
The ways in which social movements can challenge the authority of 
governments will depend on how governments obtain and reproduce their 
legitimacy. Naturally, this will differ depending on the nature of the political 
system, and on the values that predominate in a particular political culture. The 
public impact of civil society in Latin America as they denounced acts of 
governmental corruption, and a general lack of transparency in politics, during 
the 1990s could not have had the same impact in the 1970s at a time when 
many of these countries were under military dictatorship. The circumstances 
were obviously different, but the point here is that the deepening of democratic 
values of Latin America, following the experience of authoritarianism and state 
repression, decreased the degree of public tolerance of incidents that are now 
regarded as contrary to the advancement of democratic values. The margins of 
manoeuvrc in which social movements can exploit situations politically, by 
pointing out divisions among the elites, are both the result of their actions and 
also of how the general public will ultimately respond to such accusations. 
Assessing the strength of ruling elites is vital for social movements. 
Miscalculations may unnecessarily expose the movement to the cfforts of 
governments to silence their claims or even repress their activities. Contrarily, 
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an offensive strategy fonnulatcd on a correct assessment of the adversaries' 
possibilitics can cnsurc its succcss and also guarantcc the futurc continuation of 
the social movement. 
Conviction plays a central role here, for it is unlikely that there can be sustained 
mobilisation of people without the expectation that this is a politically 
justifiable option. In this regard, the weakening of ruling elites permits social 
movements to capitalise on their challenges to authority, but also to reinvent 
their own sense of purpose, direction and internal legitimacy. By exposing the 
divisions among the elites, social movements can sustain high levels of 
mobilisation. Boosting the confidence among the movement ranks that their 
struggle is yielding concrete results is absolutely necessary to maintain the 
sense of commitment and purpose, especially at the grassroots levels. This is 
commonly done by diminishing the perceived conditions of the adversaries to 
confront the pressure of social movements for change. 
Long before there were organized movements, there were riots, rebellions and 
general turbulence. It is only by sustaining collective action against antagonists 
that a contentious episode becomes a social movement. Common purposes, 
collective identities and an identifiable challenge help movements to do this. But 
unless they can sustain this challenge against opponents, they will either 
evaporate into the kind of individualistic resentment that James Scott calls 
"resistance, " harden into intellectual opposition or retreat into isolation. The 
social movements that have left the deepest mark on history have done so 
because they sustained collective action against better-equipped opponents 
(Tarrow, 1994: 5-6). 
An exploration of the tmnsnational dimension of elite cohesion concentrates on 
the networks of public officials, corporations and policy specialists that 
constitute a 'transnational capitalist elite' (Oberbeek, 2000; Robinson and 
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Harris, 2000; Sklair, 1997; Van del pij], 1984). The transnational hemispheric 
dimension of this opportunity factor identifies the extent to which governmental 
and business elites arc able to agree on a common platform of trade 
liberalisation in the FTAA process. 
Chapter 6 discusses in great detail the tensions and divisions of the elites in 
their attempt to formulate a continental conscnsus on an FTAA agenda. Their 
lack of leadership and legitimacy opened a political opportunity for the IISA to 
sustain their continental mobilisation and therein avoid dispersion and lack of 
focus. The chapter shows the ways in which the HSA has politically exposed 
and exploited the obstacles and divisions encountered by the elites with regard 
to the creation of the FTAA. 
Inter-subjective meanings 
Intcr-subjcctive meanings and beliefs embedded in political cultures also 
present social movements with political opportunities for action. The sharing of 
common interests is a necessary condition for the possibility of creating 
solidarity, which allows the collective mobilisation to advance its political 
aims. 
Tarrow (1994: 5) explains that 'the most common denominator of social 
movements is ( ... ) interest; 
but interest is no more than an objective category 
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imposed by the observer. It is participants' recognition of their common 
interests that translates the potential for movement into collective action' 
(cmphasis addcd). Ilowcver, the act of recognising common intcrests by 
political actors does not take place in a vacuum. The possibility of knowledge is 
always an act of engagement with prior knowledge - to recognise is an act of 
encounicr with something that to some extent is already known, thus rc- 
cognizc. The kinds of intcr-subjcctivc meanings and beliefs rooted in society 
provide a layer of knowledge that is necessary for political action through the 
identification of common interests. 
The view that the inter-subjective meanings that make up the political context 
of social movements can provide political opportunities for collective action is 
based on the social constructivist assumption that ideas are constitutive of 
social reality. Meaning of the world is created through the intcr-subjectivc 
interactions of people. Philosopher Ian Hacking (2003: 48) refers to social 
constructivism as the 'various sociological, historical, and philosophical 
projects that aim at displaying or analyzing actual, historically situated, social 
interactions or causal routes that led to, or were involved in, the coming into 
being or establishing of some present entity or fact'. Central to this way of 
thinking is the idea that social reality is not necessary and inevitable, as there is 
nothing in nature that determines its development. Implicitly, there is the view 
that alternative realities are equally possible. 
Social constructivism questions the positivist assumptions that permeate much 
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of current social science research which views the 'world' as already 
constituted independently from human perception or understanding. Through 
our senses we 'discover' the facts and laws that govern the regularities of an 
essentially objective and material world 'out there'. The task of science is thus 
to uncover the underlying logic of this natural world. Contrary to this view, 
social constructivism believes that there is no 'outside' world that can be 
known or grasped if claims to knowledge do not aff inn the place of subjective 
ideas as constitutive of the social reality. 
In ascertaining the intervention of humans in the constitution of social reality, 
constructivists criticise the assumptions of objectivity and materialism of 
positivists approaches. The 'neutrality' and 'distance' of the inquirer from the 
object of study is regarded as a mere fictional construct of positivism. Also, 
they place at the centre of analysis the role of ideas and interpretation. 
interpretation of reality, on the bases of socially and historically contingent 
subjectivities, informs our knowledge about the world and guides our actions 
giving sense of our engagements with it. Politics, as the realm of collective 
actions in the struggle for power, is likewise dependent on the kinds of ideas 
present in a given context, and constructed through human interactions at the 
inter-subjective level. 
Political action is therefore always an act of cultural interpretation which 
involves the engagement of prior forms of knowledge shared inter-subjectively 
among the actual or potential political actors. It can be said that such inter- 
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subjective meanings offer political opportunities to social movements when 
they can be invoked as the basis on which to justify and legitimate their claims 
in the identification or recognition of common interests. However, while these 
inter-subjective conditions are to some extent given as external factors of 
opportunity in the political context, social movements can also expand them, 
facilitating therein the mobilisation of a greater critical mass. Melucci (1995: 
44) portrays collective action as a purposeful political artefact when he defines 
it as 'an interactive and shared definition produced by several individuals (or 
groups at a more complex level) concerned with the orientations of action and 
the field of opportunities and constraints in which action takes place. ' 
Furthermore, Tarrow (1994: 189-190) claims that: 
[s]olidarity has much to do with interest, but it produces a sustained movement 
only when consensus is built around common meanings and values. These 
meanings and values are partly inherited and partly constructed in the act of 
confronting opponents. They arc also constituted by the interactions within 
movements. One of the main factors distinguishing successful movements from 
failures is their capacity to link inherited understandings to the imperative for 
activism. 
Social movements expand the political opportunities associated with ingrained 
meanings available in a given context through their framing practices. The 
notion of 'frame' refers to the 'interpretive schemata that simplifies and 
condenses the "world out there" by selectively punctuating and encoding 
objects, situations, events, experiences, and sequences of actions within one's 
present or past environment' (Snow and Benford, 1992: 137). Through frames, 
social movements embed concrete protests in emotion-laden 'packages' 
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(Gamson, 1992), and at the same time justify and legitimate their activities and 
campaigns by appealing to injustice. Framing is therefore about the 
construction of stable interpretations of social reality as the bases of 
strategically chosen events and values, whereby particular normative 
understandings of reality are reflected, reproduced and transformed. To put it 
differently, framing is the practice of engineering knowledge and meaning for 
politically efficacious goals. 
Social movements engage in frame alignment practices when they seek to 
establish linkages between individuals and the interpretative orientations of 
social movement organisations. The purpose is to make the interests, values and 
beliefs of the individual congruent with the activities, goals, and ideology of the 
organisation (Snow et aL, 1986: 464). Frame alignments can be constructed in 
accordance with four typified modalities: frame bridgingframe amplification, 
frame extension, andframe transformation. Each corresponds to the particular 
political requirements and challenges faced by social movements in mobilising 
new adherents in different contexts. However, as contexts are not 
unambiguously defined, social movements may employ more than one type of 
frame alignment at once (464474). 
Frames reflect and propose specific normative values. The discursive 
construction of a given situation as a problematic issue, or source of grievance, 
is always tied to some notion of justice. What counts as 'justice', however, 
cannot be reduced to a single universal list of elements or conditions that apply 
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across the board. Following the Lutwig Wittgenstcin theory of 'language as 
games', the meaning of 'justice' can only grasped when taking into 
consideration the ways in which this concept is used by a given linguistic 
community - hence the analogy of meaning as the rules of a game, as it is the 
p*ing of a game according to its rules that is what defines the game. The 
meaning of the concept is derived from its use and not from any defining 
quality or essence that may be 'captured' in the word. Interpretative frames 
therefore appeal to stable linguistic conventions regarding the employment of 
notions of justice. In so doing, frames reproduce moral distinctions between 
actions and situations that are deemed acceptable, or deplorable. Yet, insofar as 
the meaning of 'justice' is derived from the prevailing use of this notion, 
appeals to it often reproduce already accepted moral categories that have been 
non-nalised within historicised linguistic structures. 
The literature concerning social movement theory that discusses frames 
attributes their political effectiveness in the mobilisation of potential 
constituencies to their capacity to resonate within a given audience (Gamson et 
aL, 1982 in Snow et aL, 1986). Resonance takes place when a group of people 
can recognise a claim to justice that is in line with the ways in which the the 
notion 'justice' has been used in the past to determine judgment. Resonance is 
an act of identification which requires the existence of prior understanding. In 
this sense we can say that frames reflect preconceived notions ofjustice, insofar 
as there is a similar use of this notion among social forces that partake in a 
common linguistic community. Recognition takes place when frames capture 
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symbolic resources that make up the inter-subjectivc structure of a given 
cultural context - which are always concerned with a historicized awareness of 
past experiences, embedded in socially specific realities. Encrypted in language 
and social practices, frames must appropriate such symbolic resources to ensure 
their intelligibility, acceptance and ultimately political value in facilitating 
collective action. In other words, the success of frames in mobilising 
constituencies is tied to their capacity to establish a hermencutical dialogue 
between a meaningful past and the possibility of an envisioned alternative 
future. 
Likewise, frames can also transform the accepted meaning(s) of 'justice' by 
employing this notion in ways which divert divert from established linguistic 
conventions. At this point the value of frames ceases to be merely instrumental, 
as the original identity of the social movement is transformed. McAdam (1982) 
refers to this as a moment of 'cognitive liberation' where social movements 
undergo a transformation of consciousness and people can begin to 'define their 
situations as unjust and subject to change' (18). At this point people who have 
been subject to some form of oppression begin to understand themselves as 
sharing a common experience and condition. New subjectivities and identities 
emerge as part of such a transformative awareness. The development of this 
process can be accompanied and even mediated by the interpretative 
interventions of key leaders in their efforts to structure particular meanings and 
values as part of a novel collective experience. Framing practices can therefore 
also play a vital role in the original formation of social movements by 
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contributing to cement the initial layers of an incipient collective identity for 
mobilisation. This has direct implications for political practice, since situations 
that were considered socially legitimate can be made subject to moral 
repudiation, and thus become sources of grievance and political mobilisation. 
Moreover, frames also identify the sources of blame or responsibility: actors, 
institutions, practices, systems, and others. Whereas political frames potentially 
promote a self-critical assessment of the role of political actors or forces in 
contributing to a given problem, it is often the case that responsibility is only 
externaliscd. The attribution of responsibility acts as a means of differentiating 
between 'us' and 'others. It is a discursive practice fundamentally associated 
with the construction of distinct political subjects. 
The degree of self-reflexivity allowed in this identity construction can vary 
significantly. In cases of heterogeneous and broad transnational coalitions, the 
discursive construction of an 'other' and a 'selr through the attribution of 
responsibilities will allow a lesser permeability for a self-critical awareness. 
This is because these kinds of social actors are more vulnerable to tensions and 
differences that could easily undermine their often tenuous unity and cohesion. 
Externalising responsibility becomes the most effective way of preventing this 
as such differences can be overcome and solidarity ensured. The extent to 
which this is a good practice in the long run is surely a relevant issue of 
concem. 
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Frames also assign a direction to action - the bases on which to define a 
strategy. Clearly, the direction of action will depend on whether blame or 
responsibility is interrialised or extemalised. If there is room for internal 
attribution of responsibility, then the actions undertaken will also involve some 
form of change in the way that things had been done until that moment. This 
could involve changing the values that orient the priorities and practices of 
movements, criteria of membership, nature of coalitions, financial strategies, 
among others. In cases where blame is mostly exterrialised, action plans will be 
directed towards changing of external situations, conditions or actors: 
governments, policies, international institutions, and capitalism in the case of a 
revolutionary movement. 
Framing grievances is a particularly important activity of transnational 
coalitions. By challenging hegemonic interpretations associated with the 
legitimisation and reproduction of practices of inequality and exploitation, 
social movements advance moral critiques to subvert the acceptance of 
established meanings. In their discussion of norms, Khagram el aL (2002: 12) 
claim that 'we cannot understand transnational networks or coalitions unless we 
grasp that a significant amount of their activity is directed at changing 
understandings and interpretations of actors or, in other words, the creation, 
institutionalization, and monitoring of norms'. 
Nevertheless, framing across transnational spaces faces the limitations of 
relying on a thinner cultural fabric of inter-subjective meanings from which to 
134 
draw cultural symbols, values and references in order to orient political action. 
Accordingly, there is a greater chance for misunderstanding, and tensions 
arising from competing interpretive frameworks within coalitions. As Sikkink 
(2002: 309) explains, 'networks, transnational coalitions, and movements are 
full of internal divisions and conflicts. Although networks may present a 
harmonious front to the external world, they often experience deep internal 
divisions'. 
In light of this, it is often the case that transnational coalitions need to appeal to 
general themes and values that are largely shared among large social sectors to 
ensure unity, identity and sense of purpose. While this allows the construction 
of broad frames that can accommodate such variety of actors and cultures, 
critical reflection on issues of agenda development or strategic thinking is often 
sacrificed as a result. 
Chapter 7 examines the political opportunities present in the Americas for the 
mobilisation of an opposition to the FTAA project by the HSA. In their efforts 
to construct hemispheric frames of alternative forms of integration, the HSA 
has relied on cultural resources such as anti-American ism and anti-imperialist 
feelings widely held among the Latin American Left movements. This has 
facilitated the mobilisation of a continental opposition to the FTAA. It has also 
limited the possibilities of thinking about the FTAA as an expression of a 
global and transnational process of socio-economy transformation that goes 
beyond simplified dichotomies between Latin America and the United States; 
135 
bctwcen South and North. 
Conclusion 
This thesis critically examines the contribution of the HSA to the construction 
of political alternatives to the neo-liberal view of development contained in the 
FTAA agenda. This chapter introduced the central tenets of a political process 
approach to transnational social movement coalitions like the HSA in the 
Americas. It was argued that in order to understand the conditions under which 
social movements emerge and ultimately become politically influential, it is 
necessary to identify the opportunities created by a changing political context. 
Changes in the context can sometimes lead to changes in the expectations of 
social movements with direct implications as to the kinds of strategies that are 
adopted. Social movements not only seize opportunities for action but can also 
expand them further, therein encouraging other social forces to join together in 
challenging established authority. 
The discussion noted that the main factors of political opportunity for social 
movements are: the possibility of forming alignments with other political 
actors, the degree of access to political institutions, the divisions/cohesion of 
the elites, and the presence of ingrained cultural understandings that provide the 
interpretative horizon of social movements. An analysis of the actions and 
strategies of the HSA can only be possible when considering the range of 
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options available to them in the pursuit of their political objectives. 
The opportunity factors that were identified and discussed in this chapter 
provide the themes that are explored in the subsequent chapters dedicated to the 
empirical analysis of the HSA in its construction of alternatives to the FTAA 
project. 
The following chapter concentrates on the political opportunities created by the 
HSA through the formation of transnational multi-sectoral coalitions of trade 
unions, NGOs, grassroots social movements and eventually Leftist 
governments throughout the Americas. 
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CHAPTER 4 
The hemispheric alignment of multi-sectoral 
coalitions 
[The] methodology for new political practice assigns increased 
importance to networking. By setting up constantly shifting alliances 
and coalitions, diversity is preserved and hegemony avoided. This 
new politics presumes no a priori answers; they need to be created. It 
recognizes the legitimacy (and vital democratic necessity) of 
conflicts and disputes. Democracy moves forwards through social 
struggles, provided that the opposing forces respect founding ethical 
principles of the other's rights and their own responsibilities; this 
means to recognise and respect other subjects, joining them in 
action, dialogue, and sharing (Grzybowski, 2006: 11). 
The purpose of this research is to assess the contribution of the HSA to the 
construction of political alternatives to the neo-libcral agenda of integration 
proposed in the FrAA project. The previous chapter introduced the political 
process approach to social movement theory arguing that, in order to be able to 
assess the role of the HSA in constructing political alternatives to the FTAA 
project, it is necessary to concentrate on the options for collective action 
available in the hemispheric political opportunity structure. It is by identifying 
the opportunities and limitations created by changes in the political context in 
the Americas that the political significance of the strategies employed by the 
HSA to pursue alternative visions of development can be fully revealed. This 
chapter explores the political opportunities for the construction of alternatives 
to the FTAA project created by the formation of transnational alignments 
between social forces critical to neo-liberalism in the Americas. 
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The success of the HSA in building such alternatives depends both on their 
effective engagement with the grassroots sectors and on their ability to ensure 
that their autonomy is preserved when relating with allied states. The first 
section examines the early antecedents in the region of transnational alignment 
of multi-sectoral coalitions working on trade integration issues. These 
experiences became the building blocks of the formation of the HSA as a 
continental response to the FTAA process. The second section discusses the 
HSA alignment with the Cuban government in the framework of a Continental 
Campaign against the FTAA. The consequences of this alignment for the 
construction of alternatives to the FTAA project are highlighted. Finally, the 
third section explores the relations of the HSA with the Venezuelan government 
of Hugo Chdvez and its implications for the autonomy of the HSA in the 
construction of alternatives to neo-liberalism in the Americas. The conclusion 
reiterates the main points of the argument, and shows how they link to the 
political opportunities presented to the HSA by its exclusion from the official 
FTAA process that will be the subject of the following chapter. 
Antecedents to the HSA 
The experience generated by early initiatives of transnational collaboration 
between different social forces in the region was a vital contribution to the 
formation of the HSA as a response to the FTAA process. 
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In the context of the NAFTA process, trade union organisations, NGOs and 
social movements from the three negotiating countries established national 
umbrella networks and solid tics with partner networks from the other countries 
(Drainvilic, 2001: 25-25). This led to the formation of the Mexican Action 
Network on Free Trade (RMALC), the United States' Alliance for Responsible 
Trade (ART) and Common Frontiers and the R6seau Qudb6cois sur 
IlInt6gration Continentale (RQIC) from Canada and Qudbec respectively. Some 
of these transnational links built on earlier collaborations that started in the 
1989 Canadian-U. S. Free Trade Agreement (CUFTA) (Foster, 2003). 
Edelman (2003: 198) explains that while once 'U. S., Canadian, or Mexican 
actors stood opposed to each other in discussions of trade, environment, or 
migration, the social cleavages that NAFTA opened blurred domestic and 
foreign policy concerns in all three countries, generating new forms of 
contention that required transnational action and that increasingly divided or 
united people less along national lines than in relation to shard class, issue- 
based, or sectoral interests. A combined preoccupation with the free trade 
model of development proposed in NAFTA permitted the mobilisation of the 
North American movements across sectors and nationalities. It also set forward 
a process by which multi-sectoral transnational coalitions began to seek 
convergence on a common view of trade and development. 
Furthermore, other important experiences of transnational collaboration in the 
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region are the efforts of the labour movement in South America to articulate 
common positions to safeguard and advance the rights of workers within the 
new regional integration projects. These initiatives include the links developed 
in the Andean Consultative Labour Council since 1983 as part of the CAN 
process. Likewise, trade union coordination has also taken place in the South 
Cone Union Labour Council Coordination (CCSCS) since 1986, although with 
greater intensity since the establishment of MERCOSUR in 1991. Unlike the 
North American tri-national coalition, these labour initiatives initially did not 
pursue closer links with other social forces. Eventually, the involvement of 
these trade unions in the HSA would generate a closer connection with social 
actors. 
These initiatives are antecedents to the HSA insofar as they provide a new 
approach to addressing the social demands of the most unprotected sectors of 
society by linking development concerns with trade integration debates in the 
formation of broad-based coalitions within and across national borders. Much 
of this initial momentum was later carried forward and expanded at the 
continental level with the formation of the HSA in the context of the FTAA 
process. 
The creation of the IISA: towards a common hemispheric vision 
After four years of preparatory work that began at the Miami Summit of the 
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Americas in 1994, the negotiating phase of the FTAA process was ready to be 
launched at the Santiago Summit of 1998 (see chapter I for details on the 
official FTAA process). The relentless advance of this trade integration project 
became an incentive for the unification of a wide range of unconnected and 
geographically dispersed social forces in the continent that saw in the FTAA 
the expansion of another wave of neo-liberal policies in the region. The initial 
steps of this hemispheric alignment of social forces took place at the III Trade 
Union Summit (Labour Forum), an event hosted by the Brazilian United 
Workers Federation (CUT) parallel to the FTAA Trade Ministerial Meeting of 
Belo Horizonte, Brazil, in May 1997. 
The organisation of this parallel Trade Union Summit was part of a strategy of 
the Inter-American Regional Labour Organisation (ORIT) (the regional branch 
of the International Confederations of Free Trade Unions, ICFTU) to bring 
about: official recognition of a Labour Forum as part of the FTAA process; the 
establishment of a Working Group on Labour Rights; the incorporation of a 
social dimension in new bi-lateral and multi-lateral trade agreements; the 
recognition by the FTAA negotiating countries of core labour standards and the 
creation of compliance mechanisms; environmental protection mechanisms and 
agrarian reform to improve the quality of life of the rural population; a gradual 
negotiation process which allows each country to adopt transitional policies and 
better identify its opportunities and threats; access to information and 
mechanisms to control transnational corporations operating in the region. These 
demands reflect a firm determination of ORIT to fight for the democratisation 
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of the FTAA process, and the advance of broad-based development with social 
justice (ORIT/ICFTU, 1997). 
The trade union organisations affiliated in ORIT understood that if there was 
any chance that such objectives could be met, this would involve the 
strengthening of ties between the trade union movements throughout the 
continent as well as broadening the bases of support by involving social forces 
(Brunelle, 2004a). The ORIT trade unions were the initial drive behind the 
formation of the HSA - particularly the AFL-CIO and CUT (Jakobsen, 2006; 
Petricovsky, 2005). According to Brunelle (2004a) from RQIC: 
The labour movement has been the backbone of this initiative to create the HSA. 
The role of the AFL-CIO has been central in this process. This was also the case 
in Canada, and to a lesser degree in Mexico. In South America the Brazilian 
CUT was the most important actor, and also in Chile - even if more modestly. 
Rcnato Martins (2004) from CUT argues that 'ORIT promoted the creation of 
hemispheric alliances between labour organisations and social movements 
because this had already been done in the U. S., Canada and Brazil, although 
ORIT would never admit that there was a conscious regional policy on this 
issue'. 
The move towards the strengthening of ties between the trade unions of the 
North and South was consistent with the cfforts of the international trade union 
movement to overcome the divisions it inherited from the Cold War years 
(Chaloult and Fernindez, 2001; Dagenais, 2005: 3; Munck, 2002). In the 
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Americas, this required transcending the suspicion of the Latin American 
labour movements towards the American organisations derived from the 
historical support of the AFL-CIO for the U. S. foreign policy in the region, and 
its hostility towards any form of radical and popular movement (Brunelle and 
Dugas, 2004: 284; Chaloult and Ferndndez, 2001). Furthermore, making 
alliances with the so-called 'anti-globalisation' movements became an 
increasingly strategic component of the renewed internationalism of the labour 
movement (ICFTU, 2004). 
At Belo Horizonte, the main regional NGO networks working on the 
environment, human rights, gender, rural and indigenous issues were invited for 
the first time to participate in a Labour Forum. The goal was to work towards 
an ceffective complementarity between the perspectives and action strategies of 
the trade-union movement and those of other social movements' (Foro Nuestra 
Amdrica, 1997). It was agreed that their forces would be joined in the demand 
for an approach to hemispheric integration 'that promotes genuine development 
for all of the peoples of the hemisphere, one that recognizes and attempts to 
reduce the differences in levels of development, one that allows for integration 
of our economies based on democratically determined national development 
models, and one that is based on consensus. Strong national economies must be 
the basis for a strong hemisphere. We are proposing an agreement designed for 
sustainable development rather than for trade liberalization' (Foro Nuestra 
Amdrica, 1997). 
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The basic political alignments between trade unions, NGOs and social 
movements established at this meeting became the building blocks for the HSA 
(Jacobsen, 2006; Brunelle, 2004a; Martins, 2004). Likewise, 'the common 
preoccupation with continental free trade also opened the way for new kinds of 
cross-sector collaboration, between agriculturalists and environmentalists, for 
example, and between NGOs and popular movements. More broadly, it 
contributed to transcending the parochial, identity-based political characteristic 
of the 'new social movements' of the previous two decades' (Edelman, 2003: 
199). These complex multi-sectoral dynamics converged in the HSA. 
According to Kjeld Jacobsen from CUT, 'Belo HoriýOnte pointed the way 
forward towards a new direction for trade union intervention in trade 
agreements within the continent, based on the reinforcement of unity and 
integration with popular movements' (2001: 376). The HSA was later 
constituted formally at a meeting in San Josd, Costa Rica, in March 1999, and a 
Secretariat was established in Mexico City under the direction of RMALC. 
Table 4: Networks part of the initial nucleus of the IISA 
Networks rigin 
Mexican Action Network on Free Trade - RMALC exico 
Alliance for Responsible Trade - ART nited States 
Common Frontiers anada 
Rdseau Qu b6cois sur l'Intdgration Continentale - RQIC ýudbec 
Network for the Peoples Integration - REBRIP 3mzil 
Chilean Alliance for a Just and Responsible Trade - ACJR Mile 
Civil Initiative for the Central American Integration - ICIC 3ub-regional 
Inter-Ame ican Regional Labour Organisation - ORIT emispheric 
Latin American Congress of Rural Organisations - CLOC 
Pemispheric 
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Building the HSA was not an easy task, however. There was no obvious 
ideological consensus between the different sectors that were part of the 
coalition (De la Cucva in Anner and Evans, 2004: 16-17; Martins, 2004). 
Tensions frequently arose between: reformist and radical sectors; divisions in 
the Latin American Left; different priorities of urban and rural organisations; 
conflicts between the hierarchical organisational culture of trade unions and the 
more horizontal and participatory approaches of social movements; and the 
mistrust of some organisations from the South towards NGOs from the North 
(Berr6n, 2005; Foster: 2003,137; Hansen-Kuhn, 2004; Korzeniewicz and 
Smith, 2003: 69; Massicotte, 2004: 17; Shamsie, 2003: 34). In particular, there 
was tension between the rights-based approach of trade unions and some NGOs 
who advocated the inclusion of labour and environmental clauses into the 
FTAA agreement, and the 'anti-globalisation' movements that simply rejected 
the FTAA process (De la Cueva in Anner and Evans, 2004: 16-17; Jacobsen, 
2006). 
Efforts to reconcile some of these differences in a continental vision of 
development resulted in the first version of the HSA policy document 
Alternativesfor the Americas (HSA, 1998). The document addresses the major 
topics on the official agenda of the FTAA negotiators (investment, finance, 
intellectual property rights, agriculture, market access and dispute resolution), 
as well as topics that are of extreme social importance but which governments 
have ignored (human rights, environment, labour, immigration, the role of the 
state, and energy). Issues concerning two other important groups - women and 
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indigenous peoples - have been incorporated throughout the document (the 
Women's Committee was established to ensure that women's issues play a 
critical role and be integrated into the work of the IISA). 
Rather than being solely an economic doctrine, the Alternatives for the 
Americas is a working document designed to stimulate further debate and 
education on an alternative vision to neo-liberalism. It states that 'at this stage 
of the struggle, it is not enough to oppose, to resist and to criticize'. It is also 
important to 'build a proposal of our own and fight for it' (HSA, 1998). 
Emphasizing the collective nature of building consensus on this alternative 
agenda, the document states that 'only through free and open debate can a true 
consensus be reached around serious, viable proposals for a sustainable 
continent and the well-being of our peoples' (HSA, 1998: conclusion). This 
document was presented at the I Summit of the Peoples, a hemispheric event 
organised by the HSA as a parallel forum to the Santiago Summit of the 
Americas in 1998, and enriched by the inputs of the 2000 representatives of 
social organisations from the entire continent that participated in this event 
(Rojas Aravena and Pey, 2003: 222). 
Underlying the spectacle of hemispheric unity and solidarity projected publicly 
at the Summit of the Peoples, and with the release of the Alternative for the 
Americas document, intemal tensions began to expose some of the HSA's 
political limitations. These concerned the difficulty of overcoming the 
coalition's internal tensions, which risked undermining its cohesion and 
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leadership. Central to such tensions was a deep debate on the extent to which 
the HSA should continue to press for the incorporation of a social agenda to the 
FTAA agreement or simply reject the FTAA process as an act of imperialism. 
According to Jacobsen (2006), these two clearly distinct positions coexisted 
since the beginning of the HSA despite their constant tensions. 
The first position was defended primarily by trade union organisations and 
many of the NGOs working on development issues. Here the rationale was that 
the HSA efforts should be focused on democratising the FTAA process and 
agenda by pressing for the incorporation of a strong social component to the 
agreement - mainly labour and environmental rights, amongst other measures 
(Gonaez, 2006). The HSA Alternatives document was considered to be a 
valuable contribution to the democratisation of regional governance (Anner and 
Evans, 2004). 
Jacobsen (2006) explains that trade union organisations from the North and the 
South were united in their claim that the issue of labour rights was absent from 
the FTAA negotiations. However, there were nuanced differences between 
them. CUT was sceptical as to whether there was political space in the FTAA 
agenda to accommodate the kinds of social protections that would be required 
to make this agreement compatible with the development of the most poor 
sectors and countries in the region. The Canadian CTC was also sceptical about 
the possibility of reforming the FTAA (Katz, 2006). Comparatively, the AFL- 
CIO was the most supportive of all trade unions aftiliated to ORIT of the view 
148 
that the FTAA could be sufficiently reformed with the incorporation of social 
clauses (Katz, 2006). This position was consistent with the ICFTU international 
policy on social clauses (Katz, 2006). The AFL-CIO also believed that if it was 
not possible to reform the FTAA, it had to be opposed. However, this had to be 
demonstrated (Jacobsen, 2006). 
The second position decried that the FTAA is a form of imperialism and nco- 
colonialism that will invariably lead to the deepening of structural conditions of 
inequality and subordination, and therefore which must be simply rejected 
(Gonzdlez, 2006). The extent to which a largely reformist HSA was a force for 
real emancipation and social change was under question. In this, Drainville 
(2001: 26) claims that by pressing for the 'inclusion of environmental, labour 
and human rights clauses within trade agreements' and 'for poverty alleviation 
schemes and institutional reforms', the HSA has become functional to the 
advance of a new phase of capitalism in the region expressed in the FTAA 
project. According to this view, consensus reached by the HSA concerning the 
Alternative documents is nothing more than a 'dominant counter-discourse' of 
the FrAA that helps to legitimate and thus facilitate this trade integration 
project (27). Furthermore, he argues that in the 'age of governance, when global 
regulatory agencies are trying to move neoliberal regulation beyond coercion 
towards consensus, the attempt to create a responsible hemispheric civil society 
and the People's move from "Resisting" to "Proposing" should be seen as 
twined enterprises, both part of the making of a "hemispheric growth machine... 
(27). 
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It is not easy to separate these two positions, partly because they become 
blurred at certain times. Avoiding such polarised views, Massicotte (2004: 2) is 
right to claim that the crude distinction commonly held between 'revolutionary' 
and 'reformist' movements in these debates 'does not do justice to the activists 
involved in various types of organizations and strategies. ' The multiple 
objectives, strategies and tactics employed by such a diverse coalition pre-empt 
easy characterisations that may simplify the nature of the HSA. Furthermore, it 
is also the case that such contrasting characteri sat ions are problematic because 
the HSA has never overcome these tensions. The pendulum that marks the 
political 'centre' of the coalition swings in different directions, many times due 
to external changes in the political conditions in the region. 
Torres (2004) argues that the political momentum and leadership demonstrated 
by the HSA at the Santiago Summit of the Americas began to decrease in the 
aftermath of this event, increasingly exposing its unresolved internal 
differences and consequently affecting the vitality and direction of the coalition. 
In light of its declining leadership, the 11 Summit of the Peoples prior to the 
Qudbec Summit of the Americas of April 2001 presented the HSA with an 
opportunity to unite positions and recapture political energy. 
Organised by the Canadian members of the HSA, the RQIC and Common 
Frontiers, the Summit of the Peoples attracted 3,500 delegates (Barlow, 2001) 
to a series of activities and workshops dealing with specific themes such as: 
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labour, women and globalisation, education, communications, human rights, 
agriculture, environment, parliamentarian forum, equitable distribution of 
wealth. As members of the HSA, the Canadian Labour Congress (CLC) and the 
Confdddration des Syndicats Nationaux (CSN) from Qudbec played an 
important role in the coordination of the event (Escribano, 2004; GonzAlez, 
2006; Katz, 2006). The final conclusions from these forums were incorporated 
in a newer version of the Alternativesfor the Americas documents. 
The Qu6bec Summit demonstrated that a significant political change had taken 
in the public opinion regarding the acceptance of the FTAA project. Signalling 
a greater awareness of the implications of neo-liberalism, 60,000 people 
gathered at Qudbec to rally in opposition to the FTAA - this represented the 
largest crowd of people ever assembled in the history of this city (Drainville, 
2001: 17). In charge of the organisation of the 11 Summit of the Peoples, 
Marcela Escribano from RQIC confessed that the large scale of the mobilisation 
at Qudbec City had taken her completely by surprise. She claims that of the 
60,000 people that attended the Qudbec demonstrations, only 3,000 to 4,000 
were activists (Escribano, 2004). 
This massive response to the FTAA was explained by the political climate that 
the earlier protests at the WTO Ministerial Meeting of Seattle in November 
1999 had helped to create. What came to be known as the 'Battle of Seattle' had 
contributed significantly to strengthening the growing 'anti-globalization, 
movement, proving to 'groups based in Europe and the third world that, even in 
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the United States, corporate-sponsored globalization faced a substantial 
opposition' (Smith, 2004: 234). At Seattle it became clear that 'corporate- 
sponsored globalization and free-trade issues would face public scrutiny 
anywhere these issues were discussed'. This momentum was 'carried over into 
the opposition to the FrAA' (234). 
This was combined with the failure of the sectors within the HSA that 
supported a reformist strategy - trade unions and some NGOs like the hosting 
RQIC (Marcoux, 2001; Martins, 2004) - aimed at the incorporation of social 
clauses into the FrAA agenda to deliver any significant progress. As discussed 
in detail in chapter 5, the mechanisms of consultation with civil society 
organisations established in the official FTAA process had not allowed the 
possibility that such organisations could influence the FTAA agenda. This 
revealed the undemocratic nature of the hemispheric process, and the 
impossibility of reforming its fundamentally exclusionary logic of integration 
(GonzAlez, 2006). 
Furthermore, by this time it had been demonstrated that the environmental and 
labour side of the agreements incorporated into NAFTA had been totally 
ineffective (Lavander, 2001) and difficult to enforce (Lee, 2004: 47). This 
undermined the credibility of such a reformist strategy, weakening as a result 
the defence and continuity of this strategy option. 
Forming the backdrop to a public opinion that inclined towards a more radical 
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view of the FTAA, the HSA and its parallel Summit of the Peoples came to be 
regarded as the "official" opposition to the Summit of the Americas and the 
FTAA agenda (Marcoux, 2001). Torres (2004) claims that in light of the events 
at Qudbcc the HSA stood out as comparatively conservative. This contributed 
to a shift in the internal balance of power in the HSA, prompting a redefinition 
of its strategy of engagement with the FTAA project (Torres, 2004). 
Leaning towards its more 'radical' sectors, the HSA abandoned its original 
reformist conception and adopted instead an oppositional strategy that called 
for the absolute rejection of the FTAA project with the proclamation 'No to the 
FTAA'. At this point, preventing the establishment of the FTAA became a 
necessary condition for the construction of political alternatives. In this respect, 
rejecting the FTAA and building alternatives were seen as necessarily 
compatible and complementary goals. That is, the construction of alternatives 
demanded the derailing of the FTAA process. 
In taking a more hard line position on the FTAA process, the HSA was able to 
find a new centre of political gravitation relying on the formal and informal 
support of a public opinion that had become increasingly critical of 'free trade. 
In rejecting the FTAA project, the HSA largely overcame the 
internal tensions 
between 'reformists' and 'radicals' (Vicira, 2005) that had previously 
complicated the efforts of the coalition to define its goals and strategies. A 
4common vision' concerning the idea that the FTAA could not be reformed 
finally emerged within the HSA (De la Cueva, 2004: 2). Escribano 
(2004) 
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explains that Qudbcc constituted a turning point in the HSA. Here, the 
opposition to the FTAA was ratified. This was due to the political convergence 
that arose between the social movements; the political consensus to oppose the 
FTAA'. Rcnato Martins from CUT claims that 'it is only in at Qudbcc where 
there was a consolidated position against the FTAA. Before this moment there 
were disputes and disagreements between the different social movements and 
also within themselves. One example of this is the Canadian nctwork Common 
Frontiers. This organisation was not against the FTAA until Qudbec. Similarly, 
ORIT and CUT were not openly against it either. The overwhelming scale of 
the protests at Qudbec enabled the convergence of opposition to the FTAA' 
(Martins, 2004). 
Moreover, the HSA also found a new common base from which to mobilise and 
articulate a much broader range of social sectors in the Americas for the 
construction of political alternatives to neo-liberalism. This was reflected in the 
expansion of its membership immediately following the Qudbec summit. New 
national HSA chapters were established at a coordination meeting held in 
Florianopolis, Brazil, during 26-28 October 2001. HSA chapters were created 
in Peru, Ecuador - under the representation of the Confederation of Indigenous 
Nationalities of Ecuador (CONAIE) - and in Costa Rica, Nicaragua, El 
Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala under the unified representation of the 
Central American Popular Bloc (Jay, 2001a). Marking the beginning of a new 
phase in the struggle against neo-liberalism in the region, the HSA set out to 
expand their support bases within their respective countries, seeking the 
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alignment of trade unions, NGOs and social movements under broad multi- 
sectoral coalitions ccntred on the issue of the FTAA. At this point it could be 
said that albcit being 'only three years old, the HSA had emerged as the 
strongest force for confronting the FTAA' (Smith, 2004: 237). According to 
Torres (2004), if the HSA had not changed its strategy towards the FTAA it 
would have continued to lose political momentum to the point of becoming 
redundant as a vehicle of social change. 
Power in numbers: the Continental Campaign against the FTAA 
The most significant development in the HSA during the aftermath of the 
Qudbec summit was the launch of a Continental Campaign against the FTAA 
with the active support of the Cuban government. 
The aims of the Campaign were to obstruct the FTAA, defend national 
sovereignty, change the economic model of external dependency, and construct 
an alternative social integration and sovereignty among the peoples of the 
Americas. All of this necessitated that the FTAA process was derailed. 
Opposition would be mobilised throughout the entire continent to force 
governments out of the FTAA negotiation process. The core mandates of the 
Campaign included a commitment to: 
Raise awareness and reach the hearts and minds of our grassroots movements 
and populations about the danger the implementation of the FTAA poses for our 
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survival as independent peoples; carry out permanent grassroots work to guide 
and organize the population; create mass movements which transcend the 
interests of corporations and join forces against the economic model in question; 
carry out a large scale consultation in which the population will decide on the 
issue (the plebiscite in Brazil will be held in the week of I' September 2002. In 
other countries it will be held in the period between October 2002 and March 
2003); carry out demonstrations before and during government meetings on this 
issue; carry out economic battles against the trarisnational corporations that 
promote the FrAA; press for the holding of an official referendum on the FTAA 
in each country in the hemisphere (Continental Campaign Portal). 
A Campaign operations secretariat was established in SIo Paulo, Brazil, under 
the auspices of REBRIPICUT -the Brazilian chapter of the HSA. Likewise, the 
IISA Secretariat was also moved from its first location in Mexico City to the 
CUT offices in S5o Paulo. The formal launch of the campaign took place at the 
WSF at the Brazilian city of Porto Alegre on 4 February 2002 with an anti- 
FTAA march in which around 50,000 people participated (Continental 
Campaign Portal). 
The incorporation of a much larger range of social actors mobilised under a 
common banner of a struggle against the FTAA, and the participation of a 
government in a hemispheric coalition of civil society organisations redefined 
the political context for the efforts of the HSA to build alternatives to the FTAA 
process. 
The Continental Campaign created an opportunity to mobilise a much broader 
spectrum of grassroots popular movements that had remained distant and 
distrustful towards the HSA (Aguilar, 2004; Brunelle, 2002). 
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Aguilar (2004) from the Central American Popular Bloc argues that: 
There were some organisations opposed to the FTAA that did not want to get 
close to the IISA because they had political differences with some of the 
members that integrate this network. Confronted by this situation we had the 
idea to create a specific organisation for the coordination of the Campaign that 
would allow us to bring together actors from the HSA with other social 
movement actors from outside the HSA. In this respect, the Campaign allowed 
us to take qualitative leap in our efforts to articulate an opposition to the FTAA 
throughout the continent. Especially, it allowed the incorporation of grass-roots 
movements that were sceptical towards some of the members of the HSA for 
being too close to the NGOs and their institutional approach to politics. 
Edelman (2003) adds that the peasant movements were one example of a social 
sector that tended to remain distant from the HSA due to the presence of NGOs 
in this coalition and the associated problems regarding issues of representation. 
Relations between NGOs and the peasant and fanner networks have frequently 
been tense. At times this has involved questions of representation - who may 
speak in the name of the peasantry - and on other occasions accountability to 
constituencies and to those who provide funds for network activities. The 
imposition of donor-driven agendas has contributed to the decline or demise of 
more than one civil society initiative (Edelman, 2003: 214). 
Berr6n from the HSA Secretariat explains that in the case of Brazil, the 
Campaign permitted the convergence of a diverse range of organisations that 
did not want to be part of the HSA such as the progressive sectors of the 
Catholic Church. The shared commitment to the derailment of the FTAA 
negotiations was able to bring together large and small trade union 
organisation, NGOs who were used to lobbying practices, religious institutions, 
peasant organisations and smaller social movements with influence in other 
local movements and political parties (Berr6n in Echaide, 2006: 16). As 
Escribano (2004) from RQIC claims, 'the FTAA was the only thing that 
157 
allowed Latin American peoples to unite'. 
Many of the social organisations that joined the HSA in the Campaign were 
already participating in regional networks, some of whom were opposed to the 
FTAA since before the Campaign was created. The most important of these 
networks include: 
I Cry of the Exchided. founded in 1995 by the progressive elements of the 
Catholic Church in Brazil to challenge social inequalities, concentration of 
income and wealth, policies to privatize public services and structural 
adjustment policies imposed by multinational institutions such as the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO). 
2 Jubilee South: founded in 1999 in response to the need for a stronger and more 
cohesive Southern voice on issues of debt cancellation. A focus of Jubilee 
South is to redefine the way in which debt is discussed and understood. Instead 
of calling for debt "forgiveness", which implies a charitable act, Jubilee South 
advocates that global South countries repudiate their debts, charging that the 
debt is largely illegitimate. 
3 Convergence of Movements of the Peoples of Me Americas (COMPA): created 
in 1999 to serve as a space through which other movements and sectors can 
meet to share information and experiences, and unify strategies and campaigns, 
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around the six issue areas: indigenous peoples and lands (including sovereignty 
and biotechnology); women; the FTAA; rural development; peace and 
militarization; and the foreign debt (including questions of structural 
adjustment). 
4 Continental Latin American and Caribbean Students Organisation (OCLAE): 
created in 1966 to articulate the anti-imperialist struggles of the student 
movement throughout Latin America and the Caribbean, promoting the 
mobilisation against neo-liberal and foreign debt policies with a particular 
emphasis on their impact on education and culture. 
5 The Latin American Council of Social Sciences (CLACSO): a network of 
research institutions created in 1967 to promote the development of social 
sciences research on the social problems of Latin American and Caribbean 
societies from a critical and pluralistic perspective. 
6 Latin American Information Agency (ALAI): a communications organisation 
created in 1977 with the commitment to struggle for the democratisation of 
communication as a basic prerequisite for a democratic society and social 
justice. ALAI was assigned the role of communicating information related to 
the campaign. 
Cuba played a significant part in the colossal cffort of mobilising such a varied 
array of social actors within the Campaign. As the host of a series of annual 
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encounters called the Hemispheric Meetings of Struggle Against the FTAA 
(from now on referred to as tiemispheric Meetings), Cuba became the main 
point of political articulation of the Campaign. Other venues included the WSF, 
the Americas Social Forum, Summit of the Peoples and parallel meetings to the 
official FTAA Ministerial meetings. However, unlike such other venues, the 
Hemispheric Meetings at Havana provided the best conditions for a sustained 
and focused interaction amongst the social forces that integrate the Campaign in 
order to define strategies to stop the FTAA process. The more open nature of 
other events like the WSF often diverted the attention from the central issue of 
the struggle against the FTAA (Escribano, 2004). 
Having this event at Cuba ensures that many people will attend (unlike when 
similar events are organised elsewhere). Usually it is not easy for such a large 
group of activists to be able to spend a whole week together is a place without 
being disturbed or subject to any inconveniences. Cuba provides all the logistics, 
infrastructure and organisation for this event. This is quite unusual. Also, the 
attendance at the event is ensured by the direct financial assistance of the Cuban 
government. The costs of air-fair and accommodation of the activists are heavily 
subsidized by Cuba, making the attendance at the event very affordable. This 
applies mostly to keynote speakers and special guests (Escribano, 2004). 
Additionally, the political role of the involvement of the Cuban government in 
the Campaign was also very important. Cuba is the only country of the 
hemisphere that had not been 'invited' to participate in the FTAA process due 
to the fact that its political system is not a liberal democracy. The exclusion of 
this country from the FTAA negotiations added powerful symbolism to a 
campaign that denounced the exclusionary consequences of nco-libcral policies 
for the interests of the poor and disenfranchised sectors of society (Escribano, 
2005). 
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The alignment with the Cuban government also improved the visibility of the 
dangers posed by the FTAA to the most vulnerable social sectors of the 
continent in ways that the IISA would not have been able to attain before the 
Campaign was launched (De la Cucva, 2004: 2). Brunelle (2004a) from RQIC 
claims that the Ilcmisphcric Meetings %N, crc very important because they added 
'tremendous political visibility to what had taken place in Qudbec', giving 
'much more importance to the HSA and the campaign against the FTAA in the 
2002 World Social Forum. In the 2001 WSF many people had no idea what the 
FTAA was. In 2002 everything changed'. 
Despite the political benefits derived from the alignment of the HSA with the 
Cuban government, this also introduced a new set of challenges to the HSA in 
terms of its efforts to build an alternative to FTAA project. The margins of 
manocuvre experienced by the HSA in continuing to act as an interlocutor 
between dispersed social forces in the continent to facilitate a dialogue on 
alternatives became increasingly reduced. This was connected with the great 
influence and leadership demonstrated by the Cuban government in the 
Campaign. This would become more evident after the incorporation of the 
Venezuelan government into the Campaign. 
Pieticovsky (2005) from REBRIP explains that 'Cuba does indeed complicate 
the coordination of the Campaign'. Not everyone in the HSA agreed with the 
regime of Castro in Cuba, or with some of the often more radical views of other 
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members of the Campaign (Brunelle, 2004a). Ivan Gonzdlez from ORIT argues 
that there was an important debate within ORIT about the incorporation of 
Cuba into the Campaign. A Cuban chapter of the HSA was created with 
representation from civil society organisations from that country - including the 
Cuban Trade Union (CTC) and the Martin Luther King Centre. However, it was 
not obvious how independent civil society organisations in that country were 
from the influence of government (Gonzilez, 2006). 
Althought not everyone in the HSA was supportive of this decision, differences 
of opinion were tolerated for the sake of unity in the struggle against the FTAA 
(Pietrovsky, 2005). This greater unity also brought about a lessening of the role 
of the HSA in the Campaign. This led some in the HSA to disagree with the 
view that the alignment with the Cuban government engendered any political 
benefits for the HSA and other social movements (Jacobsen, 2006). 
As a result of this complex alignment between the HSA and the Cuban 
government, the agenda of resistance and alternatives to the FTAA in the 
context of the Campaign has been marked by a contestation for leadership 
(Berr6n, 2005). As one activist suggested, the Campaign seemed like a 
schizophrenic animal suffering from a syndrome of multiple personalities. The 
increasing overlap between the roles of the Campaign and the HSA became an 
issue that would eventually have to be resolved (De la Cueva, 2004: 2). 
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'Ad 
The IISA as an instrument or and agent for social change? The challenge 
of participation with autonomy 
There was consensus within the IISA that the coming to power of left-of-centre 
governments in Latin America from 2002 constituted a political opportunity to 
incorporate other government allies in the pursuit of regional alternatives to 
nco-liberalism (De la Cucva, 2004: 14; Hemispheric Council, 2002). 
This new political scenario posed the HSA with the challenge of finding a way 
to articulate two related, yet distinct, political processes: one unfolding at the 
national level with the coming to power of left-of-centre governments, and the 
other at the hemispheric level with the new transnational alignments established 
in the sphere of the Continental Campaign. 
It was certain that some form of collaboration between the HSA and new 
progressive governments in the region seemed vital in order to build political 
alternatives to the FTAA (De la Cueva, 2004: 14-15). Equally, some in the 
HSA also understood that the alignments with potentially allied governments 
should never compromise the autonomy and critical distance of a coalition 
predominantly comprised of civil society organisations. Reaching a consensus 
on the terms of engagement with allied progressive governments became a 
ccntral conccm within the HSA. 
The sweeping victory of the candidate Luiz InAcio Lula da Silva in the 
163 
Brazilian presidential elections of October 2002 is perhaps the most salient of 
such political developments (Lula da Silva assumed the presidency in January 
2003). This was the first time the left Workers Party (PT) of Brazil won a 
national election with the support of the CUT, Latin America's largest trade 
union organisation. The great political weight of Brazil combined with the 
aspiration of its new government to influence the nature of the hemispheric 
agenda, raised expectations that the dominance of neo-liberal order in the 
Americas could be effectively challenged (Hemispheric Council, 2002; 
Hemispheric Meeting, 2002). 
The electoral results in Ecuador and Bolivia provided further reassurance that, 
in combination with governments of a similar ideological persuasion, the 
opportunity to challenge the FTAA was better then ever. Lucio Guti6rrez, who 
won the presidential elections of Ecuador in November 2002 supported a leftist 
coalition of indigenous movements created in 2002 when he led a short-lived 
indigenous uprising in 2000 against the then President Jamil Mahuad for his 
acquiescence to free trade and structural adjustment initiatives which were 
devastating the poor (Houghton and Bell, 2004: 44; Hemispheric Meeting, 
2002). 
Meanwhile, Evo, Morales, the candidate running for the Movement to Socialism 
party (MAS), obtained second place in the 2002 Bolivian presidential election. 
Supported by displaced cocoa growers, peasants and indigenous movements, 
the emergence of MAS provides evidence of the vitality of popular sectors 
164 
pressing for representation within a political and economic system that has 
historically marginalised them. The MAS party became the second political 
force in the country and the main opposition force in the Bolivian Congress. 
Similarly, the HSA closely followed the political developments that were taking 
place in Venezuela since the election of Hugo ChAvez Frias in 1998. The 
possibility of an alignment with this government remains hitherto unpredictable 
due to the deep political crisis in that country. 
Before the HSA could reach a consensus on how to relate to potential new 
governmental allies, the coalition was suddenly drawn into an increasingly 
closer alignment with the Venezuelan government. In late 2003, a leading HSA 
activist from the Mexican RMALC started to participate in a series of meetings 
with Venezuelan government officials. The purpose of these meetings was to 
work on the Venezuelan proposal for a South American integration project 
called the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas (ALBA). The general 
principles for this regional integration project rest on the need to create a model 
of endogenous development with participatory forms of democracy (ALBA 
Portal) that can rival the market-based and exclusionary model proposed in the 
FTAA project. 
Without prior consultation or acquiescence of other HSA members, the HSA 
Alternatives for the Americas (HSA, 1998; 2002a) documents were made 
available to be used as the policy framework for ALBA, and also to serve as the 
agenda for the official position of Venezuela in the FTAA negotiations 
(La 
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RepOblica de Venezuela ante el ALCA, 2003; Position of Venezuela, 2003). 
These documents enabled the Chivez government to make up for a lack of 
technical cadres. Until that point, ALBA had been only a statement of intent 
without any concrete basis. This early contact with Venezuela became the 
gateway for an HSA alignment with this government that became increasingly 
stronger. 
The Venezuelan government became involved for the first time in the 
Continental Campaign against the FTAA at the III Hemispheric Meeting on 26- 
29 January 2004. A team of political advisors to the Venezuelan FTAA 
negotiators attended the meeting and came in contact with the main social 
forces in the continent gathered at Havana to coordinate strategies to derail the 
FTAA process. Both Cuba and thereafter Venezuela have been fostering close 
relations with the continental social movements as part of their foreign policies 
to advance an ALBA agenda in the region. 
Unlike Cuba, Venezuela was a negotiating party in the FTAA process. The 
social movements accepted the incorporation of this government into the 
Campaign only because its position in the FTAA was publicly known for its 
(overplayed) anti-American ism and critical view of neo-liberal policies. De la 
Cueva holds that regardless of the political perspective that one may have, the 
Venezuelan government is 'clearly independent from the dictates of 
Washington' (De la Cueva, 2004: 4; my translation). Booklets outlining the 
Venezuelan position on the FTAA negotiations were circulated among the 
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participants of this event - the contributions from the HSA Alternatives had 
already been incorporated into these documents. 
Notwithstanding the attempts of the Venezuelan delegation to secure firm 
political support for ALBA in the event's Final Declaration, direct allusions to 
this project were carefully avoided due to a lack of consensus within the HSA 
(Hemispheric Meeting, 2004; Escribano, 2004). The influence of Venezuela in 
the Campaign would nonetheless be significantly altered in a short period of 
time. 
Chdvez obtained greater support for ALBA the following year at the IV 
Hemispheric Meeting of 27-30 April 2005 (Hemispheric Meeting, 2005a, b; 
HSA, 2005). The standing of his government in the Campaign was evidently 
improved in comparison to its more timid involvement in this even a year 
before. This was explained by a combination of some optimistic developments 
in Venezuela, and disappointing experiences in the rest of Latin America. 
Firstly, a series of domestic victories for Chivez confirmed the long-contestcd 
legitimacy of his government as the expression of a Tolivarian Revolution'. 
He overcame an 'oil strike' orchestrated by the opposition that paralysed the 
economy, ratified the continuity of his government in a presidential recall 
referendum, and obtained an overwhelming triumph in the 2004 regional 
elections. Aided by the exorbitantly high price of oil - the country's main 
source of income - Chdvez was also able to finance a series of social 
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programmes to bring health and education services to the most marginal sectors 
of the Venezuelan society. This was done in collaboration with the Cuban 
government, who provided medical doctors, health workers and teachers in 
exchange for oil at subsidised prices. This bilateral exchange was formalised in 
a cooperation agreement signed by the two countries on 14 December 2004, 
which laid the foundations for ALBA. 
Secondly, the improved standing of the Venezuelan government in the 
Campaign was also the result of a sense of deep disappointment and frustration 
among the social movements. This resulted from the lack of progress of the 
new left-of-centre governments in the region during 2004 to move forward in 
the construction of political alternatives to neo-liberalism. 
Unlike 2003, a year that was marked by social movement offensives and 
imperial defeats, this past year [2004] represents a pause that tended to restore 
equilibrium to the region's balance of power. The situation has become more 
complex and the social movements have not won big victories like those of the 
immediate past. The most notable exception is the resounding triumph won by 
the Bolivarian process in Venezuela, which resulted in the defeat and 
fragmentation of the opposition during the referendum to remove President 
Hugo Chavez from office. This victory was won thanks to mass participation 
by broad sectors of the population. The year 2004 closed with a feeling of 
frustration while dark clouds began gathering on the horizon. The recent 
illegitimatization of the neoliberal model has not given way to political 
alternatives, which has led governments in the most important South 
American countries, in particular Argentina and Brazil, to implement 
economic policies that are far from the faults of the neoliberal model, and 
therefore, on the contrary, have tended to reinforce that model (Zibechi, 
2005b: 1). 
As the influence of the Venezuelan government within the dynamics of the 
Continental Campaign grew stronger - aided by the Cuban government - so did 
the concern within the HSA that they would become an instrument of the 
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Chdvez and Castro governments. This concern seemed to accentuate a trend 
that had started a few years earlier when the HSA began working closely with 
Cuba in the Campaign. It simply acquired greater proportions. In the effort to 
obtain categorical support for the ALBA project from the social movements in 
the Campaign as the alternative to the FTAA, the Venezuelan and Cuban 
governments were ready to alter the terms of the relationship they had carefully 
developed with the HSA since 2001 and earlier. Not only did the agenda for 
ALBA came from the HSA Alternative for the Americas documents, but they 
were also prepared to present themselves as legitimate embodiments of this 
political alternative - even when this could overshadow the HSA. 
During the days of the IV Hemispheric Meeting of 2005, the hosting Cuban 
government held a simultaneous one-day event at a local Havana theatre where 
1,000 delegates of social organisations from the continent who had travelled to 
participate in the Hemispheric Meeting were invited to attend. In this event, 
Presidents Hugo Chdvez and Fidel Castro launched the ALBA project invoking 
the solidarity of the peoples of the Americas in the construction of the 'New 
Socialism of the XXI Century'. The event received coverage from the 
international media. Despite its political importance, or rather precisely because 
of it, the HSA had not been previously notified of the plans to hold this 
additional event at the theatre. Graciela Rodriguez (2005) from the HSA 
Women's Committee claims that the content of the speech by Chivez was not 
even agreed with the HSA. They simply had not been consulted. Many in the 
HSA felt that they were being used to support ALBA without having a chance 
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to define the terms of engagement with these governments (Daza, 2005; 
Rodriguez, 2005). This was clearly contrary to the terms of relations that had 
prevailed in the Campaign, which were based on mutual trust, reciprocity and 
openness. Berr6n (2006) claims that many in the HSA felt that had been 
'bullied' in this Hemispheric Meeting by the Cuban and Venezuelan 
delegations. 
Another revealing episode at the III Summit of the Peoples organised by the 
HSA prior to the Mar del Plata Summit of the Americas, Argentina, in 
November 2005 evidenced the increasingly problematic standing of the HSA in 
the Continental Campaign. This was the first occasion where the HSA 
organised a Summit of the Peoples in a country whose government was largely 
regarded as an ally in the struggle against neo-liberalism. With the purpose of 
stressing the autonomy of the HSA the leadership of its allied governments in 
the region (notably, Chdvez, Castro, but also to a lesser degree Kirchner, Lula 
da Silva and potentially the newly elected Tabar6 Vazquez) it was decided that 
the hosting Argentine government was considered a progressive force in the 
continent and thus it would not be publicly criticised. Neither would it be 
publicly supported at the Summit of the Peoples (Berr6n, 2006). 
The Venezuelan government representatives disregarded previous agreements 
with the HSA organisers of the counter-summit concerning both the terms of 
the involvement of President Chdvez in this event and the composition of the 
head of a massive rally to repudiate the presence of U. S. President George Bush 
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in Argentina. The original plan for this event did not envisage that Chavez 
would give a speech at a stadium where a rally of 40,000 people congregated 
for the closing event of the Summit of the Peoples (Berr6n, 2005). Chavez 
wanted to occupy a central role in this event to show that the peoples of the 
Americas were behind his proposals to create a Bolivarian Alternative for the 
Americas, ALBA. Lengthy last-minute negotiations were conducted between 
the HSA organisers and high profile governmental officials from Venezuela 
and Cuba, such as Freddy Balzdn, the Venezuelan Ambassador to Argentina 
and Ricardo Alarc6n, the president of the Cuban National Assembly. As a 
compromise, the HSA could only ensure that Blanca Chancoso, a leader of the 
Ecuadorian indigenous movement, would read out the final declaration of the 
III Summit of the Peoples before president Chavez could deliver his speech. 
This was a way of preventing the whole event from being identified with the 
persona of Chavez - something that was made inevitable by his actual presence 
in this event. 
The indigenous movements and peasant organisations were amongst those 
social sectors that were the most willing to vocalise their support to Chivez and 
ALBA (Daza, 2005). Chdvez' position on land reform, food sovereignty and his 
commitment to the eradication of genetically modified crops provided a basis 
for the convergence of these movements (Houghton and Bell, 2004: 26; 
'Parlamentarios y lideres indfgenas', 2005; VC 2003; 2004; 'Via Campesina 
logra. acuerdo', 2005). 
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Trade unions, human rights movements and many other organisations that are 
part of the HSA are generally more reluctant towards the centralisation of state 
power. This results from their experience of authoritarian politics and 
repressive military dictatorships in the 1970s, particularly in the Southern Cone 
countries (Foweraker, 1995: 28-29; Jacobsen, 2006). Chdvez's authoritarian 
tendencies, his inexperience with civilian democracy and militaristic vision of 
politics (Gallardo, 2005; Wilpert, 2005: 25-27) were causes of great concern 
among the trade unions and regional NGOs that integrate the original core of 
the HSA. Ivan Gonzilez from ORIT claims that 'trade union organisations that 
are part of ORIT are particularly worried about the authoritarian characteristics 
of the Venezuelan government' (2006). 
Chdvez's conflictual relation with the trade unions and civil society 
organisations from Venezuela (Ellner, 2005; Lucena, 2005; Provea, 2005; 
Weyland, 2001) led to a public condemnation from ORIT in 2001 who 
denounced the attempts of the government to violate the freedom of association 
of trade unions (ORIT/CIOSL, 2001). ORIT also expressed concern about the 
violation of human rights in that country following the repression by the 
security forces of protesters who expressed their discontent with the 
government at a public rally on 2 December 2001 in the context of a national 
civilian strike (Paro Civico Nacionao (ORIT/CIOSL, 2002b). 
The perception that the HSA's autonomy was being undermined by an uncritical 
engagement with the Venezuelan government soon became the most divisive 
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and controversial issue within the coalition (Berr6n, 2005; Hellinger, 2005; 
Pietricovsky, 2005). Representing ORIT, Gonzdlez argues that 'there is much 
unease within the trade union organisations concerning the Venezuelan 
government's tendency to present itself as the alternative to neo-liberalism' 
(2006). He adds that there is a feeling in the HSA that Chdvez 'descended on a 
process of social movement convergence that had taken years of slow progress 
to construct, and appropriated its banner at the last minute' (GonzAlez, 2006). 
Pietricovsky argues that in making ALBA the alternative to neo-liberalism 'the 
HSA ends up in a political vacuum' (2005). But 'this is a governmental 
proposal and I do not accept being involved in a project that does not allow the 
possibility for social movements to have a critical position in the development 
of the project' (2005). 
There was also a sense that the HSA were impotent to compensate for the 
influence of Chavez in the Campaign. He simply had a much stronger 
correlation of forces (Reyes, 2005; Rodriguez, 2004; 2005). An HSA activist 
confessed that she felt that they had helped to create a 'monster' that had now 
taken absolute control. Even representatives of the Cuban chapter of the HSA 
expressed their worries about the consequences that this could have on the 
future of the coalition (Berr6n, 2005). Furthermore, the initiative of Chavez to 
create the Bolivarian Congresses in 2004 to have his own meetings with 
different social forces from the continent to discuss the meaning of ALBA did 
little to reassure those who questioned the instrumental approach to civil society 
(Berr6n, 2005). 
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Since in politics means and ends can never be separated, the challenge for the 
HSA remains to make the construction of alternatives to neo-liberalism an 
inclusive and democratic process. This is not necessarily easy, as it is not 
obvious what constitutes a 'democratic process' when it involves a loosely 
connected coalition that combines such disparate social forces with distinct 
political expectations, rooted in different national and sectoral realities. 
Democracy is itself a contested notion, subject to disagreements and tensions 
within coalitions. 
To ensure that the HSA can continue to play a role in the creation of 
alternatives, it needs to reinvent its basis of consensus by addressing the need to 
define its relation to potential allied governments - and its grassroots bases. As 
argued by Munck (2003: 508): 'A progressive alternative to neoliberalism 
might be developed by critical intellectuals and articulated by leftist political 
pasrties but, arguably, without a mobilised civil society all this will not come to 
fruition. A cowed, disoriented and demobilised civil society will be a poor 
vehicle for progressive transformation of any kind' 
Since the right to dissent is a constitutive practice of democratic values, it needs 
to be exercised accordingly to ensure that the engagement of the HSA with such 
governments is conducive to, and expansive of, democracy in the region. The 
unity of the HSA could be strengthened if the coalition strived towards a 
hemispheric consensus on a set of reference guidelines by which to make their 
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support to allied governments conditionaL Finding ways to organise and to 
relate to the state, progressive governments and political parties constitutes one 
of the central challenges to contemporary social movements in Latin America 
(Zibechi, 2003). While opposition to the FTAA was the unifying banner for the 
HSA and Campaign cohesion was more easily reached. The construction of 
alternatives to neo-liberalism at a time when the threat of the FTAA project is 
no longer there remains to be the challenge. As Ivan GonzAlez from ORIT Puts 
it, 'it is always easier to be united in opposition to something, but it is much 
more difficult to stay united in the construction of something new' (2006). 
The type of social movements that will prevail in the future will depend on how 
these issues are resolved. The challenges faced by the HSA in its politics of 
hemispheric coal ition-bui Iding conveys the reality of many progressive sectors 
in the region struggling to reinvent a much-needed political view in order to 
bring forward a truly revolutionary democracy: an alternative to neo-liberalism. 
Conclusion 
This chapter discussed how changes in the political context in the Americas 
created the possibility of establishing alignments between social forces in the 
continent, which therein affected the conditions in which the HSA pursued the 
construction of alternatives to the nco-liberalism. 
It was argued that the foundational alignments between trade unions, NGOs and 
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social movements across the continent permitted the formation of the HSA, 
providing the opportunity for different social sectors from the continent to 
engage in a consensus-building process in the search for a common view on 
development against the FTAA project. Though political differences associated 
with the broad representation of this coalition prevented absolute unity and 
direction, concrete results were obtained such as the production of the 
Alternativefor the Americas documents. These policy documents constituted a 
valuable political resource to engage different sectors in a joint transnational 
dialogue on alternatives. Furthermore, it became a foundational first step in the 
construction of a hemispheric counter-hegemonic subject. 
Changes in the Political context in the hemisphere prompted the HSA to change 
its original approach to the FTAA process. Public opinion became increasingly 
critical towards the FTAA project and aware of its potential detrimental effects 
on the region's development. Likewise, the coming to power of left-of-centre 
governments in Latin America heralded a shift in the political climate away 
from the market liberalisation priorities that had guided the political economy 
of the region since the 1980s - or earlier as in the case of Chile. Additionally, 
the lack of progress of the HSA in its attempts to reform the FTAA agenda to 
include labour and environmental clauses was also an important factor 
associated with the HSA's adoption of a rejectionist and more confrontational 
strategy. 
The rejection of the FFAA led to the mobilisation of a much broader range of 
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social actors coalescing in the Continental Campaign against the FTAA. The 
alignment with the Cuban government was pivotal for the articulation of this 
campaign. Furthermore, Cuba acted as the gateway through which the 
Venezuelan government could seek the support of the continental social forces 
that partook in the campaign for its Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas, 
ALBA (Daza, 2005). The alignment with these governments constituted a 
political opportunity for the HSA to expand its advocacy work to many other 
social forces in the continent with whom it had not been able to reach in the 
past. However, these benefits were also overshadowed by the increasingly lose 
leadership and control of the HSA over the process of the construction of 
alternatives to the FTAA. 
The HSA certainly celebrates the stalling of the FTAA project at the Mar del 
Plata Summit (see chapter I for a detained account on the development of 
FTAA process). However, this political victory can be too easily and carelessly 
overstated if not accompanied by a reflection on the future role of the social 
forces in the still pending construction of alternatives to the FTAA. Given the 
coming to power of Left-of-centre governments in the region the matter of the 
HSA's autonomy became a central issue of concern. Reaching a consensus 
within the coalition on the terms of engagement with allied governments and 
political parties constitutes the key test for the HSA. Participation with 
autonomy becomes an important challenge in the construction of alternatives to 
neo-liberalism. 
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The following chapter analyses how the HSA managed to legitimate an 
opposition to the FTAA process by revealing the undemocratic nature of this 
process. This created the political opportunity for the HSA to radicalise its 
position towards the FTAA increasing the democratic legitimacy of this 
coalition. 
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CHAPTER 5 
Exposing the undemocratic nature of the FTAA 
process 
'In a time of universal deceit, telling the truth becomes a revolutionary act' (George 
Orwell). 
'Politics would be a helluva good business if it weren't for the goddamned people' 
(Richard M. Nixon). 
The purpose of this research is to assess the extent to which the HSA has 
contributed to the construction of political alternatives to the neo-liberal view of 
development in the FTAA agenda. The previous chapter discussed the political 
opportunities created by the HSA by the establishment of broad transnational 
coalitions in the effort to create political alternatives to the FTAA project. It 
was argued that while this permitted a shift in the balance of power throughout 
the continent contrary to the FTAA process, it also introduced the challenge of 
ensuring that the autonomy of social movements is not undermined by the 
dynamics of allied governments in the region. 
This chapter explores the degree of access available for the HSA to participate 
in the definition of the FTAA agenda. It is claimed that 'trade issues' were 
insulated from the numerous attempts of civil society organisations to have an 
open democratic debate on the social and environmental implications of a 
regional integration initiative that is restricted to a market liberalisation agenda. 
The HSA's exclusion from any significant participation in the negotiation 
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process provided the coalition with a political opportunity through which to 
undermine the legitimacy of the FTAA process and agenda by denouncing their 
profoundly undemocratic and exclusionary nature. Similarly, this also 
contributed to increase the credibility of the HSA as a force of democratisation 
in the region. 
The analysis concentrates on some of the key experiences of direct and indirect 
engagement of the HSA in the official mechanisms of regional consultation 
with civil society that are part of the FTAA process. These include the 
consultations coordinated by the Chilean, Canadian and Argentine governments 
as hosts to the Summits of the Americas, the FTAA Committee of Government 
Representatives on the Participation of Civil Society (CRG) and some FTAA 
Trade Ministerial Meetings. Consultations that were held prior to the formation 
of the HSA in 1997 such as those coordinated as part of the Miami Summit of 
the Americas in 1994 are not included in the analysis. OAS participation 
instruments where trade issues occupy a marginal place in the consultation 
agenda are also not addressed. The last section of the chapter discusses the 
popular consultations on the FTAA launched jointly by the HSA and the 
coordinating committee of the Continental Campaign against the FTAA in 
many countries of the Americas. 
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The unfulfilled promise of democratic governance in the Americas 
Inter-American relations during the post-Cold War period were characterised 
by a public commitment to the advancement and consolidation of economic 
liberalisation and democracy throughout the region. An optimistic feeling 
prevailed that by promoting the participation of civil society organisations in 
multilateral decision-making processes it would be possible to redress the 
problem of democratic deficit that threatened to further separate the distance 
between governments and citizen control and representation. Mandates of civil 
society participation, transparency and accountability were incorporated into 
the Summit of the Americas and the FTAA processes for this purpose. 
The first Summit of the Americas in Miami (1994) marked the beginning to this 
new approach to hemispheric relations by stressing and promoting the 
importance of civil society participation in policy-making venues. The 
summit's declaration of principles announced that: 'To assure public 
engagement and commitment, we [signatory heads of states] invite the co- 
operation and participation of the private sector, labour, political parties, 
academic institutions and other non-goverrimental actors and organizations in 
both our national and regional efforts, thus strengthening the partnerships 
between governments and society' (Summit of the Americas, 1994). Host 
governments to the subsequent summits have sought to be regarded as leading 
the way in their commitment to democracy by honouring their commitment to 
civil society participation and consultation. 
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The FTAA process in particular generated highly innovative mechanisms of 
participation for civil society when compared to the other issues on the agenda 
of the Summit of the Americas (Botto, 2003). The FTAA process has been 
comparatively more transparent than previous trade negotiations. It is said that 
the FTAA process constitutes a 'break from a long historical tradition in which 
trade negotiations were, at least at the formal level, a decision-making arena 
reserved exclusively for governments without citizen accountability' (Botto, 
2003: 249, my translation). 
Notwithstanding the institutional innovation of civil society involvement 
introduced by the FTAA process, the degree and quality of this participation 
was minimal and largely deficient (Ricco et aL, 2006: 218-236). The FTAA 
negotiation process has been characterised by its limited transparency and 
scarce public information, making it a hermetic negotiation forum outside the 
awareness of the general public (221). 
Many of the organisations that are part of the HSA have sought at different 
times to influence the FTAA process by participating in some of its 
mechanisms of consultation created by governments. However, their 
participation was only welcome and encouraged insofar as it did not complicate 
the ultimate objective of reaching an hemispheric agreement regarding the 
creation of a common market. Demands for a serious debate with government 
representatives on the distributional implications and impacts of trade 
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liberalisation on workers rights, indigenous populations, and economic sectors 
unable to compete in a continental market, the environment and democracy 
were systematically restricted in order to minimise their possible influence on 
the political dynamics of the hemispheric process. 
Sosa Iglesias (2005: 264) observes how a secretive and undemocratic process of 
FTAA negotiations, which clearly excluded many sectors of civil society, 
contrasted with the democratisation of Latin America and with the official 
rhetoric of governments in support of broad citizen participation. Small-scale 
farming constitutes the source of subsistence for some of the poorest segments 
of society in many countries in Latin America. They are also one of the most 
under-represented sectors in the FTAA process. Why would these poor rural 
sectors support the FTAA project? It is clear that their interests have not been 
taken into account (Ortiz Guerrero, 2005: 320). It should not be surprising that 
if those that are potentially the most vulnerable to unequal trade competition in 
a liberalised hemispheric market had the opportunity to influence the FTAA 
process, the likeliness of reaching a political consensus for this trade project 
would surely be even less favourable. In this regard, it can be said that the 
FTAA was imposed on the most disenfranchised and vulnerable sectors (Ortiz 
Guerrero, 2005: 320). As Gonzdlez (2006) from ORIT claims, 'the FTAA 
process offered a language of democratic participation without really offering 
conditions for the protection or advancement of citizenship rights'. 
Their participation in the official consultations permitted the HSA to explore 
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the actual limits of the rhetorical commitment of governments to a democratic 
and inclusive hemispheric process. It also allowed the HSA to overcome its 
initial tensions and adopt a rejectionist strategy towards the FTAA process. In 
this, a public debate on the FTAA was pursued outside the official FTAA 
process through popular consultations and educational activities organised in a 
number of countries in the region as part of the Continental Campaign against 
the FTAA. The claim that the stengthening of the HSA was facilitated by its 
exclusion from the FTAA was also advanced in the preliminary research on the 
HSA produced by Korzeniewics and Smith (2003). 
The Santiago Summit of the Americas 
The second Summit of the Americas of April 1998 in Santiago, Chile, became 
the first major initiative to engage civil society organisations from around the 
continent in the Summit process. Because this Summit served as the platform 
from which to launch the FTAA negotiations, as well as to address other issues 
in the summit's agenda, ensuring its transparency and democratic legitimacy 
was crucial to cement the notion that the FTAA project was compatible with the 
strengthening of democracy in the region. It was already known that the 
legitimacy of the official Summit would be contested to some degree, as the 
HSA was also planning to hold a parallel Summit of the Peoples, as decided at 
Belo Horizonte in 1997 at the meeting where the HSA was originally created 
(Foro Nuestra, Am6rica, 1997). 
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In preparation for the Santiago Summit, the DIRECON Agency of the Chilean 
government delegated the coordination of a hemispheric consultation with civil 
society organisations to the local NGO Corporaci6n Participa with the purpose 
of creating recommendations for the Summit. The United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID) provided financial support for these 
consultations. Two meetings were held during 1997 where public authorities, 
representatives of 120 civil society organisations and academics from around 
the continent were invited to participate in order to exchange views and 
concerns (Participaci6n Ciudadana, 1998; Rojas Aravena and Pey, 2003: 221). 
Corporaci6n Participa was also in charge of promoting the newly created FTAA 
Committee of Government Representatives on the Participation of Civil Society 
(CRG) that had just been created at the IV FTAA ministerial meeting of San 
Josd, Costa Rica, in March 1998 (see chapter I for details). The Canadian 
Foundation for the Americas (FOCAL) also organised five regional 
consultations with civil society organisations in Canada prior to the Santiago 
Summit. 
Despite efforts to ensure its democratic legitimacy, the Santiago Summit proved 
to be 'a great disappointment' for the participation of civil society (Shamsie, 
2003: 26). The access of civil society organisations to the official meetings was 
restricted, and there were limited consultations during the pre-Summit agenda 
preparations (Cole, 2003: 6). These preparatory meetings acted as filters that 
prevented some recommendations from civil society from reaching the draft of 
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the Summit's Declaration and Plan of Action. Since government officials were 
present at the meetings, the emerging recommendations were already 
compromises - for example a recommendation aimed at including civil society 
participation in the FTAA process never passed the stage of the preparatory 
meetings (Seymoar, 1999: 404). 
Critical sectors of civil society regarded the official consultations as a purely 
cosmetic fagade devoid of a genuine political commitment to a constructive 
dialogue. FOCAL was heavily criticised by other Canadian civil society 
organisations for being an instrument of government, while simultaneously 
acting as 'representative' of the Canadian civil society (Korzeniewics and 
Smith, 2003: 61). 'The contrast between the HSA's efforts to involve a full 
range of civil society groups and the way in which such groups (with the 
obvious exception of the Business Forum of the Americas) have been carefully 
kept at bay by the official FTAA process is stark' (Anner and Evans, 2004: 19 - 
Footnote 13). According to Shamsie (2003: 28): 
Many argue that Santiago fell short on civil society participation. The access 
afforded civil society organisations was indeed limited, and opportunities for 
CSOs [civil society organisations] to inject their views into the agenda were few. 
Furthermore, there was no civil society representation on most national 
delegations, including the U. S. and Chilean ones. Both countries had included 
CSOs in their Miami Summit delegations. These shortcomings go some way to 
explaining why CSOs felt the need to stage an alternative summit alongside the 
official government meeting. 
In line with these observations, Brunelle comments that RQIC -a member of 
HSA - participated in the consultations organised by Chile and the United 
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States for the Santiago Summit because they were important for obtaining 
information concerning what was going on in the official process. 'But the only 
effect these experiences had shown is that government representatives would 
just one more line addressing our point in the declaration- for example, that the 
FTAA agreement will promote gender equality. This is the only effect that we 
have there. In contrast, the input received at the Americas Business Forum is 
incorporated into the body of the agreement' (Brunelle, 2001). 
Contrary to the intent of the Chilean government to build support and 
legitimacy for the Summit process, and for the FTAA as a ma or element of its 
agenda, the experience of the Santiago summit contributed instead to the 
polarisation of hemispheric civil society (Korzeniewicz and Smith, 2003). Even 
if in the past most of the civil society organisations that participated in the 
consultations had already expressed willingness to work closely and 
successfully with governments (Shamsie, 2003: 27), existing differences 
between insider and outsider organisations became institutional ised (von 
Bullow, 2003: 87). 
As an immediate consequence of this growing polarisation, the Chilean 
Network for a Peoples' Initiative (RECHIP), who had been in charge of the 
organisation of the HSA Summit of the Peoples, was divided over political 
visions of strategy. The Chilean Alliance for a Just and Responsible Trade 
(ACJR) was born out of this division as an attempt to overcome internal 
tensions. It became the Chilean chapter of the HSA. This was indicative of a 
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broader process of polarisation of civil society that had begun to take place 
throughout the entire continent. 
The FTAA Trade Ministerial Meeting in Toronto 
In line with the structure of the FTAA process, Trade Ministers were scheduled 
to meet in Toronto in November 1999 (see chapter I for details on the FTAA 
chronology). Like the United States and Chilean governments, the hosting 
Canadian government had also promoted the inclusion of civil society in the 
FTAA and Summit of the Americas processes. 
In preparation for the Toronto meeting, the American organisation Esquel 
Group Foundation organised a consultation with U. S. -based civil society 
organisations 'to develop a set of proposals for the meeting' (Prdvost, 2003: 
123). Like the Chilean Corporaci6n Participa, which had coordinated the 
consultations process prior to the Santiago Summit of the Americas, the Esquel 
Group was also working in close collaboration with government authorities in 
trying to 'provide important legitimacy to potentially controversial political 
projects, like the FTAA' (123). The HSA did not participate in this 
consultation, which was regarded as instrumental in the government's attempts 
to secure support for the FTAA process (Katz, 2006). 
Common Frontiers (HSA) organised its own Civil Society Forum parallel to the 
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Toronto FTAA Ministerial meeting. The Canadian government (institutionally 
and financially) sponsored this event as a gesture to acknowledge the 
increasingly pressing debates on trade integration fostered by HSA and other 
civil society and movement sectors outside the formal spheres of politics. 
Likewise, Common Frontiers also held a conference entitled 'Our America: 
Toward a Peoples' Vision of the Hemisphere' to which more than 40 social 
organisations who form part of the HSA from 20 Latin American and 
Caribbean countries attended. 
Leading HSA activists also tried to engage in a dialogue with the government 
negotiators involved in the FTAA processes (Katz, 2006). There had not 
previously been better conditions to discuss the implications of trade 
liberalisation as proposed by the FTAA openly with the trade negotiations. The 
HSA finally had an opportunity to submit their views directly to public officials 
in a meeting with high-profile government representatives (Korzeniewics and 
Smith, 2003: 63). The HSA also presented policy documents and 
recommendations to be considered by the government representatives - 
including 'Investment Finance and Debt in the Americas' (HSA, 1999a), 
'Social Exclusion, Jobs and Poverty in the Americas' (HSA, 1999b), as well as 
the latest version of the Alternativesfor the Americas document. 
The response obtained from government representatives was nevertheless vague 
and insubstantial (Korzeniewics and Smith, 2003: 63). Sheila Katz from the 
Common Frontiers and CLC explains that 'the HSA participants read out a 
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series of questions to the government representatives hoping to start a dialogue 
on the social and environmental implications of the FTAA project. Instead they 
replied in an evasive and diplomatic manner, without addressing any of our 
questions' (Katz, 2006). It became clear that the lack of institutional access to 
influence the terms of the FTAA agenda was not the only obstacle faced by the 
HSA. Even when institutional access could be secured, there was no political 
margin to conduct a debate on the issues that concerned the HSA. 
The wording of the Final Declaration of the Trade Ministerial meeting refers to 
the contributions of the Americas Business Forum, yet it completely ignores the 
contributions put forward by the HSA and the Civil Society Forum (Katz, 2006; 
Korzeniewics and Smith, 2003: 63). The exclusion from the final declaration 
proved to the HSA that their efforts to influence the FTAA agenda had been 
futile (Katz, 2006). According to Jay (2001a) from ART, this omission was the 
final straw that led even the most moderate members of the HSA to radicalise 
their positions with regard to the FTAA process. Commenting on the exclusion 
of civil society contributions from the Toronto meeting, Prdvost (2003: 124) 
comments: 
Not surprisingly this incident only strengthened the "outsiders" belief that work 
within the system was co-opted and futile. Such exclusion is not surprising 
because government negotiators involved in trade discussions usually have the 
needed expertise and perceive the necessity of secrecy. They are well aware that 
there will be real winners and losers as the result of their deliberations and they 
do not wish the "losers", often represented by potentially powerful social 
movements, to interfere with their negotiations. 
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The FTAA Committee of Government Representatives on the 
Participation of Civil Society 
The HSA Summit of the Peoples in Santiago demonstrated that governments 
needed to do much more to create institutional channels for the inclusion of 
civil society demands if they expected to generate consensus for the FTAA 
project. In a renewed effort to show commitment to a democratic FTAA 
process, the FTAA created the Committee of Government Representatives on 
the Participation of Civil Society (CGR). The CGR had been created with the 
objective of facilitating and improving a dialogue between governments and 
civil society and also to increase the transparency and public support of the 
process (see chapter I for details). 
In November 1998 the CGR launched an 'Open Invitation to Civil Society'. 
Civil society organisations from the continent were invited to submit their 
views and recommendations on the FTAA process via Internet for 
consideration by the Trade Ministers. The results of this first round of 
consultations were very scant. There were minimal contributions from civil 
society organisations, and most importantly no evidence that they had had any 
influence in the policy debates (FOCAL, 2000: 4; Ricco et aL, 2006: 223; 
SELA 2000: 13; Wiesebron, 2004: 8 1). 
A second round of invitations was held in 2000, which also returned very 
meagre results with contributions from organisations mostly from the United 
191 
States and Chile (Korzeniewicz and Smith, 2003: 53; SELA, 2000: 6; 
Wiesebron, 2004: 81-81). The form of participation that this mechanism 
proposed was clearly restricted to the submission of recommendations to 
government officials. There was no possibility of a political dialogue of any 
kind because civil society organisations did not receive any sort of feedback 
from their submissions (Sampson, 2004: 56). The HSA issued a letter where it 
'criticized the existing mechanism for civil society input, and the Committee of 
Government Representatives on the Participation of Civil Society that serves as 
a kind of suggestion box' (Hansen-Kuhn, 2001: 5). 
The CGR was ill conceived from the beginning to serve as an adequate vehicle 
for the inclusion of social demands in the official process. Its main deficiency is 
attributed to the lack of support of some Latin American governments. There 
was reticence towards establishing any kind of supranational initiative that 
could eventually complicate the executive branches' control of the negotiation 
process. Originally proposed by the Canadian Trade Ministry, the initiative to 
establish a CGR was supported by the United States, Argentina and other 
countries from the Caribbean, and was also vehemently resisted by Mexico, 
Peru and some of the Central American governments. As a compromise, it was 
finally agreed that the function of the CGR would only be to 'transmit' the 
views of the civil society organisations to the FTAA Trade Ministers (Tussie 
and Botto, 2003: 43). 
Effectively, this meant that the Trade Ministers retained discretionary power to 
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filter out any submissions from civil society organisations that they considered 
'inappropriate'. Anything that could politicise, and hence potentially obstruct 
and delay, the goal of market liberalisation in the continent would count as an 
inappropriate submission. Governments specified that the CGR would only 
accept 'trade-related matters' that are presented in a 'constructive' manner. 
Issues such as human rights, gender, poverty, and others, which are commonly 
treated by some officials as 'non-trade issues', were thus not brought into the 
trade discussions (Shamsie, 2003: 16). 
Hansen-Kuhn from ART comments that 'unfortunately, this committee [CGR] 
was never intended to foster a two-way dialogue between government and civil 
society ( ... ). It would serve as a 
kind of "mailbox" to receive comments that it 
would later summarise for the trade ministers' (ART, 2003: 2). The activist also 
claims that: 
HSA members decided to submit comments to the official Committee of 
Government Representatives on the Participation of Civil Society (CGR). ART 
submitted a proposal on how the governments could establish mechanisms for 
true participation by civil society (in contrast to the CGR's ineffective 
mechanisms), as well as the second version of Alternatives for the Americas, 
which incorporated comments from the Santiago Peoples' Summit. Members of 
the HSA also submitted a follow-up letter in September requesting written 
responses to our submissions to the CGR. No answers were received, and the 
CGR later summarized the seventy submissions it had received from individuals 
and organisations in the Americas in a five-page report that it delivered to the 
trade ministers at their meeting in November 1999 (ART, 2003). 
Furthermore, Barlow and Clarke (n. d.: 34-35) also argue that: 
Civil society organizations and mass popular movements are systematically 
excluded from negotiating process in ( ... ) the FTAA ( ... ) At the FTAA, when 
proposals initially made for effective consultation with non-govemmental 
organizations and popular movements were rejected, a Committee of 
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Government Representatives on Civil Society was set up to convey the views of 
civil society to the Trade Negotiating Committee. But this committee has no 
mandate from civil society movements, let alone the mechanisms required to 
effectively present issues and proposals for action to the TNC. 
In the absence of feedback from government officials concerning the 
submissions from civil society, it became increasingly clear that the real 
function of the CGR was 'to keep up the appearance of dialogue' (Barlow in 
Wiesebron, 2004: 82; ART, 2003). Several HSA members interpreted the 
failure of the CGR consultations as proof that participation in such official 
institutional channels was completely useless (Gonzdlez, 2006; Jacobsen, 2006; 
Katz, 2006). In a public declaration the HSA stated that: 
The FTAA negotiations continue to be secret and undemocratic. The draft text 
not only does not incorporate the proposals of civil society, but it also 
contradicts their principles and contents. Despite the "formal" attempts to imbue 
the FTAA negotiations with "transparency and civil society participation" 
creating the Committee of Government Representatives on the Participation of 
Civil Society (CRG), this initiative has served as a "mailbox of 
recommendations" through which some "demands" may eventually reach the 
trade ministers. Its minimal structure is useless (HSA, 2003b). 
Hansen-Kuhn explains that given 'the lack of any positive results from the 
CGR, the HSA also decided not to make further submissions to that committee, 
although some member organisations continue to do so on their own behalf 
(ART, 2003: 3). Those civil society organisations that continued to participate 
in these consultations came to be regarded as agents of their respective 
governments (Korzeniewics and Smith, 2003: 53). 
Hdctor de la Cueva (Korzeniewics and Smith, 2003: 67; footnote 18) from 
RMALC comments that the HSA decided to oppose any dialogue and also to 
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oppose participation in what he considers 'simulated' consultations organised 
by government representatives. Furthermore, he argues that the HSA does not 
cwant to participate in the forums for the simulation of civil society 
participation. Instead, we should only try to influence where it is possible to 
influence, in governments that are receptive (De la Cueva, 2005). 
Appeals were made to the FTAA Trade Ministers to change the CGR, so that it 
could 'truly provide a mechanism for ensuring that free trade in the Americas is 
built on principles of democracy, development and prosperity for all countries 
and all peoples of the Americas' (SICE, 1999). No reform of the CGR was ever 
made to address these demands for a more inclusive and democratic system of 
representation of social demands. 
The Qu6bec Summit of the Americas and its aftermath 
The Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade and 
Qudbec's Ministry of External Affairs sponsored a series of academic 
conferences and meetings with civil society organisations during the months 
prior to the Qu6bec Summit of the Americas in April 2001. The HSA received 
institutional and financial support from these governments ($ 300,000) for the 
organisation of the 11 Summit of the Peoples as a parallel activity to the official 
summit (Drainville, 2001: 17; Korzeniewics and Smith, 2003: 66). In terms of 
consultation with civil society organisations, the Canadian government 
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promoted two initiatives. 
The first initiative was to engage civil society organisations in the preparation 
of the summit by involving them in the 'Special Committee on Inter-American 
Summit Management' (CEGCI). Civil society organisations were able to give 
input to the preparation of almost all the thematic areas of the Summit, with the 
only notorious exception of the FTAA! (Shamsie, 2003: 28). As on other 
occasions, the FTAA, the more controversial issue of the Summit agenda, was 
left out of this consultation process. The argument that is often used by 
governments to justify the separation between 'trade-related' and 'social' issues 
is that this way they can avoid further complicating trade negotiations, 
legislative approval and the implementation of the FTAA (SELA, 2000: 8). 
The second initiative of consultation with civil society organisations in the 
Summit process was the 'Citizen Participation: From the Santiago Summit to 
the Qudbec City Summit' project, jointly supported by the Canadian and United 
States' governments. Relying on the experience gained in the organisation of 
previous consultation processes at the Santiago Summit, the coordination of this 
project was delegated to the Canadian Foundation for the Americas (FOCAL), 
Chile's Corporaci6n Participa, and the United States' Esquel Group 
Foundation. Within a period of six months, these organisations conducted 18 
national consultations, and 6 consultations with civil society hemispheric 
networks totalling 900 organisations, set up a website to receive views from 
civil society organisations, and produced 243 proposals on the thematic areas of 
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the Summit Action Plan. The HSA did not participate in consultations 
coordinated by FOCAL, an organisation that was regarded as an instrument of 
the government in generating social consensus for the FTAA (Foster, 2006; 
Katz, 2006). 
The issue of trade was largely avoided in these consultations. The final report 
containing these proposals to be presented at the preparatory bodies of the 
Qudbec Summit (Summit of the Americas, 2001b) was drafted by Participa and 
Esquel, and released one month before the beginning of the Summit (Shamsie, 
2003: 28-29). The report included a wide range of specific recommendations 
about civil society participation, gender issues, corruption, education, 
sustainable development, human rights, indigenous population issues, small 
enterprises and, albeit limited, trade issues. Again, the inclusion of trade issues 
in this report generated considerable controversy and resistance, and was only 
included due to the insistence of some of the social organisations that 
participated in this consultation process (Korzeniewics and Smith, 2003: 67). 
Government officials at Qudbec did not comment on the contributions 
presented by civil society resulting from the round of hemispheric 
consultations. This confirmed the growing perception among the HSA that 
they could not rely on these consultations as a means to generating a democratic 
debate on the implications of the FTAA (Katz, 2006). The most discouraging 
aspect of the summit 'was the continued lack of feedback, response, or even 
reference to, past CSO submissions' (Shamsie, 2003: 3 1). 
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In light of such unresponsiveness to the HSA's attempts to conduct a serious 
debate on trade, and moreover considering the deliberate exclusion of the issue 
of trade from the consultation agenda, the HSA pressed for a public face-to-face 
meeting with the region's heads of state. They demanded that the meeting had 
full coverage from the mass media (Korzeniewics and Smith, 2003: 67-68). The 
purpose was to ensure that the policy issues that were being discussed secretly 
at the summit became subject to public accountability and debate in order to 
inform the population about the political, social and environmental implications 
of free trade agreements like the FTAA. The Canadian representatives at the 
summit declined this invitation to a public debate from the HSA, and instead 
offered to arrange a meeting behind closed doors within the security perimeter 
that protected the zone where the government officials were staying. Trade 
union representatives and members of the Canadian cabinet (including the 
Trade Minister) would be invited to participate (68). 
The HSA could not accept those conditions. Agreeing to hold a meeting behind 
closed doors could have been interpreted as a sign that the HSA was betraying 
its commitment to an open and democratic FTAA process. Similarly, they 
would have been seen as being co-opted as part of the efforts of governments to 
build a consensus for the FTAA project. Most importantly, a secret meeting 
would defeat the point of opening the FTAA debate to the general public which 
is what the HSA desired (Foster, 2006). Ultimately, the meeting did take place 
in line with the conditions laid out by the Canadian government, but the HSA 
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did not participate (Sharnsie, 2003: 34). 
In the eyes of the HSA, it became clear that the FTAA process responded to a 
corporate agenda, and that it allowed no room for a democratic and socially 
inclusive model of integration (Hellinger, 2005). It was claimed that 'there was 
no evidence that the HSA had been able to incorporate its contributions to the 
official FTAA process' (Foster, 2006). The consultation process with civil 
society was therefore regarded as a 'sham' with 'little true participatory value' 
(Shamsie, 2003: 33). Aguilar (2004) from the Central American Popular Bloc 
claims that the experience of participation in the official consultations with civil 
society demonstrates that its does not produce any significant results. He 
comments that the HSA feared that by engaging in these consultations, they 
would contribute to the legitimisation of an FTAA process. There was no doubt 
that these were only 'simulations' of participation (Korzeniewics and Smith, 
2003: 67). 
Ironically, democracy was the theme of the Qudbec Summit. All signatory 
governments from the continent (excluding Cuba) agreed to an OAS 
Democratic Charter as a means to further consolidate and safeguard the stability 
of democratic regimes in the region. Nevertheless, such commitments to 
advance democracy in the continent obviously contrasted with the HSA's 
condemnation of the poor democratic content of the summit process. Their 
failed attempts to open a debate on trade were a testimony to the narrow 
parameters within which civil society participation in this process was allowed. 
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The impressive security perimeter set up in Qudbec to prevent protesters from 
reaching the area where the summit took place became known as the "wall of 
shame": a symbol of the 'exclusionary and undemocratic nature of the 
negotiations' (ART, 2003). 
As Maude Barlow from Common Frontiers claimed, 'if our governments cared 
about democracy, they would have released the text to us months ago. [Also] 
they would be involved in real dialogue with our groups and would not have 
allowed corporations to buy their way into the inner circle during the Summit - 
a practice questioned even by the conservative press in Canada' (Barlow, 
2001). If governments 'were really serious about promoting democracy, they 
would allow the citizens of the region to vote directly on the proposed FTAA 
deal through referenda' (Shamsie, 2003: 33). 
Subsequent invitations to participate in official consultations were declined or 
openly rejected. Ecuadorian representatives of the HSA rejected an invitation to 
take part in a meeting with the ministers at the FTAA Trade Ministerial meeting 
in Quito, Ecuador, in November 2002. Instead of agreeing to what they 
considered to be a simulation of participation and dialogue, they organised a 
protest march that headed towards the official meeting (Barlow and Clarke, 
n. d.: 23-24). A Declaration of the 'Hemispheric Days of Resistance' (27 
October to I November 2001) was handed over to the governmental 
representatives, clearly outlining the position of the HSA on the FTAA project. 
Immediately thereafter, they vacated the room without engaging in dialogue 
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(Berr6n, 2006). Hansen-Kuhn from ART notes that the 'session was boisterous, 
with some 40 to 50 indigenous and other civil-society people expressing 
outright indignation at the phoney process of consultations and the high level of 
social exclusion in the FTAA process' (ART, 2003: 5). 
In a statement on the Declaration by Trade Ministers Meeting in Quito on the 
FTAA negotiations, the HSA stated: 
The ministers continue to affirm the need for true transparency, as well as "two 
way" communications with civil society. In practice, however, their actions 
contradict those objectives ( ... ). We also note a 
deficiency in the references to 
real channels of consultation with civil society in the negotiations process. In 
spite of the fact that some countries - due to constant efforts by social 
organisations demanding increased opportunities for participation - have held 
seminars and meetings with varying degrees of openness and transparency, up to 
now there is a lack of real spaces where civil society can present its agenda and 
question the official agenda. We do not need more exercises in propaganda on 
the supposed benefits of free trade; we need real dialogues on concrete 
proposals, their potential impacts on our economies, societies and environments, 
and concrete indications that there will be broad democratic consultations with 
our peoples on what has been negotiated by our governments. In response to the 
lack of information and real dialogue on the part of many governments in the 
region, we in civil society are carrying out a broad education campaign and 
public consultations in many countries ( ... ) Many points in the ministerial 
declaration only serve to strengthen our conviction that the solution is not to add 
to or modify details of the FTAA but to continue with our continental campaign 
against the FTAA (HSA, 2002b). 
Likewise, the HSA also decided not to take part in the 'Dialogue with Civil 
Society' initiative launched by the Argentine government in preparation for the 
the Mar del Plata Summit of the Americas of 4-5 November 2005. Instead, the 
HSA held the Third Summit of the Peoples in parallel to the official summit 
(Summit of the Peoples, 2005b). 
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Liberating the text of the FTAA draft agreement. 
From 2000, the HSA led a campaign to petition the governments of the 
Americas to release the draft of the FTAA negotiating text. In November 2000 
the HSA delivered a letter to the FTAA Secretariat and to Trade Ministers in 
Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Mexico, the United States and Canada demanding that 
the governments publish the FTAA text (ART, 2003; Sampson, 2004: 63). ART 
activist Karen Hansen-Kuhn argues that 'the HSA and other citizen 
organizations have been calling for greater transparency and participation in 
decision-making on trade accords' (2001: 5). It is such a commitment to 
democratise the FTAA process which led the 'more than 330 groups (all but 50 
of whom were from outside the U. S. ) [to send] a letter with those demands to 
the head of the FTAA Trade Negotiations Committee (5). This initiative was 'a 
critical first step is opening the FTAA process to a broader representation of 
social sectors' (5). 
There was a compelling need to foster a debate in society about the potential 
implications of the FTAA in the region. The negotiating governments did not 
have a democratric mandate to make such decisions on behalf of their citizens. 
Neither had there been a public debate in the mass media or in the parliaments 
on the FTAA. The agenda-setting and negotiation process was being conducted 
almost exclusively by the executive branches of government. Oscar Ugarteche 
claimed that 'all the negotiations have gone on under the table' and that 'the 
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issue hasn't even been discussed by national legislatures. As members of civil 
society, we have the obligation to openly debate and analyze anything that is 
going to directly affect us' (Ugarteche in Ricco et aL, 2006: 233). Supported by 
a massive street demonstration by the major trade union organisations at the 
Buenos Aires Trade Ministerial Meeting in April 2001, trade ministers acceded 
to increase the transparency of the process by recommending to their 
governments the release of the draft text of the agreement to the public (Katz, 
2006). 
The text was finally released to the public in July 2001 after the Qudbec 
Summit of the Americas, presumably to minimise the foreseeable greater 
opposition that it would create amongst the BSA and other civil society 
organisations gathered for that occasion. Sheila Katz from Common 
Frontiers/CLC claims that 'there is no doubt that the liberation of the text of the 
FTAA draft agreement was a very important victory for the HSA' (Katz, 2006). 
Access to the text was the key issue in the struggle for transparency and 
democracy (Foster; 2006; Jacobsen, 2006). 
Despite this success in making the FTAA process more transparent, public 
access to the draft agreement proved to be insufficient. The text was heavily 
bracketed concealing areas of disagreement between the governments and it 
was not specified which government supported the many conflicting positions 
on contested parts of the agreement. This meant that it was not possible for the 
HSA to hold the governments responsible for the positions that they adopted in 
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the negotiations. Shamsie (2003: 21) argues that 'trade officials believed that 
these concessions conveyed a commitment to transparency and greater civil 
society participation'; however, civil society organisations 'continued to 
denounce the secrecy surrounding the negotiations and the absence of a "true 
dialogue. "' 
Furthermore, access to the draft agreement demonstrated that the HSA had not 
been able to influence the content of its agenda. This confirmed that there was 
no political reception for any of the recommendations and policy positions thast 
it had been developing in the Alternativesfor the Americas documents. Foster 
from ART comments that 'despite the strength of the Qudbec city mobilisation 
in 2001 and the increased media attention to the arguments made by the 
Alliance [HSA] members, Alliance analysts could specify little shift in the 
framework or detail of key issues in negotiation' (Foster, 2003: 139). 
Escribano (2004) from RQIC comments: 
The focal point of the opposition and criticism to the FTAA was the lack of 
legitimacy of the hemispheric process. That is, it was centred on the process and 
not on the content of the FTAA. The Canadian government disclosed the draft of 
the negotiation document soon after the beginning of the summit to respond to 
the pressure and demands of civil society. Public access to the content of the 
FTAA draft agreement confirmed what the HSA had long feared. Access to this 
content was therefore crucial for the emergence of a consensus among the social 
actors in the Americas to oppose the FTAA. 
The legitimacy of the HSA as a democratising force was improved as a 
consequence. Kjeld Jacobsen from CUT holds that 'if the HSA had not been 
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excluded from the negotiation process, it would have been more difficult for the 
coalition to build its legitimacy as a democratic force' (Jacobsen, 2006). 
The other debate: organising popular consultations on the FTAA project 
The experience of civil society participation in the FTAA consultations 
demonstrated the futility of this approach to foster a democratic debate on the 
implications of this trade integration project for the development of the region. 
As a product of its exclusion from the official FTAA negotiation process, the 
HSA gained legitimacy as the representative of the most marginalised sectors 
throughout the continent. This facilitated the creation of political conditions 
favourable to launch a Campaign Against the FTAA, increasing the number 
social forces in the continent with whom the HSA was aligned as discussed in 
chapter 4. 
The Campaign had as one of its central activities the organisation of a 
hemispheric-wide popular consultation on the FTAA. In a public declaration, 
the HSA states: 
We do not need more exercises in propaganda on the supposed benefits of free 
trade; we need real dialogues on concrete proposals, their potential impacts on 
our economies, societies and environments, and concrete indications that there 
will be broad democratic consultations with our peoples on what has been 
negotiated by our governments. In response to the lack of information and real 
dialogue on the part of many governments in the region, we in civil society are 
carrying out a broad education campaign and public consultations in many 
countries (HSA, 2002b). 
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The purpose of this was to generate the public debate that had not been allowed 
to take place within the formal institutions of the FTAA process. It also sought 
to provide infonnation on the consequences of the FTAA, and to mobilise 
support behind forcing govemments to hold official plebiscites on the FTAA as 
a condition for the eventual signing of the agreement. The idea behind this is 
that if such plebiscites were to take place, govemments would not be able to 
rely on sufficient support to create the FTAA. A more ambitious objective of 
the popular consultations was to contribute to the derailment of the FTAA 
process by generating sufficient opposition to this agreement to be able to drive 
govemments out of the negotiation process. Furthermore, the popular 
consultations were also intended to increase the legitimacy of the HSA (De la 
Cueva, 2004: 2). 
The national coordinating bodies of the Continental Campaign organised a 
series of consultation initiatives between September 2002 and March 2003. 
There was flexibility to decide what kind of consultation initiative was the most 
appropriate for each country, considering the specific political conditions and 
infrastructure available. Aside from the relative success attained in each of the 
countries, these initiatives have been important within the HSA to see that it 
was actually possible to coordinate actions at a hemispheric level (Aguilar, 
2004). 
The most successful of these experiences was conducted in Brazil between I 
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and 7 September 2002, where more than 10 million people in 3,894 
municipalities from across the country voted in a popular plebiscite on the 
FTAA- The results of this consultation showed that 98% of the people that 
participated were opposed to the signing of the FTAA, versus 1% that 
supported this treaty ('Dez milh6es', 2002). Material for popular education was 
also produced and widely distributed: 40,000 booklets; 5,000 videos; 15,000 
books; 50,000 posters; CDs that were circulated to local radio; and 3,000,000 
information leaflets on the FTAA, The massive turn out to the plebiscite was 
the result of a very successful information campaign, but also of the political 
momentum generated by an earlier popular plebiscite on Foreign Debt in 2000, 
in which 6,000,000 people participated. 
The views of Berr6n (2005) from the HSA Secretariat and Pietricovsky (2005) 
from REBRIP coincide in the suggestion that the success of this consultation is 
based on the infrastructure and mobilisation capacity made available by the 
National Catholic Bishops Confederation, the Landless Workers' Movement 
(MST) and the CUT-the PT as the party in government did not take part in the 
organisation of this consultation. According to Mello (2005), also from 
REBRIP, there is no other consultation experience in the continent that is 
comparable. Its uniqueness is linked with the remarkable dynamism and 
complexity of civil society in Brazil. 
Other activities organised to raise awareness of the consequences of the FTAA, 
and possible alternatives to this agreement, included the Continental Juridical 
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Encounter on the FTAA held in August 2003 (HSA, 2003a). Also, the HSA and 
the organisations that integrate the Brazilian Campaign against the FTAA also 
collected 2 million signatures to petition the government to hold an Official 
National Plebiscite on the FTAA. The relatively low number of votes cast at 
this consultation is explained by the decreased level of mobilisation of the 
campaign resulting from the expectations placed on the recently elected 
government of Lula (Berr6n and Freire, 2004: 303). 
Another important occurrence took place in Argentina, where the 
Autoconvocatoria No al ALCA organised a popular consultation on the FTAA, 
foreign debt and militarization between 20 and 26 November 2003. On this 
occasion, 2,252,358 people voted in 5,700 voting boxes placed in every 
province of the country (Berr6n and Preire, 2004: 301; Echaide, 2006). The 
results of this consultation showed that 96% of the people expressed their 
opposition to the FTAA, 88% against the payment of the country's foreign debt 
and 97% against the authorisation for the establishment of a U. S. military base 
in Argentina to hold joined military exercises. According to Clara Algranati 
from CLACSO, this consultation helped to stop the advance of the FTAA 
negotiations ('Comercio-America', 2004). 
In terms of the number of people that it included, this consultation was the 
second most important initiative of the campaign, following the Brazilian 
consultation (Berr6n and Freire, 2004: 301). A second consultation was 
launched again in July 2004 to pressure the government to hold an official 
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referendum on the FTAA, other trade agreements, the payment of foreign debt, 
militarization, and the need for solutions to the problems of poverty in 
Argentina. However, the pressure mounted by this second initiative was not 
sufficient to make the government hold this kind of referendum (Echaide, 
2006). 
The experience of Paraguay was also quite successful. With the leading role 
held by the National Social Pastoral, rural movements and organisations and 
NGOs working mostly on human rights and the environment, a popular 
consultation was organised during 2003 in seventeen districts from around the 
country. Surpassing the organisers' expectations, 162,676 participated in this 
consultation. A series of popular grassroots education initiative were likewise 
held before the launch of the consultation: 23 workshops specifically catered to 
community leaders in which 2,065 participated; and 182 general workshops that 
reached 15,489 people. The Paraguayan campaign managed to introduce the 
FTAA as an issue of discussion in the press and in the national debate agenda. 
This is considered one of its most important achievements (Berr6n and Freire, 
2004: 304). 
A system of permanent consultation process was used in Mexico from 12 
October to 18 March of 2003 in which 2,000,000 participated. However 
900,000 voted in favour of the FTAA. The Permanent Committee of Struggle 
against the FTAA launched a consultation in Ecuador on 9 October 2003, and 
the Uruguayan chapter of the HSA coordinated a Citizen Popular Consultation 
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for our Sovereignty and against the FTAA on the 21 August 2003 (HSA, 
2003a). 
In the United States, ART organised an on-line consultation on the FTAA. 
Deborah James (2005) from Global Exchange (member of ART) claims that the 
popular consultations in the United States were extraordinary, due to the 'lack 
of strong mass-based social movement'. She adds that 'in the lead-up to the 
Miami FTAA Ministerial [Meeting] in November 2003, U. S. groups could only 
amass about half a million signatures against the FTAA from our collective 
education efforts'. 
Campaigns to collect signatures were launched in Costa Rica, El Salvador and 
Honduras. In Nicaragua, 10,000 signatures were collected in the first five 
months starting in June 2003 (HSA, 2003a). Aguilar (2004) explains that: 
In Costa Rica and the rest of Central America we did not have the organisational 
capacity or resources to organise a consultation. Instead we had a collection of 
signatures. In our countries the competition we have with the mass media is 
brutal! It is not easy to win a consultation like that. That's why we organised a 
collection of signatures against the FTAA, the Central American-U. S. free trade 
agreement, and Plan Puebla Panama. We've been very successful with this 
signature campaign in terms of the educational impact it had. 
A public opinion survey was conducted in Peru by the Peruvian Committee of 
Struggle against the FTAA on 20 October 2002. The results showed that 35.6% 
of the 500 people that participated in the survey did not know what the FTAA 
is, while 27% claimed that the FTAA would be beneficial for the country, and 
73% considered that there should be an official consultation before signing this 
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agreement. Likewise, in English-speaking Canada, Common Frontiers collected 
54,000 signatures (until October 2003) which voted no to the FTAA (HSA, 
2003a). In the province of Qudbec alone, RQIC gathered 60,000 signatures. 
93% of these votes were against the negotiation of the FTAA, while 95% 
demanded their government not to sign any hemispheric agreement that may be 
reached without a transparent and democratic negotiation process and which 
could undercut the soverign power of the state to legislate in behalf of the 
public interest, democracy and respect for the environment, the prevalence of 
individual and collective rights over trade and the equality of women and men 
(Brunelle and Dagenais, 2004: 5). 
Hdctor de la Cueva from RMALC explains that the efforts to conduct popular 
consultations on the FTAA in every country of the continent led to very 
unequal results. While in some countries this initiative was successful, in others 
it was either not possible to hold a consultation, or else the scope of the 
consultation was rather limited. This is explained by the differences in political 
and social conditions of each country, the unequal strength of the social 
organisations involved in the consultations, the lack of support by some 
international networks to hold the consultations, the difficulties they 
encountered in making the FTAA debates accessible to the popular sectors, and 
the failure to connect the struggle against the FTAA with the priorities of some 
of the social movements at the national levels (De la Cueva, 2004). 
Nevertheless, the activist also acknowledges that despite these limitations, the 
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popular consultations increased the public knowledge about and visibility of the 
FTAA and encouraged the participation and education of large popular sectors 
in many countries in the construction of multisectoral coalitions. He argues that 
'the struggle against the FTAA has definitely acquired a more solid base and a 
much greater reach than it had in an earlier period [before the popular 
consultations were held]' (De la Cueva, 2004: 3; my translation). 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, it was argued that the inability of the HSA to engage 
government representatives in a meaningful political debate on the implications 
of trade liberalisation and development in the Americas led to a search for other 
options outside the designated formal institutional arrangements to promote a 
debate on the implications of the FTAA project. The participation of the HSA 
in the official channels for the consultation of civil society created in the FTAA 
and the Summitry processes did not result in a greater acceptance of these 
processes, as was originally expected. 
Rather than facilitating the democratisation and transparency of the negotiation 
process, they exposed the political restrictions put in place to debate trade 
issues. This was evidenced by the absence of adequate institutional mechanisms 
to ensure a two-way dialogue between government representatives and civil 
society organisations. It was also demonstrated that once the draft text of the 
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agreement was made public, the FTAA process remained insulated from the 
public demands of the HSA. 
Failing to make use of the existing institutional arrangements unnecessary to 
relay its views to the trade negotiators, the HSA hardened its critique of the 
undemocratic nature of the hemispheric process. This significantly undermined 
governmental pretences to legitimate their efforts to advance the negotiation of 
a trade agenda. Once the idea that the FTAA process was only representative of 
the interests of transnational corporations was installed, the early HSA strategy 
to reform the FTAA through the incorporation of a social dimension to the 
agreement was no longer seen as viable, or even desirable. The decision in 2001 
to abandon this approach in favour of a rejectionist strategy would not have 
been possible if the HSA had not been confronted with the systematic attempts 
of governments to marginalise their demands for a more inclusive and 
democratic process. In other words, opposition to the FTAA only became a 
political option after the experience of exclusion from the FTAA process had 
demonstrated the absence of other viable options. 
Capitalising on its denunciation of the undemocratic and exclusionary nature of 
the FTAA process, the HSA embarked on the ambitious attempt to derail the 
entire FTAA process by forcing governments to step out of the negotiations, or 
at least to hold official referendums on the FTAA. The previous chapter 
discussed the extent to which this goal was deemed feasible in light of the 
greater support added by the alignment of the HSA with other social movement 
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coalitions in the continent and the Cuban government in the framework of the 
Continental Campaign. In this chapter, it was argued that the increased 
legitimacy of the HSA as a democratic force in the continent was also a key 
factor that facilitated its cohesion and subsequent mobilisation capacity in the 
context of the Campaign. 
The debate that was prevented from taking place within the official FTAA 
process was taken to the grassroots level with the organisation of public 
consultations on the FTAA. This helped to increase the opposition to the 
agreement by reaising awareness of what was at stake. None of the national 
members of the Campaign in any country succeeded in forcing its government 
to leave the FTAA negotiation - not even Venezuela, despite its openly critical 
view of the process - or in pressing their governments to hold an official 
plebiscite on the FTAA. Moreover, albeit obtaining irregular results, the 
organisation of popular consultations on the FTAA contributed to the 
promotion of a debate among civil society on the meaning of the FTAA. 
Likewise, it also expanded the rights of citizens to information. 
Chapter 6 will explore the political opportunities created by the HSA to oppose 
the FTAA process by exposing the signals of an eroding neo-liberal hegemonic 
consensus in the region. Exploiting the weaknesses and contradictions of the 
hemispheric process, the HSA ensured that ongoing mobilisation against the 
FTAA was sustained and optimism renewed. 
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CHAPTER 6 
Divisions in the ruling elites: 
The decline of the neo-liberal consensus 
The previous chapter suggested that in its efforts to build alternatives to the 
FTAA project, the HSA created a political opportunity by denouncing the 
undemocratic and exclusionary nature of the hemispheric process. This 
permitted not only the possibility of a consensus to reject this trade project, but 
also an opportunity to promote a debate on trade and development at the 
grassroots level through the organisation of popular consultations throughout 
the continent. 
This chapter explores another dimension of the HSA's engagement in the 
construction of alternatives. Arroyo Picard argues that the first step in the 
construction of alternatives to neo-liberalism is to convince ourselves and 
others that alternatives exist (Arroyo Picard, 2005b: 1-2). To do so, the HSA 
capitalised on the widening divisions amongst the political elites (in close 
connection with the corporate power) to bolster the confidence of the social 
forces by conveying the view that the FTAA could be effectively stopped. 
Divisions among the ruling elites associated with the deepening of market 
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liberalisation policies indicated that neo-liberalism was loosing the ideological 
battle. This improved the conditions for the construction of counter-hegemonic 
alternatives to the FTAA. The main claim of this chapter is that elite divisions 
renewed expectations among the HSA that the FTAA could be effectively 
defeated, as they were interpreted as the breakdown of a neo-liberal consensus 
in the region. 
The first section discusses the early signs of disruption to the neo-liberal 
hegemony at the global level with a shift in the terms of the development 
approaches that followed the Washington consensus guidelines, the rise of a 
global justice movement, the militarization of U. S. foreign policy, and the 
problematic advance of the WTO Doha Round. The second section draws 
attention to the weakening of neo-liberal hegemony in the Americas. It 
discusses the goverriability crises and instability of governments in Latin 
America associated with the continuity of market liberalisation and structural 
adjustment policies. Lastly, the third section focuses on the stagnation of the 
FTAA negotiations process, which peaked at the FTAA Ministerial Meeting in 
Miami, 2003. Differences between the negotiating governments over the FTAA 
agenda became even more difficult to resolve in light of such decreasing 
support for this hemispheric project. 
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Signs of disruption 
Towards the mid 1990s, the neo-liberal hegemonic consensus that had prevailed 
since the late 1980s began to show signs of disruption. The decline of neo- 
liberalism was heralded by a series of incidents that included the financial 
crises in emerging countries, the rise of social movements in the search of 
alternatives to corporate globalisation, the recourse of the United States to a 
militaristic and unilateral foreign policy, and the incapacity of the WTO to 
reach a renewed global consensus on trade liberalisation. These events put an 
end to previous years of neo-liberal euphoria, and marked the beginning of a 
critical appraisal of the norms and principles underpinning the international 
economy (Estay, 2004: 276). 
The Mexican financial crisis of 1994 was the first blow to the confidence of the 
dominant paradigm of development associated with the Washington Consensus 
policy framework: fiscal discipline, macroeconomic stability, privatisation, 
trade liberalisation and deregulation, and competitive exchange rates. The 
Mexican crisis became 'the context and the opportunity to begin reversing the 
ideological defeats that were suffered in the first stages of neo-liberalism' 
(Arroyo Picard, 2005b: 2; my translation). Subsequent financial crises in East 
Asia (1997), Brazil (1997) and Russia (1998) further exposed the detrimental 
effects of financial instability resulting from capital deregulation and the 
liberalisation policies advocated by the IMF and World Bank as recipes for 
growth in emergent economies. In addition to the devastating consequences for 
217 
the economies and social conditions of these countries, these financial crises 
contributed significantly to undermining the credibility of the hitherto 
unquestioned Washington Consensus (Munck, 2003: 500-501). 
The certainty with which a neo-liberal strategy of development had been 
previously defended gave way to a debate that questioned the viability of this 
approach to bring about prosperity and growth. At the level of policy and 
academic circles, influential economists like Paul Krugman (1995) and Joseph 
Stiglitz (1998a, b) called for the need to formulate a post-Washington 
Consensus. Different views began to debate the reasons behind the failure of 
the earlier development paradigm. Positions oscillated between a defense of a 
continuity and further deepening of market liberalisation policies, the demand 
for a total transformation of the rules of economic globalisation, and a middle 
ground position that proposed a more balanced assessment of the benefits and 
costs of market liberalisation which took into account the social implications of 
market restructuring policies. The extent to which such a debate actually 
transformed the current development paradigm constitutes a disputed issue in 
policy and academic circles (Hayami, 2003; Oniý and $enses, 2005). 
Nevertheless, the significance of this debate within mainstream academia is that 
it reveals the need to reassess the assumptions and consequence of a previously 
unquestioned neo-liberal approach to development. 
This was merely the tip of the iceberg in terms of the political change that was 
underway. Below the timid indications of an eroding consensus of the viability 
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of neo-liberal approaches on the policy and academic settings, an emerging 
global movement critical of corporate globalisation posed a much greater 
challenge to the legitimacy of neo-liberalism. The 'Battle of Seattle' in 1999 
became the most visible moment of this emerging global movement. 
The significance of this event was not only the massive mobilisation of broad 
sectors to repudiate the launching of a new trade round in the WTO. It was also 
the fact that it took place in the United States, the main promoter of neo-liberal 
globalisation. It became clear that opposition to neo-liberalism was not an issue 
that could simply be reduced to differences between the national state interests, 
or groups of states. Rather, Seattle showed that neo-liberalism was a global 
agenda that concerned all sectors throughout the planet that were subject to 
what Harvey (2005) calls the dynamic of 'accumulation by dispossession'. in 
an era of mass communications, the images of Seattle under siege by the 
thousands of demonstrators blocking the streets were transmitted around the 
world as a global spectacle of resistance. 
Although the Battle of Seattle is usually remembered as an iconic symbol of 
resistance, there was a long process of grassroots resistance and transnational 
coordination that had been slowly developing during the previous years. Many 
other forms of resistance had also been actively searching for new means of 
articulation and political expression. The development of the anti-globalisation 
movement began as early as mid 1996, with the first of a series of 
Intercontinental Encounters for Humanity and Against Neo-Liberalism held in 
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Chiapas, Mexico, by the Zapatista National Liberation Army (EZLN). These 
meetings led to the formation of Peoples Global Action. Also, from 1997, the 
campaign against the OECD Multilateral Agreement on Investments (MAI) by 
the U. S. association Global Trade Watch was another foundational initiative 
that contributed to the unification of social forces from North America and 
Europe to undermine the advance of a neo-liberal order. The defeat of the 
OECD Multilateral Agreement of Investments (MAI) in 1998, due to the 
pressure of the campaign, showed the new anti-globalisation movement that it 
was possible to shift the balance of power through the mobilisation and 
articulation of broad sectors of the population. 
Many other experiences of resistance would follow these first initiatives. The 
First European March held by the unemployed workers movement against 
labour flexibility policies was held in 1997, as well as a strike in the United 
States by the truck drivers union (Teamsters) with the support of the AFL-CIO. 
That same year yielded the results of the Asian financial crisis: protests in 
Indonesia that led to the downfall of Suharto's regime; demonstrations by 
workers in Thailand and strikes of the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions 
(KCTU) against the layoffs resulting from the effects of the crisis in that 
country. The surge of a global 'movement of movements' that challenged the 
principles and consequences of neo-liberal economic globalisation was a 
manifestation of a political weakening of this 'consensus' which opened the 
possibility for the conformation of a new historical bloc. 
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In Latin America alone, the turn of the century witnessed a substantial rise in 
the number and intensity of social conflicts. Seoane el a/. (2005: 2) argue that 
'this increase in social conflictivity accounts for the appearance of a new cycle 
of social protest, which, being inscribed in the force field resulting from the 
regressive structural transformations forged by the implanting of neoliberalism 
in our countries, emerges to contest the latter'. 
Table 5: Social conflicts in Latin America (May 2000 - April 2004) 
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The Iraq War was another important sign that neo-liberalism began to retreat 
from its declining position as the hegemonic consensus for a model of global 
civilisation. The intervention in Iraq without consent frorn the international 
community and without the legality bestowed by the U. S. Security Council 
resolution, revealed the weakening leadership of the United States. In 
Gramscian terms, the recourse to war and violence evidences the breakdown of' 
hegemonic consensus. The credibility of the United States as the leader of' a 
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world hegemonic order was thus seriously undermined. Influential scholars 
closely linked to the political establishment such as Joseph Nye (2004) 
announced the importance of rebuilding the United States' 'soft-power'; 
namely, their capacity to convince others without resorting to the use of force. 
Bello (2005) suggests that the renewed unilateral militarism of U. S. foreign 
policy is indicative of its political weakness rather than of its strength. As a 
main advocator of neo-liberalism, the United States had ceased to be the source 
of values that others in the world sought to emulate. 
The stalemate of the Doha Round process at the WTO was also an indication 
that neo-liberal hegemony was being contested. At the Canc6n WTO 
ministerial summit of 10-14 September 2003, governments tried unsuccessfully 
to secure a consensus on an agenda to deepen the liberalisation of the world 
economy. Initiating a round of trade talks was very important politically, 
considering that neo-liberalism had received a devastating blow in 1999 when 
the earlier WTO meeting at Seattle had also ended in collapse in the midst of 
unprecedented street protests. North-South divisions over the definition of trade 
rules were at the centre of the breakdown of the Canc6n summit. 
A newly created coalition of Southern developing countries (G20) demanded 
that agricultural subsidies in industrialised countries were dismantled. The G20 
was integrated by China, India, South Africa, Egypt, Indonesia, Brazil, Mexico, 
Argentina, Venezuela and Chile among others, and its formation opened 'a new 
front in geopolitical bargaining' that could signal 'the emergence of an "anti- 
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neo-liberal" power bloc in the world' (Harvey, 2005: 230; 23 1). 
The demands of the G20 contrasted with the agenda that Northern industrialised 
countries sought to put forward. This latter related to the incorporation of new 
trade areas of the so-called Singapore issues: investment protections; 
competition policy; government procurements; and trade facilitation. The G20 
even refused to initiate talks on such new issues until they could ensure that the 
markets of the Northern countries were effectively opened to their agricultural 
exports. The unwillingness of developed countries to move away from 
protectionist safeguards against the competition of developing countries in the 
agricultural sector exposed the hypocritical rhetoric of free trade of some of the 
most fervent proponents of neo-liberal globalisation (particularly the United 
States and the European Union). 
Arroyo Picard from the Mexican RMALC interprets the outcome of the WTO 
summit in Cancfjn as an indication that the United States is no longer capable of 
generating international consensus to move the liberalisation process forward. 
Its capacity to convince has simply been damaged, despite its enormous 
continuing capacity to impose itself. However, what this summit shows is that 
the hegemonic standing of thepensie unique has been broken. The social forces 
against neo-liberalism are winning the ideological battle and reaching 
unprecedented levels of international coordination and unity. According to the 
activist, although the struggle will be long and difficult, they have begun to 
shift the balance of power in their favour (Arroyo Picard, 2005a). 
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Also from RMALC, De la Cueva highlights the fundamental role played by 
social movements in the derailing of the WTO summit. Without the pressure of 
these movements, governments would have enjoyed a more favourable political 
context in which to negotiate and overcome their differences. Nevertheless, the 
activist also recognises that the contradictions between the great powers, and 
the emergence of a coalition of Southern countries, were determining factors 
behind the failure of this summit. This failure represented a significant blow to 
the WTO, and to the global neo-liberal institutional isation of which it is a part 
(De la Cueva, 2003: 282-3). 
The Canc6n events generated optimistic expectations that the FTAA could be 
defeated (Berr6n, 2006). Particularly, if the pressure that was applied by the 
formation of a coalition of Southern countries at the global level was transposed 
to the context of the hemispheric process, the FTAA negotiations could be 
derailed or prolonged indefinitely (De la Cueva, 2003: 282-3290). In a 
framework discussion document presented at a plenary session at the III 
Hemispheric Meeting of Struggle Against the FTAA in Havana (26-29 January 
2004), De la Cueva claims that 'the victory that was secured at Canc6n against 
the WTO was able to put into question the neo-liberal agenda of 'free trade' and 
its institutions. This became an important precedent for our future struggles' 
(De la Cueva, 2004: 4). 
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GovernabiIity under fire: political instability sweeps the region 
In the Americas, the erosion of neo-liberal hegemony became manifest in the 
recurrent crises of govemability that swept many governments of a neo-liberal 
persuasion. The political instability and failure of market-led models of 
development in the region were interpreted with great optimism by the social 
movements that participate in the HSA and Continental Campaign against the 
FTAA. 
These events provided a sense of optimism that is very much required to ensure 
that the mobilisation of opposition to the FTAA can be sustained throughout 
time. It is often the case that the public visibility and mobilisation capacity 
gained by issue-based campaigns during their first stages of formation can lead 
to the gradual loss of political momentum. It is not always easy to keep many 
social sectors unified and active. The downfall of governments that were 
associated with the continuity of market-making policies contributed to a sense 
of immediacy and success with regard to the possibility of derailing the FTAA 
process. Interpreting these governability crises as expressions of a declining 
neo-liberal consensus became a political opportunity to build confidence and 
endurance in the battle against the FTAA. These crises were regarded as the 
regional expression of a broader transformation at the global level, as noted in 
the previous section. 
The most spectacular of such crises was experienced in Argentina in December 
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2001. Having been the poster-child of neo-liberalism during the 1990s, 
Argentina descended into the worst political and economic crisis of its history. 
Its neo-liberal development model - based on the irresponsible deregulation of 
the economy, privatisation of state assets and liberalisation of trade and 
financial markets - proved to be economically and socially unsustainable. In 
the midst of unprecedented popular mobilisations demanding the resignation of 
the entire political class, and denouncing the moral vacuity of institutions, 
President Fernando de la Ma stepped down from office on December 21, 
leaving behind a political crisis that accounted for the succession of five 
presidents in the course of twelve highly unstable days. Thirty street protestors 
died at the hands of sanctioned police repression, bank savings were 
confiscated, the country eventually defaulted on most of its $141 billion debt 
and the currency was later devalued, terminating the convertibility regime that 
had been regarded as the cornerstone of economic stability since 1992 by 
pegging the Argentine peso to the U. S. dollar. 
The distributional and political repercussions of the crisis were phenomenal. 
More than 50% of the population was submerged below the poverty line, and 
the credibility of political institutions was seriously undermined. Similarly, the 
crisis rearranged the configuration of political forces in the country. Factions 
that advocated the continuity (by 'correcting' and even deepening) of the neo- 
liberal orientation of the 1990s experiment were politically weakened by the 
crisis. This led to the accession to power of a left-of-centre government with the 
election of Ndstor Kirchner in 2003, and its subsequent confirmation at the mid- 
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term elections of 23 October 2005. The extent to which Kirchner's government 
represents a breakaway from a neo-liberal approach to development remains an 
open question. 
The social movements that participated in the Continental Campaign against the 
FTAA that gathered at the II Hemispheric Meeting in Havana (20-23 November 
2002) highlighted the significance of the Argentine crisis for the struggle 
against neo-liberalism. The magnitude of this crisis was regarded as revealing 
the debacle of the neo-liberal model (Hemispheric Meeting, 2002: 1). 
The events in Argentina infused the Campaign with a sense of enthusiasm and 
optimism, as the prospect of defeating the FTAA became more real. This 
presented an opportunity to bolster the efforts of the social movements to make 
governments step out of the FTAA negotiations, in line with the objectives of 
the Campaign. De la Cueva claims that, 'in light of a disastrous neo-liberal 
experience in Argentina, the new forms of resistance and popular organisation 
that emerged are sources of hope' (De la Cueva, 2004: 4). The Final 
Declaration document states that 'there is no doubt that the new scenarios 
presented by these victories constitute a setback to the neo-liberal model 
because the vote of our people was against that model, against "free trade" and 
against North American domination ( ... ) Our possibilities for resistance are 
better than before and there are new sources of hope. Our struggle must also 
enter a decisive phase' (Hemispheric Meeting, 2002: 3; my translation, italics 
added). 
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Furthermore, the declaration states: 
In the year that has passed since our First Hemispheric Meeting we have 
witnessed the considerable strengthening of the resistance against the threat 
posed by the FTAA and other dangers that neo-liberal policies have caused to 
our peoples. ( ... ). In Argentina, where the 
demise of the neo-liberal model has 
been most evident, popular mobilisation against policies of wealth concentration 
responsible for a social genocide is on the rise. ( ... ) The individualism, 
competition and divisions fostered by neo-liberalism are in retreat due to the 
growing unity and solidarity of the peoples (Hemispheric Meeting, 2002; my 
translation). 
The Bolivian crisis was another important manifestation of the notion that there 
was an opportunity to construct political alternatives to neo-liberal policies in 
the region. The escalation of popular protests in Bolivia pressing for 
nationalisation, or for greater control of the benefits derived from the country's 
oil and gas industries, led President Gonzalo Sdnchez de Lozada to step down 
from office on 17 October 2003. This political crisis followed a wave of 
demonstrations against his project to export gas via Chile that left 80 people 
dead. Vice-President Carlos Mesa replaced the ousted president, but also had to 
resign in June 2005 - he was replaced by head of the Supreme Court, Eduardo 
Rodriguez. These incidents were the last in a line of events that began in April 
2000 with the popular struggles in opposition to the privatisation of water 
services in Cochabamba that opened the door for increasingly militant popular 
movements, shifting the balance of power in Bolivia away from the neo-liberal 
direction that it had embraced since the early 1990s. The political crisis that led 
to Sdnchez de Lozada's resignation heralded the incapacity of weakened ruling 
coalitions to secure support for political programs associated with neo-liberal 
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reforms (Berr6n, 2005). 
Bolivia became 'an example of dignifying resistance' in the eyes of the social 
movements participating in the Continental Campaign convened at the III 
Hemispheric Meeting of 2004 (Hemispheric Meeting, 2004). The escalation of 
protests and violence leading to the resignation of president Lozada were 
celebrated as 'a truly popular revolt of the Bolivian people against the FTAA 
and to the challenge this agreement posed for this country's sovereignty over its 
natural resources' (Hemispheric Meeting, 2004). De la Cueva argues that 'in 
Bolivia there has been a popular revolt in defense of the sovereignty of their 
natural resources and against the FTAA that led to the fall of a puppet 
government of Washington, and which has infused the continental struggle of 
resistance with enthusiasm' (De la Cueva, 2004: 4). 
In an opening speech at the III Hemispheric Meeting, Osvaldo Martinez from 
the hosting Cuban organisation committee paid tribute to the role played by 
organisations that integrate the HSA in bringing about the downfall of the 
Argentine and Bolivian governments, suggesting that other governments would 
follow a similar fate (Martfnez, 2004: 5). Social movements were encouraged to 
continue pressing their governments to step out of the FTAA negotiations and 
to raise public awareness about the dangers of this proposed treaty. The final 
declaration of this event ends with an optimistic tone: 
At the end of this III Hemispheric Meeting we can be satisfied that we have 
accomplished many of the objectives laid out at the 11 Hemispheric Meeting. 
229 
Furthermore, we are enthusiastic to see that our peoples are better prepared 
today to face this new decisive phase [of the FTAA negotiations] (Hemispheric 
Meeting, 2004). 
Ecuador was also another scenario in which an intense political struggle led by 
the popular sectors resulted in a deep governability crisis. Lucio Guti6rrez came 
to office with a mandate to place social issues at the centre of his government 
agenda. The support he received by the vigorous indigenous movements that 
are part of CONAIE was crucial for his electoral success. However, once in 
power, Guti6rrez swayed towards a neo-liberal orientation by trying to advance 
controversial reforms and economic austerity measures. This was interpreted as 
a betrayal (De la Cueva, 2004: 5). Widespread mobilisations and protests 
resulted in the resignation of Guti6rrez on 20 April 2005 - the CONAIE had 
also occupied a central role in earlier events leading to the ousting of Presidents 
Buchanan in 1997 and Mahuad in 2000. 
The events of Ecuador were celebrated as a victory in the struggle against the 
FTAA. The Final Declaration of the IV Hemispheric Meeting at Havana states 
that these events shook other 'weak governments' in the Andean region, 
complicating their negotiation of Bilateral Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) with 
the United States (IV Hemispheric Meeting, 2005a). The view was that events 
in Ecuador and Bolivia could destabilise the Andean region altogether, with 
direct implications in Peru and even Colombia (Hemispheric Meeting, 2005a). 
The failure of neo-liberal governments to stay in power was regarded by the 
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HSA as a sign that ruling elites could no longer generate hegemonic consensus 
leading to political destabilisation (Jacobsen, 2006). Gustavo Codas from the 
Brazilian CUT and a member of the HSA Executive Secretariat claims that 
even at a time when U. S. imperialism shows its highest degree of 
aggressiveness with the invasion of Iraq, imperial order in the Americas is 
being undermined, as demonstrated by the events in Ecuador. This represents a 
political opportunity for social movements to confront U. S. imperialism in the 
Americas and elsewhere ('ALCA, "estado de coma"', 2005). Gonzdlez (2006) 
from ORIT argues that the accumulation of resistance to neo-liberal policies 
throughout the region raised the optimism and confidence of the HSA. 
The stagnation of the FTAA negotiations 
The stagnation of the FTAA negotiation process was also a signal that neo- 
liberalism could no longer provide a hegemonic consensus to cement a new 
wave of liberalisation in the continent. 
The VIII FTAA Trade Ministerial Meeting held at Miami in November 2003 
had the enormous task of preparing the ground for the last period of the 
negotiations, ensuring that existing differences that prevented a consensus 
could be ironed out before the I January 2005 deadline for the coming to force 
of the FTAA (see chapter I for details on the chronograrn of the negotiation 
process). Considering the lack of progress of the negotiations, preparation prior 
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to the FTAA Miami meeting was essential in order to avoid the collapse of the 
meeting, which could seriously jeopardise the political viability of the entire 
FTAA project. 
As co-chairs of the FTAA negotiations, the Brazilian and the U. S. trade 
officials called for an emergency mini-ministerial meeting at the Wye River 
Conference Center in Maryland in May 2003. Only 15 out of the 34 countries 
engaged in the FTAA process participated in this meeting, presumably to 
facilitate reaching a consensus to overcome the crisis of the FTAA process. 
Lori Wallach, director of Public Citizen's Global Trade Watch claimed that 
'half the countries in the hemisphere [were] pushed to the side while a blueprint 
for the Miami Ministerial [was] drawn by a select few' (Public Citizen, 2003). 
However, reducing the number of governments at the negotiating table did not 
guarantee consensus. Even with a smaller number of countries involved, 
governments could not manage to bring their positions into alignment (Public 
Citizen, 2003). This placed a great expectation on the coming meeting at 
Miami. The possibility that the final phase of the FTAA negotiation process 
would be successfully completed within the estimated timeframe was 
dependent on the success of Miami in overcoming the stagnation of the process. 
Since no progress was reached prior to the meeting, in order to prevent a 
breakdown of the FTAA process, ministerial governments agreed to a limited 
variant of the FTAA - to a 'FTAA-light' or 'A la carte' - in Miami. This new 
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negotiation scheme allowed governments to overcome the impasse of the 
negotiations by moving the most sensitive issues of the agreement from a 
multilateral to a bilateral track - it was also decided that the principle of 'single 
undertaking', which establishes that nothing is agreed until everything is 
agreed, was to be renounced. This meant that the Latin American countries 
could withdraw from negotiations on intellectual property rights, investments, 
government procurement, services, competition policy and other area of interest 
to the United States. Similarly, it also meant that the United States could 
continue subsidising its agriculture. A minimum number of commitments to 
liberalisation would be sought multilaterally as the common base for the FTAA, 
while countries would be free to decide which issues they wanted to negotiate 
at the bilateral level (see chapter I for more details). 
Having saved the Miami ministerial from a devastating collapse, the trade 
negotiators resumed their efforts to build a minimum consensus for a now 
scaled-down FTAA agenda. Despite their working on a comparatively less 
ambitious agenda, no agreement was reached in any of the consecutive 
meetings held in the aftermath of the Miami meeting. Notwithstanding the 
attempt to overcome their differences by holding an extraordinary Summit of 
the Americas in Monterrey in January 2004, no progress was reached in the 
subsequent Trade Negotiating Committee (TNC) meeting of February 2004 in 
Puebla, Mexico, or at the 'informal' meetings called in Buenos Aires on 31 
March and on I April 2004 to rectify the February TNC deadlock (Public 
Citizen, 2004). 
233 
In these informal meetings, trade negotiators from only nine countries hoped 
they could agree on a common set of FTAA obligations that they could approve 
at a planned Vice-Ministerial TNC scheduled for April at Puebla. No consensus 
was secured then either, leading to the cancellation of the Vice-Ministerial 
meeting of Puebla (Public Citizen, 2004). A Trade Ministerial Meeting 
scheduled to take place in Brazil was also cancelled. Since April 2004, the 
FTAA negotiations have been halted. 
The stagnation of the FTAA negotiations was a sign that the political 
contradictions in the Hemisphere had become so accentuated that governmental 
efforts to reach a common base concerning this trade agreement were simply 
futile (Continental Campaign, 2003; Escribano, 2004; HSA, 2003c: 1; 
Jacobsen, 2006; Martfnez, 2004). Similarly, it was also increasingly evident 
that the United States government lacked the required leadership to overcome 
this deadlock (De la Cueva, 2004: 3) - especially considering that it could 
potentially offer sufficient concessions in the negotiations in order to move the 
process forward at least before the the November 2004 presidential elections. 
In a public statement following the Miami ministerial meeting, the HSA 
declared that: 
The final declaration from the VIII FTAA Ministerial held on 20 and 21 
November 2003 in Miami confirms the demise of the original vision 
underlying these negotiations. Despite every effort by officials to declare this 
Ministerial a resounding success and one that breaks an impasse in the FTAA 
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talks, the lack of consensus that brought down the WTO negotiations in 
Cancun was evident once again in Miami. In addition, it was plain for all to 
see that the U. S. government no longer has the capacity to impose its agenda 
while making it appear that a general "consensus" was achieved (HSA, 
2003c). 
The FTAA process could never recover from its stagnantion. The commitment 
to meet the January 2005 deadline as a date to begin implementing the FTAA 
was never met. All the attempts to move this process forward could not resolve 
the difference of visions among the negotiating governments. This was finally 
evidenced in the IV Summit of the Americas at Mar del Plata in November 
2005. In spite of the efforts of the U. S., Canadian, Mexican - and others - 
governments, the Final Declaration of this Summit does not make any specific 
reference to a commitment to resume the FTAA negotiations (see chapter I for 
details). This confirmed the insufficient political conditions for advancing the 
continental project. 
Bilateral Free Trade Agreements: moving targets 
The political divisions between governments that prevented the conclusion of 
the FTAA negotiations and the definition of its agenda, however, did not leave 
much room for celebration for the HSA. The adoption of an FTAA-light 
scheme at the Miami ministerial meeting meant that the most dangerous issues 
of the agenda were transferred to the negotiation of bilateral Free Trade 
Agreements (BFTAs), where the United States had a greater advantage to 
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impose its position on the negotiations (De la Cueva, 2003: 290; Estay, 2004: 
284-85). The intention of the the United States government to begin 
negotiations of such agreements with the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Peru 
and Colombia was even announced at this ministerial meeting in Miami. 
The HSA understood that this development in the hemispheric negotiations 
could actually further complicate its efforts to prevent the advance of a neo- 
liberal agenda in the continent and, consequently, its pursuit of alternatives to 
such a model of integration and development. The HSA stated that: 
This [FTAA-light] "agreement" in Miami may in fact turn out to be more 
dangerous than the original FTAA formulation. The final declaration maintains 
the original time frames and its antidemocratic character and puts forward a 
"flexible" structure for the negotiations, shifting them to a bilateral level, 
particularly on issues lacking common agreement. This shift towards 
bilateralism puts many countries at a greater disadvantage in their direct 
negotiations with the United States. In addition, all issues remain on the table. In 
other words, the danger is that, beyond the issue of market access, supra- 
constitutional rules will be imposed on all economies in the areas of investment, 
services, intellectual property, government procurement, agriculture, etc. (HSA, 
2003c). 
According to Oscar Martinez, keynote speaker at the Hemispheric Meetings in 
Havana, the FTAA-light and the FTAs 'are not proof of the defeat of the 
FTAA, but rather of a new tactic to impose the domination of Latin America 
and to make neo-liberal policies irreversible, whether this is done with one 
name or another'. The U. S. managed to save 'the essence of the project' thus 
allowing the resurgence of 'a new and perhaps even more dangerous proposal 
of negotiation' (Mart[nez, 2004; my translation). In a statement issued after the 
Miami ministerial it was declared that: 
236 
We are witnessing in Miami the failure of the original FTAA project, and at the 
same time the emergence of a new and perhaps more dangerous proposal for 
negotiations ( ... ). The United States will try and present the Texible' proposal 
to move the negotiations forward as a success of the Ministerial Meeting. But 
this is only a faýade ( ... ). Miami has revealed that the United States has lost its 
capacity to convince people of the virtues of its 'free' trade project, and is using 
force to impose its objectives, trying to isolate the governments of the continent 
that are proposing a different vision (Continental Campaign, 2003). 
Escribano from the RQIC argues that the Miami ministerial opened the door for 
the negotiation of BFTAs, which are especially problematic for social 
movements (Aguilar, 2004; Brunelle, 2004a; Escribano, 2004). There was no 
doubt in the HSA that, in light of the threats posed by these agreements in 
addition to the FTAA-light scheme, the strategy of engagement with these 
processes had to redefined (De la Cueva, 2004). However, it became difficult to 
generate broad bases of consensus among the social movements on how to 
define common objectives and actions (Escribano, 2004). 
It was comparatively easier to mobilise a continental opposition to the FTAA 
project (Rodriguez, 2005), when the negotiation process involved all the 
countries in a single scheme - as in the original version of the FTAA. In that 
case, it would only have taken the decision of one government to step out of the 
negotiation process to considerably obstruct the FTAA project. The social 
organisations that partake in the HSA were more readily available to mobilise 
opposition to an agreement that could potentially affect the social and 
environmental conditions of their own country. 
Nevertheless, as the bulk of the negotiation agenda was moved to the bilateral 
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track, it became more difficult to maintain a focused hemispheric-wide 
mobilisation. The specific priorities of each country began to override the 
hemispheric dimension of the HSA collective action. Trade processes such as 
the CAFTA-DR and the BFTAs with Andean countries were opposed with 
impressive resistance by social movements in those countries that were 
involved in these potential agreements. The same cannot be said in other 
countries in which these agreements did not pose an immediate threat. 
In the background of this challenge faced by the HSA, the United States 
government proved to be relatively successful in its strategy to obtain allies in 
the region for the creation of BFTAs. In 2003, the U. S. -Chile Free Trade 
Agreement was signed by the governments of these countries. This was the first 
free trade agreement between the United States and a South American country. 
The US-CAFTA-DR Agreement was later signed by the United States, Costa 
Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua 
(August 2004), followed by the the Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement 
(February 2006) and the Peru Trade Promotion Agreement (April 2006). 
It was at this point that the Venezuelan and Cuban governments began to 
demand stronger backing from the HSA to the Bolivarian Alternative for the 
Americas (ALBA) project. Chapter 4 referred to the fact that some of the ways 
in which this political support was obtained violated the tacit agreements that 
the HSA had with the Cuban government regarding their autonomy and 
consensus building processes. This was exemplified by the unexpected launch 
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of ALBA that took place at a local theatre in Habana without prior consultation 
with the HSA during the IV Hemispheric Meeting and which was presided over 
by Presidents Castro and Chdvez. For the first time, the final declaration issued 
at the Hemispheric Meetings at Habana make explicit reference to ALBA, 
appealing to the hope and optimism that this Project represents a 'radically 
different model of development and trade' from the FTAA and the BFTAs 
(Hemispheric Meeting, 2005a). 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, it was argued that the HSA created a political opportunity for 
the construction of alternatives to the FTAA by highlighting each instance in 
which neo-liberal coalitions failed to produce a political consensus that could 
advance market liberalisation policies. Attention was given to the notoriously 
virulent crises of governability that swept many Latin American countries, and 
to the obstacles encountered by governmental elites in advancing trade 
fiberalisation talks at the multilateral level. 
Focus on such events provided the necessary confidence and encouragement to 
social sectors mobilised within the Continental Campaign that the stalling of the 
FTAA was a near and realistic possibility. The HSA's biggest challenge was to 
ensure that resistance to the FTAA could be sustained and so withstand the 
inevitable tendency towards dernobilisation that characterises extended 
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transnational campaigns. 
This worked relatively well until the FTAA negotiation process became 
stagnant in 2003. Thereafter, the diversification of the trade liberalisation 
agenda into the DR-CAFTA and the BFTAs between the U. S. Andean countries 
put a greater strain on the mobilisation capacity of the coalition to act as a 
hemispheric force. The prominence acquired by bilateral negotiations of trade 
issues permitted the strengthening of government alignments in the region 
associated with the support of the more controversial aspects of the trade 
agenda - rules on investments, intellectual property rights, subsidies, 
government procurements, dispute resolutions, lack of binding obligations on 
labour and environmental international standards, no recognition of 
asymmetries or application of special and differential treatment to developing 
countries in the region, amongst others. These contested issues in the trade 
agenda were also part of the original version of the FTAA agenda, which had 
led to the formation of the HSA in the first place (see chapter I for details). 
The 'mutation' of the FTAA negotiation process into an FTAA-light format 
combined with BFTAs imposed significant limitations on the efforts of the 
HSA to coordinate a hemispheric-wide opposition to neo-liberalism. This gave 
a certain advantage to the sectors within the HSA that were more inclined to 
support the ALBA project. The next chapter analyses the political opportunities 
created by the HSA at the discursive level in the framing of the FTAA as an 
antagonistic other. 
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CHAPTER 7 
Framing the FTAA: 
The discursive construction of an antagonistic other 
The purpose of this research is to assess the role of the HSA in constructing 
political alternatives to the neo-liberal view of development contained in the 
FTAA agenda. In the previous chapter, it was argued that the HSA sought to 
create political opportunities by exposing the decline of neo-liberal hegemony 
while renewing the encouragement of resistance to the FTAA. This chapter 
explores the framing practices undertaken by the HSA to discursively construct 
the 'FTAA' as an antagonistic other in opposition to which mobilisation and 
resistance was encouraged. It also analyses the extent to which these framing 
practices have advanced the construction of alternatives to the FTAA. 
The HSA helped create a critique of the FTAA that animated the imagination of 
a broad-range of actors throughout the continent by discursively visualising the 
links that exist between trade and development and the power structures that 
mediate this relation. The discursive construction of the FTAA as the 
antagonistic other has undergone considerable changes since the origins of the 
HSA in 1997 until the Mar del Plata Summit of the Americas in 2005. The 
analysis of the discursive strategies employed by the HSA to oppose the 
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advance of a neo-liberal agenda reveals three distinctly identifiable FTAA 
frames. The differences between them reflect the adaptation of this coalition in 
light of a changing political context in the hemisphere. 
The main claim of this chapter is that the HSA was limited in its capacity to 
frame the FTAA in a way that was conducive to building political alternatives 
to neo-liberalism. The prevailing FTAA frames reflected a disproportionate 
emphasis on mobilisation of opposition at the expense of a discussion on policy 
alternatives to neo-liberalism. 
The following sections of this paper discuss these distinct FTAA frames used 
by the HSA. In each case, their specific prevailing understandings of justice, 
attribution of political responsibility and proposed action are discussed. 
The FTAA as an unsustainable and undemocratic model of development 
The first image of the FTAA framed this project of hemispheric integration as 
an unsustainable and undemocratic model of development. This corresponds to 
the early stages of formation of the HSA, in which the coalition was integrated 
mostly by the trade union organisations affiliated to ORIT and NGOs working 
on human rights, the environment and gender issues, amongst others. The 
emphasis of this initial frame was placed on highlighting the detrimental effects 
that the creation of a hemispheric market would pose for the attainment of 
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sustainable forms of development in the region. 
Appeals to justice were raised in connection to the deteriorating conditions of 
workers' rights, the undercutting of democratic sovereignty to the advance of 
corporate rule, and the devastating impacts on the environment. The FTAA 
project is deemed to be immoral, since it would lead to economic polarisation, 
social and political disempowerment and environmental degradation. The 
FTAA is compared to the NAFTA model, which had demonstrated that it 
caused greater harm than goods, in terms of advancing social and 
environmental justice causes (HSA, 2001; Public Citizen, 2004). Echoing a 
humanist ethic that places the person at the centre of concern, the HSA defines 
itself as a 'movement of the peoples of the Americas demanding their very 
humanity'. This is done by stating that 'nutritious food, a comfortable place to 
live, a clean and healthy environment, health care and education are human 
rights' (HSA, 1998). The idea that trade integration should be subordinate to 
the advancement of human development and not the reverse as proposed by the 
FTAA becomes a recurrent theme. 
The first declaration of the HSA states: 
There should be no FTAA agreement if it is to be created along the lines of other 
existing agreements such as NAFTA. We need an agreement that promotes 
genuine development for all of the peoples of the hemisphere, one that 
recognizes and attempts to reduce the differences in levels of development, one 
that allows for integration of our economies based on democratically 
determined national development models, and one that is based on consensus. 
Strong national economies must be the basis for a strong hemisphere. We are 
proposing an agreement designed for sustainable development rather than for 
trade liberalization. ( ... ) Any trade agreement should not 
be an end in itself, but 
rather a means toward combating poverty and social exclusion and for achieving 
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just and sustainable development. We do not support isolationism or traditional 
protectionism. We are not nostalgic for the past. We are looking forward, and we 
have viable proposals. We know that our economies cannot be isolated from the 
dynamics of the world economy, but we do not think that free trade is the 
solution. The problem is that free trade involves more than the opening of 
borders; it involves the abandonment of national development models and poses 
a serious threat to democracy (Foro Nuestra Amdrica, 1997; emphasis added). 
Furthermore, 
We call on our governments to ensure that no further efforts to increase 
hemispheric trade and economic integration will be undertaken unless and until 
they clearly enhance the broad Summit goals of democracy, sustainability, and 
the eradication of poverty. If the proposed FTAA will not further these goals, it 
should be radically changed or rejected. ( ... ) We call on our governments to 
reject the 'low road' approach, by which we all compete to sell our natural 
resources and labour power at the lowest possible price. Instead, we believe that 
our governments have both an opportunity and a duty to take the 'high road': 
building capacity and skills, improving labour standards and living conditions, 
and respecting and valuing cultural diversity and biodiversity in our 
hemisphere. Our people demand the construction of a new model of 
development based on justice, democracy, and freedom. Only in this way can 
we avoid social exclusion and ensure a sustainable livelihood for all people of 
the Americas (HSA, 1999b; emphasis added). 
In the final declaration of the Second Summit of the Peoples the HSA states: 
We reject this project of liberalised trade and investment, deregulation and 
privatisation. This neo-liberal project is racist and sexist and destructive of the 
environment. We propose to build new ways of continental integration based on 
democracy, human rights, equality, solidarity, pluralism and respect for the 
environment (Summit of the Peoples, 2001; emphasis added). 
Responsibility is attributed to transnational corporations and international 
capital, the main would-be benefactors of the FTAA agreement. It is their 
interests that drive the FTAA agenda of integration. Corporate interests are 
behind the push to introduce rules on investments that would restrain the 
sovereignty of states to legislate in cases that would easily be interpreted as 
encroachments on the rights of investors, and giving investors the right to sue 
governments directly (as in NAFTA Chapter 11 on Investments); a dispute 
settlement system that would transfer the functions of national judicial systems 
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to the special tribunals integrated by technical appointees without public 
accountability; and rules to protect the intellectual property of large 
corporations without consideration for the social implications in terms of the 
health of the population, among others. Corporate power is embodied in the 
transnational corporations, many of which are located in the industrialised 
economies of North America, but some of which are also based in Latin 
America. There is an obvious advantage in the North, but a transnational 
dimension of corporate globalisation overrides a geographic North-South 
distinction. 
The first version of the Alternativefor the Americas policy documents launched 
by the HSA at the Summit of the Peoples in Santiago, Chile, in 1998 clearly 
stresses that the financial power of transnational corporations with the 
complicity of governments, are behind the FTAA agenda: 
While transnational corporations, speculators and their government sponsors 
will continue to act in their self-interests; we now are beginning to unite across 
borders and across sectors in order to oppose these self-interests with those of 
the vast majority of the residents of our hemisphere. While the building of such 
a social alliance is in its early stages, this urgent task has begun (HSA, 1998; 
emphasis added). 
Conflict is not bound by geography, even when it is recognised that 
governments are complicit in the pursuit of this trade agenda. What is most 
important, however, is the distinction created between 'corporations' and 
4people', as a conflict that transcends national boundaries. The need to defend 
the rights of the people against the encroachment of corporate power is 
245 
sometimes represented in terms of a conflict between 'corporations' and 
4states'. In a document issued for the occasion of the Toronto FTAA Ministerial 
meeting in 1999, the HSA argues that: 
What is at stake is a struggle between the ambition of transnational 
corporations to be free of state controls and the capacity of the hemisphere's 
citizens and the governments we elect to decide on our own destinies ( ... ). 
There is every indication that the intention is to extol the rights of large 
enterprises without establishing corresponding obligations towards peoples and 
nations. Our proposals subordinate the rights of corporations to the rights of the 
peoples and nations of our continent (HSA, 1999a; emphasis added). 
Action is directed at redressing the unbalance in favour of corporations by 
incorporating public instruments of regulation that will ensure that trade 
liberalisation is made compatible with sustainable development: 'Our proposals 
are to subordinate the rights of corporations to the rights of the peoples and 
nations of our continent' (HSA, 1999a; emphasis added). This portrayal of the 
FTAA is the early 'reformist' strategy of the HSA, in which the view that there 
could be a rights-based approach to sustainable development through the 
inclusion of labour and environmental rights are central parts of an agreement, 
is still influential within the coalition's overall orientation. 
As discussed in detail in previous chapters, the reformist phase of the HSA was 
never fully supported to the same extent by all the members of the coalition. 
This became increasingly problematic as it became evident that there were few, 
if any, possibilities to make the FTAA project compatible with an agenda for 
sustainable development. The critique of the FTAA, as highlighted in its initial 
frame, centred on policy issues. Although politically limited, it was relatively 
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clear what an alternative to the FTAA should look like. Its understanding of 
social justice was tied to democracy, social equity and environmental 
sustainability. Transnational capital and corporations were the forces that 
needed to be contained in an eventual alternative view of integration that 
emphasised a rights-based approach to the relation between domestic and 
international trade relations. 
The FTAA as a project of U. S. Imperialism 
The decreasing expectations that the FTAA could be reformed led to the HSA 
decision to adopt a strategy to reject the FTAA process and to the launching of 
a Continental Campaign. Generating opposition across the continent to derail 
the FTAA process became the most important political priority. The task of 
building a common ground of identification invariably became more 
challenging than it had been when it concerned a smaller group of social 
organisations, comprising mainly trade unions and NGOs. The original FTAA 
frame was accordingly adapted in order to address this new challenge. The new 
frame that was adopted was not absolutely different from the one previously 
employed. The first FTAA frame was expanded to incorporate other elements 
that could resonate within a much broader range of social sectors mobilised in 
the Campaign in opposition to this trade agreement. 
The appeals to justice associated with notions of social equity, democracy and 
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environmental sustainability that had characterised the early FTAA frame was 
expanded with the incorporation of the notion of the independence of Latin 
American peoples from colonial domination. This theme resonated widely 
throughout the broad spectrum of social movements in the hemisphere that 
were able to join forces under a common struggle of opposition to the FTAA 
project. The alignment of the HSA with Cuba was central to this rhetorical shift 
(Berr6n, 2005; Rodriguez, 2005). Increasingly, the notion of justice became 
used in direct allusion to the condition of emancipation from imperial 
subordination. 
This was accompanied by the glorification of those leaders who led the 
independence revolutions of Latin American republics during the XIX century 
from the rule of their European colonial powers. Largely due to the influence of 
the alignment with Venezuela, Sim6n Bolfvar was the most cited of these 
historical figures, as the inspiration of a revolution against colonial oppression. 
Marchand (2005) argues that the HSA invokes 'a Bolivarian geopolitical 
imagination' in order to construct an alternative regional project and identity. 
This involves the reinterpretation of Bolivar's doctrines in ways that allow the 
HSA to retain its anti-colonialist elements and yet add a commitment to 
democracy and justice which was originally absent from Bolivar's worldview. 
Past and present are thus united in a discourse that emphasised the continuity of 
the peoples' struggle for emancipation and freedom. Opposition to the FTAA 
project came to be regarded as ethically compelling. 
248 
Although transnational corporations continued to be represented as the sources 
of blame attribution, the links between state power and corporate power was 
made more explicit. Nowhere was this link more clearly stressed than in the 
relation of the United States govemment with the large corporations based in 
that country. The discursive construction of the United States as the focus of 
responsibility behind the FTAA project led to a growing sense of anti- 
Americanism. 
Bruce Jay (2001b: 1) from ART explains that 'the FTAA is being tainted with 
an image of US imperialism and identified with other unpopular US initiatives, 
such as Plan Colombia. This climate makes it harder to talk about engagement 
and compromise'. Likewise, 'the anti-corporativism of the opposition to 
globalization and trade is turning to a more standard version of 'Yankee' 
baiting to express opposition to the FTAA'. It did not take much to polarise the 
sentiments and perceptions of the social forces involved in the Campaign by 
invoking anti-American and anti-imperial rhetorical devises. The FTAA 
became the expression of 'an ongoing process of annexation and re- 
colonisation of our peoples' by the United States (Hemispheric Meeting, 2001; 
emphasis added). The final declaration of the Hemispheric Meeting in Havana 
in 2002 claims that: 
Behind the false rhetoric that the FTAA will bring about progress and well 
being for our peoples, our governments are committed to the negotiation of an 
integration project that will consolidate the hegemony of the United States in 
the region through its political, economic and military domination 
(Continental Campaign, 2002; my translation. Emphasis added). 
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There were at least two reasons that ensured the effectiveness of this discursive 
strategy. First, despite the heterogeneity that characterised the broad range of 
social forces gathered at the Continental Campaign, there was an embedded and 
shared perception that the United States represents an interventionist and 
imperialist threat in the region. This suspicion towards the imperial pretence of 
the United States is the obvious result of a history of illegal U. S. intervention in 
Latin America, cynically conducted in the name of freedom and democracy - 
some of the most notable examples include the interventions in Guatemala 
(1954), Cuba (1961), Guatemala (1966-67), Chile (1973), El Salvador (1981- 
92), Nicaragua (1981-90), Grenada (1983-84) and Panama (1989). 
Other events such as the illegal invasion by the United States (and Britain) of 
Iraq in 2003, and the overtly unilateral U. S. foreign policy as seen by this 
government's rejection of the International Criminal Court and the United 
Nations Kyoto Protocol, were taken as confirmations that the policies of the 
United States government responded to purely self-interested considerations. 
The ideological identity of the most progressive sectors and movements in 
Latin America has been shaped by their experience of such a history of 
intervention and by the struggle against the allied authoritarian military 
governments in the region. This deeply rooted suspicion of the United States 
has played a central part in the development of nationalist ideologies in Latin 
America, shared by both left and right on the political spectrum. 
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Second, the alleged support of the United States government for the short-lived 
coup of the Venezuelan President Hugo Chivez between 11-14 April 2002 - 
either with direct financial support or by its notorious delay in publicly 
condemning this - facilitated the identification of the FTAA project with the 
politics of U. S. imperialism in the region. In a public statement of support to the 
Venezuelan government and the principles of ALBA, the HSA pronounced its: 
vigorous readiness to defend our sister Venezuelan nation from the attacks and 
serious threats it receives from the ultra-rightist cronies that govern the United 
States. We understand and feel each of these threats and attacks as threats and 
attacks on our own nations, and to our own aspirations to overcome the centuries 
of imperial plundering in our region (HSA, 2005; my translation). 
Once the idea of U. S. imperialism was established, following its turn to a 
realpolilik engagement in global issues, the new FTAA frame was ready to 
resonate and become more effective as a means of raising opposition to the 
FTAA project. 
Framing the FTAA as a United States imperialist project permitted the 
conceptual linkage of the trade liberalisation agenda with the issues offoreign 
deht and to militarization in the region. These were presented as three 
complementary and self-supporting 'mechanisms of re-colonization' of the 
region (Hemispheric Meeting, 2002; 2004; Summit of the Peoples, 2005a). 
They all became part of the same U. S. project for domination. The 
militarization of the continent referred specifically to the Colombia Plan 
sponsored by the United States, as well as to their intentions to build new 
military bases, in Paraguay, Brazil, and earlier in Argentina. The final 
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declaration of the Hemispheric Meeting in Havana in 2002 claims that: 
( ... ) the United States and 
its allied governments in the Hemisphere persist in 
their ob ective to impose a supranational treaty on our nations that will 
increasingly impoverish larger sectors of the population in the South and the 
North, grant rights to transnational corporations that supersede the rights of 
states and peoples, plunder our natural, productive and human resources 
undermining the possibility of a sovereign development for our nations, and 
thus constituting a new era of colonization and annexation of our America to the 
political, economic and military power of the United States (Hemispheric 
Meeting, 2002; emphasis added). 
This FIFAA frame directs political action towards building opposition in order 
to derail the negotiation process through the polarisation of public opinion in 
terms of a U. S. versus Latin American conflict - or North and South. As argued 
in previous chapters, the alignments with the Venezuelan and Cuban 
governments sought to steer the support of social movements in the region 
towards embracing the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas (ALBA). The 
considerable success of president Chdvez' attempts to be seen as the 
embodiment of the peoples' resistance to imperialism (as demonstrated at the 
Summit of the Americas in Mar del Plata in 2005) could not have been possible 
if a discursive frame of the FTAA that locates and defines conflict along the 
lines of a Latin American struggle for emancipation and independence against 
the imperialist hegemony of the United States there had not been already in 
place. 
Framing the FTAA as a project of American imperialism was a successful 
strategy to increase mobilisation and opposition to this trade process. As argued 
in chapter 4, the Continental Campaign permitted the alignment of the HSA 
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with other coalitions that had been working actively in the region on issue- 
based campaigns. The most important of these other campaigns includes: that 
against the privatisation of water services, the one in defense of public 
education, the campign against the payment of 'illegitimate' foreign debt led by 
Jubilee South, and the Campaign for the Demilitarization of the Americas 
(CADA). In order to ensure cohesion among these social forces within the 
Continental Campaign, the HSA and other social forces in the Campaign 
explicitly linked the struggle against the FTAA with the advocacy efforts of 
other coalitions promoting debt cancellation and the demilitarization of the 
Americas 
The significance of this strategy of continental mobilisation against the FTAA 
goes beyond its instrumental value to ensure cohesion within the Campaign. It 
is also an exercise of ideological construction. The identities and normative 
understandings of the social forces that partake in the Campaign are also 
transformed. The framing of the FTAA as U. S. imperialism facilitated the 
uncovering of the organic relations between political and economic power. This 
can be regarded as a contribution to the construction of alternatives to neo- 
liberalism. 
However, other things which are also important for the construction of 
alternatives were left out from this frame. In contrast to the earlier FTAA frame 
that stressed the undemocratic and unsustainable nature of this trade agenda, the 
FTAA as U. S. imperialism does not emphasise the importance of democracy or 
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sustainable forms of development for the construction of alternatives. 
Democracy became a rather 'uncomfortable' issue that was avoided whenever 
possible, or raised in ways that did not generate controversy over its meaning 
and political implications. Furthermore, it was also trivialised, as I personally 
observed it at the III Hemispheric Summit in Havana when Fidel Castro made 
what he considered to be a humorous remark in a plenary session, commenting 
that he did not have any problem with the issue of political representation in 
Cuba since he was Cuba. 
Many began to see democracy and human rights simply as convenient 
rhetorical resources to justify the illegal interventions of the U. S. government in 
foreign countries in order to expand its control of their natural resources. The 
controversial electoral process that led George W. Bush to power in 2001 was 
often held up as evidence that his government has no moral authority to justify 
its actions on the basis of a defence to democracy. While these are certainly 
appropriate observations, such claims should also be qualified with a clear 
proposition of what constitutes desirable democracy. Of course, this would 
have inevitably created rifts in the coalitions. By maintaining silence on this 
issue, the FTAA frame discouraged a much-needed reflection on democracy. 
This lack of stress on democracy in the FTAA frame did not mean that it was 
absent from the campaign altogether. In chapter 5, it was argued that one of the 
main activities of the campaign was the organisation of popular consultations 
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on the FFAA, including putting pressure on governments to make the approval 
of the FTAA conditional to the outcome of official plebiscites, and ultimately 
the derailing of the entire negotiation process. Thus, participatory forms of 
democracy were indeed encouraged through these popular consultations - even 
when their success was generally scant, with the exception of a few countries. 
However, whereas as democratic values were actively encouraged in this 
regard, this was left to the discretion of the national campaign organisers in 
each country to decide what kind of consultation was carried out and how to 
promote it. When it came to framing a hemispheric discourse on the FTAA as a 
collective initiative of the campaign through which to unite its forces, 
democracy was not explicitly high lighted as a central theme of this particular 
frame. 
Furthermore, another important implication of framing the FTAA as American 
imperialism is that it underplayed the centrality of policy alternatives to neo- 
liberalism. Many advances had been made by the HSA in defining a policy- 
oriented vision of alternatives to neo-liberalism as evidenced by the production 
of a series of Alternative for the Americas documents. This base of consensus 
on alternative policies was expected to become the 'the Bible' of activist 
organisations fighting against the FTAA. Its contribution was meant to be 
'pedagogical' (Martins, 2004), and to provide a framework for debates among 
different social forces in their search for alternatives and new consensus 
(Rodriguez, 2004; Hansen-Kuhn, 2004). However, the Alternatives documents 
were never sufficiently diffused and socialised (De la Cueva, 2004: 3): 'It was 
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never really popular' (Martins, 2004). There has always been a certain 
resistance amongst many of the organisations that are part of the Campaign to 
even read this document (Rodriguez, 2004). Much of this resistance has to do 
with the complexity rather technical nature of these documents which does not 
facilitate their diffusion among a non-specialised audience. Also, with the fact 
that many of the movements that are part of the Campaign prioritise 
mobilisation and public protests as their main strategy of response to the FTAA 
process. The poliical value of the Alternativesfor the Americas documents have 
not been easily recognised by these movements. 
As a consequence, the contents of the documents have not been fully 
appropriated discursively by the social forces mobilised against the FTAA 
(Hansen-Kuhn, 2004). According to Jacobsen, the HSA Alternatives documents 
was very influential in setting the boundaries for discussions and consensus 
building from the Santiago Summit of the Peoples in 1998 until the Qudbec 
Summit of the Peoples in 2001. It later ceased to be influential when the 
Campaign was launched in 2001 (Jacobsen, 2006). 
The discursive construction of the FTAA during the period of the Campaign 
can be described as a 'broad stroke without too much room for detail' (Foster, 
2006). The strategy associated with the frame of the FTAA as U. S. imperialism 
prioritised the mobilisation of opposition by appealing to popular sentiments 
against the imperialist impulse of the United States. This allowed the 
association of trade integration with the issues of foreign debt and 
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militarization, therein identifying key areas which alternatives to neo-liberalism 
would need to address. However, it did not go far enough. It did not facilitate 
an exploration of the meaning of democracy nor a policy- focused reflection on 
alternatives to neo-liberalism. This would eventually become a liability for the 
HSA. 
The FTAA as "free trade" 
The FTAA project had permitted the unification of social forces, which resulted 
in the formation of the HSA and later the Continental Campaign (Escribano, 
2004). However, as discussed in previous chapters, the negotiation format of 
this trade project suffered considerable modifications due to the lack of political 
consensus within the region on a multilateral set of rules and obligations to 
open and regulate hemispheric trade relations. After the Miami FTAA 
ministerial meeting in 2003, the original version of the FTAA was changed to 
an FTAA-light scheme. This meant that in addition to the governmental pursuit 
of a minimum base of agreement for a scaled down FTAA-light commitment, 
the most sensitive issues of the trade agenda were also negotiated bilaterally 
through trade agreements: the DR-CAFTA and BFTAs between the U. S. and 
Peru, and Colombia and Ecuador. Likewise, the negotiation dynamics of these 
processes were also tied to the ongoing development of simultaneous 
negotiations at the WTO, and in the EU-MERCOSUR process. This 
diversification of simultaneous trade processes created the need to further 
257 
readapt the ways in which the HSA framed its critique of the FTAA. 
Berr6n and Freire (2004: 300) from the HSA Secretariat argue that having so 
many fronts complicates things for the Continental Campaign against the 
FTAA. Raising any awareness amongst the general public about the FTAA had 
already been a considerable achievement. Highlighting the relation between the 
FTAA and other processes was much more challenging, considering the greater 
complexity that is introduced and the sense of distance of those other processes 
from the immediate realities of people. As these activists claim, 'it was 
considered important to 'broaden and consolidate a convergence of social 
coalitions on comprehensive and unifying focal points' (Berr6n and Freire, 
2004: 306). The FTAA frames that had prevailed during the early stages of the 
HSA and later during the peak of mobilisation of the campaign were no longer 
adequate to face this challenge. A new focus had to be found. 
Following lengthy discussions within the HSA, it was decided that the notion of 
'free trade' provided the new emphasis of the FTAA frame. In this, Aguilar 
(2004) explains that 'the HSA is leaving behind the FTAA and adopting 'free 
trade' as its main focus of mobilisation and struggle. We have broadened it to 
'free trade', and not exclusively restricted it to the FTAA. There was a very 
long discussion on this issue within the HSA. Now the struggle is also against 
WTO, BFTAs, the effects of NAFTA and the Chile-U. S. Agreement, foreign 
debt and militarization. This shift to free trade is concerned with the reality of 
the BFTAs. I share the view with some sectors of the HSA who believe that 
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there is a fundamental relation between the FTAA, WTO and BFTAs'. 
The shift towards the notion of 'free trade' was meant to re-energise the 
declining levels of mobilisation that were taking place once the original FTAA 
process ceased to be the main driving force for the mobilisation of continental 
social forces critical to neo-liberalism (Berr6n, 2006; Rodriguez, 2005). The 
rationale behind this decision lay in a strategy of semantic appropriation and 
subversion of this term. Governments often publicly defend their trade policies 
by appealing to the beneficial gains supposedly derived from 'free trade' 
policies in terms of economic growth, prosperity and development. Though 
increasingly less, this view of 'free trade' constitutes the 'common sense' of 
policy discussions and the mass media coverage. Given its positive overtones, 
the HSA set out to appropriate this widely disseminated term in order to subvert 
its accepted meaning. 
Through the discursive re-signification of 'free trade', the HSA attempted to 
create an underlying inter-subjective basis of meaning that could embrace the 
many simultaneous trade liberalisation processes under a common and 
encompassing critique. The FTAA, BFTAs, WTO and EU-MERCOSUR 
processes would become different manifestations of the same phenomenon. 
Following lengthy discussion within the HSA, the new FTAA frame was finally 
available at the Hemispheric Meeting of 2004 (Berr6n and Freire, 2004: 299). 
In a speech at a plenary session at this meeting in Havana, Hdctor de la Cueva 
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from REMALC claimed that: 
The HSA was created with the focus on the struggle against the FTAA. 
Maintaining this narrow focus has been convenient in order to ensure the unity 
of such a broad, diverse and delicate coalition. However, as it was demonstrated 
at the Canc6n WTO summit, there is an evident overlap between the agendas, 
issues, alliances and actors. The WTO is a more global setting for dispute on 
'free trade' that is linked to the regional and bilateral initiatives used in the 
competition among large corporations. The HSA participated in the battle at 
Canc(in, although its role there was rather timid. In the case of the bilateral and 
sub-regional free trade agreements, the HSA has so far had a little response, 
despite the obvious link between these initiatives and the FTAA project. 
Certainly, the HSA cannot jump from one issue to the next, expecting to respond 
to every bilateral negotiation that takes place. This is something that has to be 
done by the corresponding local and sub-regional social forces. Nevertheless, it 
is also true that not acting upon these new bilateral and global scenarios weakens 
the ultimate objective of the struggle against the FTAA. It is no longer possible 
to continue with a strategy of resistance focused exclusively on the FTAA 
project, without also addressing the other parallel and linked scenarios. It is 
also the case that it is not possible to address everything simultaneously. The 
focus [of the campaign] should remain on stopping the FTAA, but it is necessary 
to adopt a strategy that will also enable us to take part in other scenarios. ( ... ) The challenge is to undertake a global campaign against 'free trade', forming 
coalitions with all the international forces beyond the Americas ... to demonstrate that no agreement based on this kind of ['free trade'] model can be 
beneficial. This campaign would not be limited to one particular agreement, but 
it would rather address the fundamental implications behind 'free trade'. ( ... ) This requires greater coordination between the agendas of anti-neoliberal social 
movements from around the continent. One of the main problems that we face in 
the majority of the countries is the lack of connection, practically the divorce in 
many cases, which exists between the global and national agendas. It is 
necessary to place the struggle against 'free trade' (namely, the WTO, FTAA 
and the Bilateral Free Trade Agreements) at the centre of the specific popular 
struggles taking place against privatisations, the defence of water, small 
agricultural interests, labour rights, and others' (De la Cueva, 2004; my 
translation. Emphasis added). 
The FTAA frame as "free trade" does not break away from the previous frames. 
Rather, it builds on them, expanding its scope in order to mobilise opposition to 
the other trade processes. The previous focus on the U. S. government as a force 
of imperial domination in the region became limited to accommodate processes 
where this government was either absent, as in the EU-MERCOSUR 
negotiations, or simply less influential than in the Western Hemisphere, as in 
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the WTO process. Albeit less prevalent, the emphasis on the U. S. as an imperial 
force has not been altogether abandoned. The following excerpts from the final 
declaration of the IV Hemispheric Meeting in Havana show the cumulative 
layers of meaning associated with the FTAA as derived from its earlier 
formulations: 
In spite of the resistance demonstrated by our peoples and the social destruction 
caused everywhere by 'free trade', we are gathered here again because the 
governments from the hemisphere - with some honourable exceptions - persist 
in their commitment to negotiate the FTAA ( ... ). The United States government is trying to impose bilateral and sub regional treaties and mega projects, such as 
the free trade agreements between the United States and Central America and 
with the Andean region - with the exception of Venezuela. To prevent the 
advance of these projects and treaties is also to prevent the advance of the 
FTAA ... ) The Empire does not rest. The plague of the wrongly called 'free 
trade' the emblem of a neo-liberal globalisation that seeks to expose our 
countries to indiscriminate plundering and denies their right to development - 
expands everywhere adopting all possible forms. ( ... ) The most delicate scenario 
that we are facing is in Central America, the Caribbean and the Andean region. 
Having failed to advance the original FTAA project, the United States 
immediately shifted its strategy to advance its agenda through the negotiation of 
bilateral and sub-regional free trade agreements (Hemispheric Meeting, 
2005a; my translation. Emphasis added). 
The FTAA as "free trade" was a response to the diversification of trade 
processes. The bargaining leverage of governments in one negotiation process 
is affected by the outcomes and expectations of the other processes in which 
they are simultaneously involved. This meant that, in order to prevent any one 
of these processes from succeeding in progressing the most sensitive issues of 
the neo-liberal trade agenda, the HSA also had to mobilise against the other 
simultaneous processes. 
The tactical effort to devise a more encompassing FTAA frame that enabled the 
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incorporation of other processes exposed some of the inherited limitations of 
the earlier framing strategies. When the FTAA project had ceased to be the 
main integration project driving the dynamics of hemispheric integration, the 
HSA lost the mobilising instrument that it had so painstakingly created. In 
terms of frames, the discursive shift to 'free trade' did not have the same effect 
as the somewhat clearer U. S. imperialist FTAA. This is particularly noticeable 
in reference to the WTO and the EU-MERCOSUR processes. Moreover, the 
signing of BFTAs between the U. S. and Chile, Peru, Colombia, Central 
America and the Dominican Republic also evidences the limitations of this 
frame in mobilising opposition to the trade agenda that was originally part of 
the FTAA project. 
As previously suggested, the reason for this lies in the fact that opposition was 
not mobilised on the basis of a reflection on policy alternatives to neo-liberal 
trade integration, regardless of what format this integration may adopt. Priority 
was instead given to the mobilisation of the largest possible number of social 
actors in the campaign in order to ensure that the balance of power against the 
FTAA process could be attained. The concept of "free trade" was simply too 
abstract without the necessary reflection on alternatives. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter it was argued that the HSA engaged in a strategy of mobilisation 
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by framing the FTAA project as an antagonistic other. Three frames were 
introduced and analysed in terms of their appeal to values ofjustice, the sources 
of responsibility behind a given issue or situation that was deemed problematic, 
and the related proposed action that follows to revert that situation. Differences 
between the three frames that were identified related to the new challenges 
faced by the HSA for the building of alternatives to the FTAA, in light of the 
changing political opportunities in the hemisphere. 
It was argued that the original emphasis on a critique of the TTAA as an 
undemocratic and unsustainable model of development' was a good start that 
promised a productive reflection on alternatives to the project. Nevertheless, as 
explained in more detail in previous chapters, this frame failed to mobilise a 
sufficientlY strong opposition to the FTAA. 
The framing of the 'FTAA as project of American Imperialism' helped to 
personify an otherwise complex and less graspable process. This frame could 
more easily ensure greate resonance among the critical sectors of the public 
opinion in the Americas, and especially among the social movements that were 
involved in the Continental Campaign against the FTAA. The alignment with 
the government of Cuba, and later of Venezuela, significantly contributed to 
changing the tone of the discursive construction of the FTAA. Since at this 
point the priority was to derail the FTAA process, the FTAA frame that was 
employed tried to increase the polarisation of public opinion. This frame was 
successful in building such opposition, leading to the halting of the FTAA 
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process in 2005 at the Mar del Plata Summit of the Americas (see chapter I for 
details). However, this framing strategy proved to be a double-edge sword. 
When the possibility of the BFTAs became a reality, continental opposition to 
their agenda was less successful. This was the moment at which a deeper debate 
on policy alternatives to neo-liberalism was most needed. The appeal to an 
abstract discourse of "free trade" replaced the visible face of U. S. imperialism 
without successfully installing the content necessary to fill this void. 
The chapter showed the the ways in which the dominant FTAA frames favour 
mobilisation of opposition but not a reflection on alternatives. The cause of 
advancing alternatives could have been improved if the framing of the FTAA 
had placed greater emphasis on discussing the policy alternatives to this 
project's agenda. 
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CONCLUSION 
This thesis examined the efforts of the Hemispheric Social Alliance (HSA) to 
construct political alternatives to the FTAA project. It was argued that the HSA 
was only partially successful in this venture. 
One of the main achievements of the HSA has been the articulation of the main 
social forces in the continent critical of neo-liberalism in a consensus building 
process for the construction of alternatives of development for the region. Such 
varied social forces as trade union organisations, development NGOs and 
grassroots social movements came together in the HSA united by a shared 
concern on the FTAA project. Throughout time this fruitfuil encounter led to 
the production of the Alternativesfor the Americas policy documents. Albeit 
incipient, these documents constituted a valuable political resource in so far as 
it embodied the common aspirations of different social sectors in the collective 
pursuit of concrete alternatives to neo-liberal integration. 
Another important victory of the HSA is the greater transparency obtained in 
the FTAA negotiation process with the public release the draft text of the 
FTAA resulting from the concerted pressure exerted on the governments. 
Likewise, in conjunction with the Continental Campaign against the FTAA, the 
HSA launched a hemispheric-wide popular consultation on this trade agreement 
initiative. Although not successful in all countries, the organisation of popular 
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consultations permitted the HSA to hold a public debate to inform citizens 
about the meaning and implications of the FTAA agenda. This debate had been 
denied by official FTAA process. Despite their limitations, these consultations 
expanded the rights of the public to information about and participation in 
politicals matters with such enormous social implications as the implementation 
of an FTAA. In this respect, the HSA acted as a democratising force in the 
continent. 
Moreover, the HSA was also capable of generating optimism and confidence 
amongst the social movements in the continent that their struggle against the 
FTAA would be victorious. This was crucial in order to ensure that continental 
resistance to the FTAA could be sustained, therein avoiding the tendency to 
demobilisation that often characterises extended transnational campaigns. This 
was carried out by succesfully exploiting politically the divisions amongst 
governments in their recurrently failed attempts to arrive at a consensus to 
move the neo-liberal trade agenda forwards. Exposing the weaknesses of these 
governments evidenced their limits to create hegemonic order in face of the 
counter-hegemonic challenges posed by social forces such as the HSA. This 
worked relatively well until the original FTAA negotiation format was changed 
at the Ministerial meeting in 2003. 
The opportunities created by the HSA for the construction of political 
alternatives in the region to the FTAA project were also limited by a series of 
shortcomings which hindered the remarkable advancement attained by this 
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coalition. This limitation stemmed from the gradual decrease in the leadership 
of the HSA's capacity to act as a hemispheric force in the construction of 
alternatives to neo-liberalism in light of the influence aquired in the region by 
the government of Venezuela with its initiative to create a Bolivarian 
Alternativefor the Americas (ALBA). The agenda of ALBA rests on the bases 
of consensus that the HSA had painstakingly articulated at the grassroots 
hemispheric level. However, once appropriated by president Chivez as a 
governmental iniative, ALBA came to be regarded as the beacon of counter- 
hegemonic models of integration opposed to the neo-liberal FTAA project 
(Berr6n, 2005). 
This reduced the political margins available to the HSA to continue to drive 
forward a process of bottom up coalition-building independently of 
governmental control. The concern about the autonomy of the HSA is not only 
limited to the case of Venezuela. Other governments in the region with whom 
the HSA shares some political affinity include Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, 
Cuba, Bolivia and recently Ecuador and Nicaragua. Since in politics means and 
ends can never be separated, the challenge of the HSA remains to make the 
construction of alternatives to neo-liberalism an inclusive and democratic 
process. In this regard, the HSA faces the central challenge of finding new ways 
of relating to allied governments and political parties, as a way of participating 
in the construction of alternatives without compromising its cherished 
autonomy. The type of social movements that will prevail in the future will 
depend on how these issues are resolved. Likewise, the prospect of truly 
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democratic alternatives to neo-liberalism is also dependent on this. 
Furthermore, the unity reached by the HSA in its capacity to inspire confidence 
about their success in struggling against the FTAA project was only noticible 
until the original FTAA negotiation format was changed at the Ministerial 
meeting in 2003. In this meeting, governments agreed to a scaled down FTAA- 
light format in an attempt to prevent the failure of the negotiations process. The 
adoption of an FTAA-light format meant that governments transferred the most 
divisive issues in the trade agenda to the bilateral track and also to the WTO 
negotiations. This led to the diversification of the trade negotiation processes in 
the Americas with the simultaneous advance of the DR-CAFTA, the FTAs 
between the U. S. and Andean countries, and the FTAA-light. The complexity 
added by these concurrent trade processes put a greater strain on the capacity of 
the HSA to act as an hemispheric force for the mobilisation of opposition to 
neo-liberalism. It was comparatively easier to mobilise a continental opposition 
to the FTAA project when all the countries were involved in a single 
hemispheric trade process. The completion of these negotiations and signing of 
the FTAs demonstrated the limitated ability of the HSA to steer resistance to 
these initiatives when pursued bilaterally. 
Finally, the HSA was also limited in its capacity to frame the FTAA in 
ideologically productive ways that could advance further the building of 
political alternatives to neo-liberalism. The dominant FTAA frames employed 
by the HSA favoured the mobilisation of opposition to the FTAA while 
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discouraging a policy-oriented reflection over the implications of this 
hemispheric project and its possible alternatives. 
Trade agreements like the FTAA can serve as focal points for the convergence 
of different social forces in the search for other undestandings of development, 
expanded notions of democratic rights, the environmental and social justice. 
The experience of the HSA in the context of the Continental Campaign shows 
that it is too easy to make up for the absence of this kind of debate by 
portraying the FTAA simply as a form of American imperialism, conveniently 
invoking nationalist sentiments and other populist rhetorical devises. 
Inflammatory declamations of imperialism and American dominance have 
certainly been functional to the objective of raising opposition to the FTAA. 
However, they also became increasingly a liability as the trade integration 
agenda in the hemisphere was diversified through the simultaneous negotiations 
of the FTAA, BFTAs, the WTO and the EU-MERCOSUR processes. At this 
point rhetorical denunciation of imperialism became insufficient to address the 
extent of the challenge faced by the HSA with the negotiation and signing of 
others trade agreements by the region's governments. The cause of advancing 
alternatives to neo-liberalism could have been improved if the framing of the 
FTAA had placed as much emphasis on visualising possible avenues along 
which to continue building concrete policy alternatives as it did on 
denunciation. 
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Contributions of the thesis 
The study of the HSA from the perspective of the political process tradition of 
social movement theory challenges realist, liberal and critical theorizations of 
state strategies for regional integration such as the FTAA process. 
Firstly, a bottom-up study of transnational social movement resistance to the 
FTAA process exposes the limitations of realist perspectives of regional 
integration. In the case of Latin America, it shows the simplistic assumptions of 
'national interest'and democratic representation that underpin this kind of state- 
centric perspective. The study of the HSA and the FTAA process evidences 
precisely that the mobilisation of social forces seeks to undermine the 
legitimate authority of governments to represent people's interests in trade 
integration processes. Likewise, the underlying struggles for deeper and more 
significant forms of democratic control within and across countries renders 
abstracted notions of 'national interest' analytically limiting and politically 
questionable. Transnational social movement coalitions undermine the 
separation of realist accounts between the 'domestic' and 'international' 
spheres of politics. The study of the HSA demonstrates that in the case of the 
Americas it is no longer possible to understand the nature of domestic politics 
concerning issues of trade and development independently from the politics of 
transnational coalition building at the hernsipheric level. Domestic and 
hemispheric dimensions have been interlaced in the construction of political 
alternatives to neo-liberal regional integration. 
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Secondly, the study of the HSA also challenges the institutionalist accounts of 
the FTAA process advanced by liberal theories of regional integration. 
Although liberal theory assumes a pluralist understanding of politics, accounts 
of the FTAA process from this perspective are inadequate to address the 
complex dynamics of grassroots mobilisation throughout the continent. The 
reason for this is that liberal accounts have focused primarily on the few civil 
sociery organisations that have sought to influence the FTAA process by 
participating in official institutional mechanisms of consultation created by 
governments at the hemispheric and national levels. Nevertheless, most of the 
civil society activism directed at the FTAA process has not been mediated 
through such formal institutional mechanisms. 
As the late period of the HSA shows, most social movements and some NGOs 
(perhaps less the trade unions) have pursued other avenues to influence their 
governments on the FTAA process. Some of these strategies include street 
protests, hemispheric summits, popular education initiatives and the 
organisation. of plebiscites in which people could have a saying with regards the 
FTAA project. Since none of these 'non-institutional' or 'informal' ways of 
engaging with the FTAA process are part of the formal institutional architecture 
of the hemispheric process, they have not been addressed by liberal accounts. 
The political process approach to the HSA outlined in this thesis permitted to 
bring in the bottom-uP social responses articulated by the HSA into the 
hemispherc politics of the FTAA process. 
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Thirdly, the political process framework used for the analysis of the HSA 
makes a contribution to the understanding of the agency of counter-hegemonic 
social forces. Neo-Gramscian perspectives have not adequately addressed the 
question of agency in their analyses of the emerging transnational forms of 
resistance to neo-liberalism. Their emphasis rely heavily on structural 
explanations of the changing features of global capitalism and simply stating 
the opportunities that these changes create for the resistance and transformation 
of the system by the global activism of marginalised social sectors. Likewise, in 
the specific case of the FTAA, much of the reflection from critical perspectives 
has centred on the denunciation of the dangers posed by this trade integration 
project on the most vulnerable social sectors of the continent. This kind of 
analysis does not reflect on the role of social movements in contesting the 
FTAA project and in creating its alternatives. Instead, they portray the FTAA 
process as something 'external' to the social forces, which they must oppose 
and resist. As a result of this, the social forces are not regarded as actors 
capable of conditioning the political dynamics of the hemispheric process, but 
rather as reactions to it. In light of this, the analysis of the HSA from a political 
process approach contributed to explore the contingencies and challenges of 
social movements in their efforts to create broad-based coalitions across 
national borders. 
Despite the value of a political process approach for the analysis of the HSA in 
the Americas, there are some aspects of this process that are not addressed 
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adequately by this theory. In particular, its instrumental view of politics 
becomes Problematic in order to understand the dynamics of such a diverse 
coalition like the HSA whose identity and composition have been subject to 
constant construction and change. It is limiting to address the HSA from a 
purely utilitarian perspective. The HSA's interactions with the political 
opportunities created in the hemispheric context in the pursuit of alternatives to 
the FTAA has also transformed some of the initial identities, perceptions and 
consensus that were the original defining features of this coalition. The 
alignment of the founding HSA core organisations with other social forces 
(social movements and governments) in the framework of the Continental 
Campaign has surely redefined some of the initial perceptions and attitudes of 
this coalition. In this regard, a theoretical perspective that facilitates the 
assessment of the possibilities and limitations of the HSA in its construction of 
alternatives can also obscure the complex dynamics of identity formation 
underlying this coalition. 
The analysis of the HSA prioritised the hemispheric level of coalition building. 
This has come at the expense of a deeper exploration of the national and sub- 
regional levels. Much more can be said about the particular conditions in each 
country and/or sub-region which have facilitated or inhibited the HSA's efforts 
to build political alternatives to the FTAA through its engagement with other 
forces at the hemispheric level. The same factors associated with the rise and 
development of the HSA that were analysed at the hemispheric level can also 
be explored in detail at the local levels to reveal their differences and 
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complementarities: politics of multi-sectoral alignments, access to political 
institutions, divisions of the elites, and framing practices. 
The case of the HSA has wider implications for the study of other transnational 
coalitions. Clearly, some of its characteristics could not be found elsewhere and 
are therefore specific to the context of the Americas and Latin America in 
particular. Nevertheless, other of its features can iluminate similar experiences 
of transnational activism in other parts of the world. 
One of such features refers to the search for what constitutes political 'power, 
and how is it built and exercised when concerning a broad based coalition of 
social forces. That is, what is the power of a social movement coalition and 
how is it created and used? There is a debate in the HSA on whether power is 
built 'top-down' with the support of allied governments in the region, or 
'bottom-up' through the construction of solid bases at the grassroots level 
autonomously from governments. In Latin America this debate has become 
central since many of the Left governments have emerged from a long historry 
social movement acitivism. It is not necessarily clear in many cases what are 
the distinctions between governments and social movements (e. g., Bolivia and 
Venezuela). However, to some extent this debate over the nature of power can 
also be found in a different variant in the World Social Forum. There has been a 
long discussion among the forum organisers of the whether the forum should 
aspire to issue a final declaration document containing the conclusions and final 
positions of each forum, or if it should continue being an open space for the 
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exchange of ideas. The latter view can be identified with the 'bottom-up' 
position in the debate over the nature of power. 
Central to these concerns over the nature of power is the issue of democracy. 
How to organise and represent the interests of different social actors mobilised 
by common concerns in the absence of formal systems of representation. There 
are no obvious answers to this. However, it can be said that the HSA constitutes 
a social laboratory for the emergence of new forms of deliverative democracy. 
Social movements, NGOs and trade unions have been able to negotiate their 
differences and find spaces of convergence in order to ensure their continuity as 
an effective hemispheric coalition while defining a common vision and agenda. 
This has required undergoing a certain transformation at the level of political 
culture in favour of more open and democratic values. To give an example, it is 
less than obvious that trade unionists, activists from rural movements, 
indigenous movements and NGO members specialised in trade negotiations 
have been able to accommodate each others differences to find common 
grounds. The experience of the HSA in this respect can be valuable to explore 
other broad-based coalitions. 
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ANNEX: 
Social organisations part of the main HSA national 
chapters and affiliated regional networks 
Common Frontiers: 
APG Americas Policy Group of Canadian Council for International 
Cooperation 
CAW Canadian Auto Workers 
Canadian Consortium for International Social Development 
CELA Canadian Environmental Law Association 
CFS Canadian Federation of Students 
CLC Canadian Labour Congress 
CUPE Canadian Union of Public Employees 
CEP Communications, Energy and Paperworkers Union of Canada 
Council of Canadians 
KAIROS: Canadian Ecumenical Justice Initiatives 
Maquila Solidarity Network 
Oxfam Canada 
Rights and Democracy 
Sierra Club of Canada 
SHF Steelworkers Humanity Fund 
United Church of Canada - Latin American and Caribbean Division 
R6seau Quebkcois sur l'Int6gration Continentale (RQIQ: 
ACAMS Association canadienne des avocats du mouvement syndical 
ADEESE (UQAM) 
AEP et AECSP (polytechnique) 
AGEPA 
AGEUQAR et AEEESUQAR (UQAR) 
AGEUQAT(UQAT) 
AGEUQO(UQO) 
AGEUQTR(UQTR) 
Alternatives 
Amnistie international - Section canadienne francoPhone 
AQOCI Association qudbdcoise des organisations de coop6ration internationale 
CADEUL et AtUtS (Laval) 
CAP Monde (Vers une convergence pour Pavenir des peuples du monde) 
Centrale des syndicats d6mocratiques (CSD) 
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Centrale des syndicats du Qu6bec (CSQ) 
Centre de fernmes du pays de Maria-Chapdelaine 
Centre de fernmes Mieuxt6tre de Jonqui&re 
Centre populaire de Roberval 
CERD-McGill Centre d'dtudes sur les r6gions en ddveloppement 
CISO Centre international de solidaritd ouvri6re 
Comitd d'environnement de Chicoutimi 
Comit6 des droits sociaux d'Alma 
Confdddration des syndicats nationaux (CSN) 
Conseil central de Montr6al m6tropolitain (CSN-CCMM) 
Corporation de ddveloppement communautaire des Bois-Francs 
CQDE Centre qudb6cois du droit de Yenvironnement 
CSN-CCMM Conseil central de Montrdal 
CSQ Centrale des syndicats du Qu6bec 
CUSO-Qudbec 
Ddveloppement et paix 
FAtCUM (U de Montrdal) 
FECQ Fdddration 6tudiante colldgiale du Qudbec 
Fdddration canadienne des 6tudiantes et dtudiants (FCEE) Section Qudbec 
Fdddration des fernmes du Qudbec (FFQ) 
FEUQ Fdddration 6tudiante universitaire du Qudbec 
FEUS et REMDUS (Sherbrooke) 
FIIQ Fdddration des infirmi6res et infirmiers du Qudbec 
Forum Social Qudbec-Apalaches 
FTQ Hddration des travailleurs et travailleuses du Qudbec 
GRIC-UQAM Groupe de recherche sur Vint6gration continentale, Universitd de 
Qudbec a Montreal UQAM 
Ligue des droits et libert6s 
MAGE-UQAC (UQAC) 
Mouvement d'dducation populaire et d'action communautaire du Qudbec 
(MtPACQ) 
Regroupement d'dducation populaire d'Abitibi-Tdmiscamingue (RtPACT) 
Regroupernent des organismes d'dducation autonome de la Mauricie (ROM) 
RQGE Rdseau qu6bdcois des groupes dcologistes 
Service budgdtaire et communautaire d'Alma 
Service budg6taire et communautaire de Chicoutimi 
Service budgdtaire populaire de St-Fdlicien 
Solidarit6 Nord-Sud des Bois-Francs 
SPGQ Syndicat de professionnelles et professionnels du gouvernement du 
Qudbec 
SPQ Solidaritd populaire Qudbec 
SSMU (McGill) 
Syndicat de la fonction publique du Qu6bec (SFPQ) 
Syndicat des professionnelles et professionnels du gouvernement du Qudbec 
(SPGQ) 
Table des groupes populaires de la C6te-Nord. 
Table r6gionale des organismes volontaires d'dducation populaire (TROVEP) 
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Montdrdgie 
TROVEP Montrdal 
Alliance for Responsible Trade (ART): 
AFL-CIO 
Agricultural Missions, Inc. 
Alliance for Democracy 
American Friends Service Committee 
American Lands Alliance 
Campaign for Labor Rights 
Center of Concern 
Committee for New Priorities 
Development GAP 
Ecumenical Program on Central America and the Caribbean 
Friends of the Earth - U. S. 
Global Exchange 
Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy 
Institute for Policy Studies, Global Economy Project 
INTERCONNECT 
International Labor Rights Fund 
Kensington Welfare Rights Union 
Maryknoll Off ice for Global Concerns 
Mexico Solidarity Network 
Oorders of Friar Minor, Peace and Integrity of Creation Council-English 
Speaking Council 
Public Services International, Inter-American Regional Office 
Resource Center of the Americas 
Rural Coal ition/Coalici6n Rural 
Tennessee Industrial Renewal Network 
Union of Needletrades, Industrial and Textile Employees 
United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America 
United for a Fair Economy 
United Methodist Women's Office for Economic Justice 
U. SJLabor Education in the Americas Project 
Witness for Peace 
Women of Color Resource Center 
Women's EDGE 
individuals: 
Bruce Jay, Center for Labor Research and Studies, Florida International 
University 
Rob Scott, Economic Policy Institute 
Rede Brasileira Pela Integraýäo dos Povos (REBRIP): 
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ActionAid Brasil 
AGAPAN 
CDH Palmas 
CEDEC 
CEPIA Cidadania, Estudo, Pesquisa, Informaggo e A95o 
Criola 
CUT Central Onica dos Trabalhadores - Nacional 
CUT - Rio de Janeiro 
DIEESE 
FAOR 176rum da Amaz8nia Oriental 
FASE Federag5o de 6rgaos para a Assistancia Social e Educacional 
FNU- Federagilo Nacional dos UrbanitArios da CUT 
Fundaggo Vit6ria AmazOnica 
ICEM 
IBASE - Instituto Brasileiro de Anfises Sociais e Econ6micas 
INESC - Instituto de Estudos S6cio-Econ6micos 
Instituto Terrazul 
Jubileu Sul 
Marcha Mundial das Mulheres 
lPDH- Instituto Palmares de Direitos Humanos Amauri Queiroz 
MST - Movimento dos Sem Terra Daniel da Silva 
Nova Pesquisa e Assessoria cm EducaqAo 
PACS - Instituto Politicas Alternativas para o Cone Sul 
Ser Mulher 
Red Alexicana de Acci6n contra el Libre Comercio (RMALC): 
CIEPAC Centro de Investigaciones Econ6micas y Politicas de Acci6n 
Comunitaria 
CILAS Centro de Investigaci6n Laboral y Asesorfa Sindical 
CMDPDH Comisi6n Mexicana de Defensa y Promoci6n de los Derechos 
Humanos 
CODEHUTAB Comitd de Derechos Humanos de Tabasco 
DAS Desarrollo, Ambiente y Sociedad 
DECA Equipo Pueblo 
Factor X (Tijuana) 
FAM Foro de Apoyo Mutuo Frente Autdntico del TrabaJo 
FAT Frente, Autdntico del TrabaJo 
FDAL Frente, por el Derecho a la Alimentaci6n 
Fronteras Comunes 
GEA Grupo de Estudios Ambientales 
MCD Movirniento Ciudadano por la Democracia 
Secretariado Social Mexicano 
Seminario Permanente de Estudios Chicanos y de Fronteras 
SIPRO Servicios Infortnativos Procesados 
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Alianza Chilena para un Comercio Justo y Responsible (ACJR): 
ROLAC Oficina Regional para Amdrica Latina y el Caribe de Consumer's 
International 
CONADECUS Corporaci6n Nacional de Consumidores y Usuarios 
Asociaci6n de Inmigrantes por una Integraci6n Lati-noamericana 
Escuela de Ingenierfa Cornercial de la Universidad Bolivariana 
Red Internacional de Gdncro y Comercio - capitulo Chile 
CODEPU Corporaci6n de Promoci6n y Defensa de los Dcrechos del Pueblo 
IEP Programa de Economia Ecol6gica del Instituto de Ecologfa Polftica 
Interamerican Regional Labor Organization (ORIT): 
Argentina: Confederaci6n General del Trabajo - CGT 
Barbados: Barbados Workers Union Solidarity House - BWU 
Brazil: Central Unica de Trabajadores - CUT; Confederaci6n General de 
Trabajadorcs - CGT; Fuerza Sindical. - FS 
Canada: Canada Labour Congreso - CLC 
Chile Central Unitaria de Trabajadores - CUT 
Colombia: Confederaci6n de Trabajadores de Colombia - CTC 
Costa Rica: Confederaci6n de Traba adores Rerum Novarum - CTRN 
Dominica: WAWU 
Ecuador: Confederaci6n Ecuatoriana de Organizaciones - CEOSL 
El Salvador: Central de Trabajadores Democrdticos - CTD 
United States: American Federation of Labour and Congress - AFL-CIO 
Guatemala: Confederaci6n de Unidad Sindical de Guatemala - CUSG 
Guyana: Guyana Trades Union Congress - GTUC 
Honduras: Confederaci6n de Trabajadores de Honduras - CTH; Confederaci6n 
Unica de Trabajadores de Honduras - CUTH 
Jamaica: Jamaican Confederation of Trade Unions - JCTU 
Japan: APRO 
Mexico: Confederaci6n de Trabajadores de Mdxico - CTM; Confederaci6n 
Revolucionaria de Obreros Campesinos - CROC; Uni6n Nacional de 
Trabajadores 
Montserrat: Monserrat Allied Worker'Union - MAWU 
Nicaragua: Confederaci6n de Unificaci6n Sindical - CUS; Central Sandinista 
de Trabajadores - CST 
Panama: Confederaci6n de Trabajadores de la Republica de Panama - CTRP; 
Convergencia Sindical - CS 
Paraguay: Central Unica de Trabajadores - CUT 
Peru: Confederaci6n Unitaria de Trabajadores - CUT 
Dominican Republic: Confed. Nacional. de Trabajadores Dominicana - CNTD; 
Confederaci6n de Traba adores Unitarios 
Trinidad and Tobago: National Trade Union Centre of Trinidad - NATUC 
Venezuela: Confederaci6n Trabajadores de Venezuela - CTV 
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ORIT partner organisations: 
Belize: National Trade Union Congress of Belize - NTUBC 
Colombia: Central Unitaria de Trabajadores - CUT 
El Salvador: Uni6n Nacional de Trabajadores Salvadoreflos - UNTS, Uni6n 
Nacional de Trabajadores Campesinos - UNOC; Coordinadora Sindical de 
Trabajadores Salvadoreflos - CSTS 
Guatemala: Unidad Sindical de Trabajadores de Guatemala - UNSITRAGUA; 
Central de Trabajadores del Campo - CTC 
Nicaragua: Asociaci6n de Trabajadores del Campo - ATC 
Suriname: Algemeen Verbond van Vakverenigingen de Moederbond - AVVS 
Uruguay: Plenario Intersindical de Trabajadores-Convenci6n Nacional de 
Trabajadores - PIT-CNT. 
Latin American Confederation of Peasant Organisations (CLOQ: 
Argentina: Movimiento Campesino de Santiago del Estero (MOCASE); 
APENOC 
Belize: Belize Association of Producers Organization (BAPO) 
Bolivia: Federaci6n Nacional de Mujeres Campesinas de Bolivia "Bartolina 
Sisa" (FNMCB-BS); Confederaci6n Sindical Unica de Trabajadores 
Campesinos de Bolivia (CSUTCB); Confederaci6n Sindical de Colonizadores 
de Bolivia (CSCB/FTQ 
Brazil: Movirniento, Sin Tierra (MST); Movimento, dos Atingidos por Barragens 
MAB; Confederacao Nacional dos Trabalhadores na Agricultura (CONTAG); 
Articulacao Nacional de Mulheres Trabalhadoras Rurais (ANMTR); Comissao 
Pastoral da Terra (CPT); Movimento dos Pequenos Agricultores (MPA) 
Chile: Asociaci6n Nacional de Mujeres Indigenas (ANAMURI); El Surco; 
Confederaci6n Nacional Sindical Campesina e Indfgena de Chile (NEHUEN). 
Colombia: Asociaci6n Nacional de Usuarios Campesinos-Unidada y 
Recconstrucci6n (ANUC-UR); Federaci6n Nacional Sindical Unitaria 
Agropecuaria (FENSUAGRO) 
Costa Rica: Mesa Nacional Campesina 
Cuba: Asociaci6n Nacional de Agricultores Pequefios (ANAP) 
Ecuador: Federaci6n Nacional de Organizaciones Campesinas Indfgcnas y 
Negras del Ecuador (FENOCIN); Confederaci6n Unica Nacional de Afiliados 
al Seguro Campesino (CONFEUNASSC). 
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Guatemala: Coordinadora Nacional Indigena, y Campesina (CONIC). 
Honduras: Consejo Coordinador de Organizaciones Campesinas de Honduras 
(COCOCH). 
Mdxico: Central Campesina Cardenista; Coordinadora Nacional Plan de Ayala 
(CNPA); Uni6n Nacional de Organizaciones Regionales Campesinas 
Aut6nomas (UNORCA); Central Independiente de Obreros Agrfcolas y 
Campesinos (CIOAQ. 
Nicaragua: Asociacion de Trabajadores del Campo, Nicaragua 
Paraguay: Movimiento Campesino Paraguayo (MCP) 
Peru: Confederaci6n Campesina del Per6 (CCP) 
Dominican Republic: Confederaci6n Nacional de Mujeres del Campo 
(CONAMUCA) 
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